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Abstract 
Introduction: Values have been widely researched within social psychology, particularly 
with regards to their effects on behaviour, but their application to mental health has been 
largely neglected.  Some psychological therapies acknowledge the importance of values 
(e.g. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy) but their approaches to using values within 
therapies has not been empirically tested.  The Schwartz model of values (Schwartz, 1992; 
Schwartz et al, 2012) has been demonstrated to be related to some mental health constructs 
and offers a potentially systematic way of understanding the dynamic relationships between 
values and mental health.  
 
Aims: The current research aimed to investigate the relationship between obsessionality 
and values within a non-clinical sample, and to demonstrate the relationship between 
priming values and behaviours related to obsessionality.  In doing so it draws upon the 
Schwartz model of values and the social psychology literature on the effects of priming 
values on value congruent behaviour.  More specifically, it investigated whether individuals 
primed with obsessionality related values (conservation values) performed more 
obsessionality related behaviours and whether obsessionality related behaviours occurred 
more in those with high pre-dispositions of obsessionality.  The role of responsibility beliefs 
and the importance of value centrality were also investigated.  
 
Methods: A between-subjects experimental design was employed, with 90 participants (an 
obsessionality/conservation values prime group, n=30; a non-obsessionality/openness 
values prime group, n=30; and a control group, n=30).  Univariate statistics, correlations and 
chi-square analyses were used to test the hypotheses.  All participants completed a 
measure of values (PVQ-21), as well as measures of obsessionality (VOCI, SOAQ) and 
responsibility beliefs (RAS).  All participants also completed two further tasks which 
incorporated obsessionality behaviours of checking, ordering and cleaning. 
 
Results: The obsessionality values primed group demonstrated more cleaning behaviour 
than the controls and non-obsessionality primed group.  Relationships between the priming 
tasks and other behaviours were not significant.  Levels of obsessionality related behaviours 
were found to not significantly differ between those with high and low obsessionality or 
responsibility pre-dispositions.  High levels of responsibility beliefs were found to be related 
to self-transcendence value priorities as expected but high obsessionality beliefs were not 
found to be significantly related to conservation value priorities. 
 
Conclusions: This study provides empirical support for considering the values that 
individuals with obsessionality related difficulties hold, through demonstrating that bringing to 
mind obsessionality related values can lead to obsessionality related behaviour in a non-
clinical sample.  It also highlights the motivational underpinnings of obsessionality with 
regards to individuals needing substantial motivations to engage in obsessionality related 
behaviours in line with current conceptualisations of obsessionality related mental health 
difficulties.  The results are discussed with reference to the existing literature and the clinical 
implications are outlined.  The strengths and limitations of the research and ideas for future 
research are also presented. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
The current study investigated the links between values and the construct of 
obsessionality.  Chapter one introduces the concept of values and how they can 
motivate behaviour.  It goes on to introduce values in relation to mental health 
problems, and focuses in on the construct of obsessionality.  It also introduces the 
Schwartz model of basic values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 
Cieciuch, Vecchione, Davidov, Fischer et al, 2012) as a way to investigate values in 
relation to mental health constructs. This is followed by a systematic review which 
aims to investigate the evidence base for how priming values cognitively can lead to 
value congruent behaviour to demonstrate the utility of this methodology for the 
current study.  It concludes with the outline for the current study and the hypotheses.  
Chapter two focuses on the methodology of the current study giving details of the 
procedures and measures used throughout.  Chapter three presents the results of 
the study providing descriptive results first, followed by statistical analysis in relation 
to the hypotheses.  Chapter four critically discusses the results of the study and 
considers the implications, the relationship to existing literature and clinical practice, 
directions for future research and the limitations.  
 
1.2 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 
 
Values are relevant to many different psychological theories and therapies (i.e. 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Hayes, 1994; Positive Psychology, Seligman 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Narrative Therapy, White & Epston, 1990; Person 
Centred/Client Centred Counselling, e.g. Rogers, 1951.  However, while the topic of 
values has been a prominent area of research within social psychology, there is a 
relative lack of research in the area of values related to mental health. 
 
This research aims to investigate how values are linked to the construct of 
obsessionality, in a non-clinical sample, by drawing on the Schwartz (1992, 2004; 
Schwartz et al, 2012) model of basic  human values and existing research 
concerning the impact of activating values to motivate behaviour (e.g. Maio, Pakizeh, 
Cheung & Rees, 2009a; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Karremans, 2007; Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trotschel, 2001; Hart & Albarracin, 2009).   
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The chapter will introduce the concept of social values and how they are defined.  It 
will go on to introduce the Schwartz (1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 2012) model of 
basic values, give details of how values can be measured and also how they can be 
activated to motivate behaviour.  It will then focus on the relationship between values 
and mental health and the role of values in a range of therapies for mental health 
difficulties.  An overview of obsessionality will then be provided including the 
definition and measurement of obsessionality and the relationship of obsessionality 
to values and other mental health variables. 
 
The process of activating values will be put forward as a methodology for studying 
the link between values and behaviours in relation to obsessionality.  A systematic 
review on the evidence base in relation to the role that activating values has on 
motivating behaviour will be presented.  The chapter will then conclude with outlining 
the research questions and hypotheses of the current study. 
 
1.3 CONCEPTUALISING AND DIFFERENTIATING VALUES 
 
1.3.1 Defining values  
 
There is generally common agreement among researchers that values represent 
desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in peoples’ lives 
(e.g. Schwartz, 1994; Seligman, Olson & Zanna, 1996).  There are several 
components that are believed to make up the concept of human values and which 
are implicit in the writings of many theorists (e.g. Feather, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; 
Rokeach,1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).  Schwartz (1992) outlined these 
components as: 1) values are beliefs which are linked inextricably to affect, 2) values 
refer to desirable goals that motivate action, 3) values transcend specific actions and 
situations, 4) values serve as standards or criteria, and 5) values are ordered by 
importance. 
 
In the early 1950s Allport, Vernon & Lindzey (1951) designed a typology of values in 
which peoples’ ‘stable preferences’ for all kinds of private and societal behaviours 
were categorised.  This early values structure relied on a conceptualisation of values 
14 
 
as fixed and stable elements which is far removed from the understanding of values 
today (e.g. Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). 
 
Rokeach (1973; 1979) moved the focus towards the notion that each individual 
creates a very personal and flexible hierarchy out of the values available in their 
culture.  He used the idea of terminal values which refer to desirable end-states of 
existence (goals we would like to achieve during our lifetime) and instrumental 
values which refer to preferable modes of behaviour (i.e. means of achieving the 
terminal values) to understand the individual’s value structure.  He postulated that 
the values individuals learn develop into a value structure over time through 
experiences in which two values are placed in conflict, forcing the individual to 
choose one value over the other (Rokeach, 1973). 
 
There is evidence that the initial development of values is thought to occur through 
social interactions with role models such as parents and teachers (e.g. Parks & 
Guay, 2009).  However, there are many factors that can contribute to the values an 
individual will develop with the individual’s needs (e.g. Maslow, 1954), traits, 
temperament, culture (e.g. Meglino & Ravlin, 1998), socialisation (e.g. Schwartz & 
Bardi, 1997), and personal experiences (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; 
Inglehart, 1997) all playing a part (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011).   
 
Building on the work of Rokeach, Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) 
has moved values research into new territory with the development of his circular 
model of values which provides a framework for how values are related to each other 
in terms of their underlying motivations.  Various researchers have commented on 
the theoretical and empirical grounding of the Schwartz model (e.g. Silfver, Helkama, 
Lonnqvist & Verkasalo, 2008; Parks & Guay, 2009; Maio et al, 2009a).  To develop 
it, Schwartz chose values and value items based on a large quantity of empirical 
data from different cultures around the world.  Schwartz then performed 
multidimensional scaling of these data and identified a set of values that are 
understood similarly across various cultures (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz & 
Savig, 1995).  This means that there is a cross cultural consensus on which of these 
values are compatible and which are in conflict.  The Schwartz model is described in 
further detail below. 
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1.3.2 Schwartz model of values 
 
The original theory of basic human values developed by Schwartz (1992) included 
ten motivationally distinct, broad and basic values that were seen to be derived from 
three universal requirements of the human condition: needs of individuals as 
biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and 
welfare needs of groups (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz et al, 2012).  These ten 
values are intended to include all the core values recognised in cultures around the 
world.  Each of the ten values can be characterised by describing its central 
motivational goal which are outlined in Table 1.1 below.  There are also individual 
values that fit within the ten broad basic values and examples of these are also 
included in Table 1.1. 
 
The unique characteristic of the Schwartz values theory is that it offers a way of 
understanding the relationships between different values rather than looking at each 
value in isolation.  As noted by previous values theorists (i.e. Rokeach, 1973) 
individuals potentially develop their own values system through choosing certain 
values over others in different situational contexts.  Schwartz attempts to give 
evidence for this theory by developing it further and proposing a coherent system of 
dynamic relations underlying the 10 basic values which can help to explain individual 
decision making, attitudes and behaviour (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz et al, 
2012).  This extended theory postulates that some values are more closely linked 
with regards to their motivational goals than others.  For example, pursuing 
conformity values may be compatible with the pursuit of security values as seeking 
to fit in and conform to one’s social group is likely to be closely related to maintaining 
the stability of the social group and feeling safe (Schwartz, 1992).  In contrast, the 
pursuit of self-direction values may conflict with the pursuit of conformity values as 
seeking to be creative and pursuing independence may obstruct actions aimed at 
following social expectations and norms (Schwartz, 1992; Maio et al, 2009a).   
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Table 1.1 – motivational goals of the ten basic values (and examples of individual 
values incorporated within the broad basic values) (Schwartz, 1994, pp 22; Schwartz, 
Sagiv & Boehnke, 2000, pp316).   
 
Basic Value Motivational goal (individual values) 
Self-Direction Independent thought and action - choosing, creating, exploring 
(creativity, freedom, curious, independent, choosing own goals) 
Stimulation Excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an 
exciting life) 
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying 
life, self-indulgent) 
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to 
social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential) 
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and 
resources (social power, wealth, authority, preserving public 
image) 
Security Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships and of 
self (family security, national security, social order, clean, 
reciprocation of favours, sense of belonging) 
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or 
harm others and violate social expectations or norms (obedient, 
self-discipline, politeness, honouring parents and elders) 
Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that traditional culture or religion provide the self (accepting my 
portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, humble, moderate) 
Benevolence Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact (helpful, forgiving, honest, loyal, 
responsible) 
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature (social justice, broadminded, 
world at peace, wisdom, a world of beauty, unity with nature, 
protecting the environment, equality) 
 
 
Schwartz (1992) used data from 67 countries to investigate the overall structure of 
values across cultures and Figure 1.1 below displays the circular structure that was 
subsequently described.  The circular arrangement is a continuum of motivations 
rather than each value being a discreet entity (Schwartz, 1992; Davidov, Schmidt & 
Schwartz, 2008).  The closer two values are in either direction around the circle, the 
more similar their underlying motivations and the more distant from each other the 
values are, the more conflicting their underlying motivations.  
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Figure 1.1 – Circular structure of the Schwartz values theory (Schwartz, 1992)  
 
The structure shown in Figure 1.1 can also be described with reference to two 
orthogonal dimensions.  The self-enhancement versus self-transcendence 
dimension places power and achievement values as opposed to universalism and 
benevolence values.  Both of the former emphasise the pursuit of self-interests, 
whereas both of the latter involve concern for the welfare and interests of others.  
The conservation versus openness to change dimension places security, conformity 
and tradition values as opposed to self-direction and stimulation values.  All of the 
former emphasise self-restriction, order and resistance to change whereas both of 
the latter emphasise independent action, thought and feeling and readiness for new 
experience.  Hedonism is thought to share elements with both openness and self-
enhancement (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz et al, 2012).   
 
Supporting evidence for this motivational structure has been found in multiple studies 
(e.g. Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Vecchione, Casconi & 
Barbaranelli, 2009; Bilsky, Janik & Schwartz, 2011; Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012).  
This research points to broad underlying motivations that may constitute a universal 
principle that organises value systems.  This makes the model applicable across 
cultures and research has indicated that while there can be differences in value 
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priorities across cultures the structure beneath the values systems is still the same 
(e.g. Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1999).  The same also holds true for there being 
individual differences in value structures (e.g. Fischer & Schwartz, 2011) as well as 
possible gender differences (e.g.  Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).  Generally, it has been 
found that people may differ substantially in the importance they attribute to the 
different values that comprise the ten basic values (see Table 1.1), but the same 
structure of motivational oppositions and compatibilities apparently organises their 
values (Schwartz, 1992; 1994).   
 
This integrated motivational structure of relations among values makes it possible to 
study how whole systems of values, rather than single values, relate to other 
variables which has been an area of interest for much research.  For example, 
Pakizeh, Gebauer & Maio (2007) have shown that the circular nature of the model 
reflects not just conscious decisions but also the way that values are represented in 
memory i.e., people rate a second value in terms of importance quicker when the 
two values are directly related or directly opposing rather than intermediate.  Other 
research has demonstrated that the structure of intra-individual value change occurs 
in line with the circular structure of motivations such that when one value changes in 
importance the ones closest to it in the Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz et 
al, 2012) values structure will also change (Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh & Soutar, 
2009). 
 
More recently Schwartz has refined his values theory to include further basic values 
and further overarching motivational dimensions to the circular structure (Schwartz, 
2006, 2009; Schwartz et al, 2012).  This followed on from evidence that some of the 
existing values had more than one conceptually distinct component which might be 
better represented by being separate values (e.g. Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, 
Vecchione & Barbaranelli, 2006; Vecchione, Caprara, Schoen, Gonzalez-Castro & 
Schwartz, 2012) and recently Schwartz et al (2012) demonstrated that there is 
evidence for 19 distinct values within the revised model.  Figure 1.2 illustrates these 
19 values and also shows the overarching motivational dimensions.  It can be seen 
that the conservation and self-enhancement quadrants together form an anxiety 
related motivation.  That is, a motivation to perform actions and pursue goals that are 
related to pursuing self-protection and avoiding anxiety.  In contrast the openness to 
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change and self-transcendence quadrants form an anxiety free motivation related to 
self-expansion and growth rather than protection (Bilsky, Janik & Schwartz, 2011).  
The other dimension that Schwartz suggests in his revised model is that 
conservation and self-transcendence quadrants form a society based motivation 
whilst openness to change and self-enhancement quadrants form an individual 
based motivation.  Within this motivational dimension the motivation to develop as an 
individual versus a motivation to fit in with society and look after others is at play.   
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Revised model of basic human values (Schwartz et al, 2012, pp 669) 
 
Evidence for these over-arching motivations has been demonstrated.  For example, 
Schwartz, Sagiv & Boehnke (2000) investigated value priorities and the correlations 
with worry about societal problems by asking participants across five nations to 
complete questionnaire measures of their value priorities and worries related to 
seven life domains.  They found that the extent to which respondents worried about 
issues such as poverty, hunger and destruction of the environment was strongly 
positively correlated to universalism values with other positive correlations with the 
other socially oriented values (see left side of Figure 1.2).  The personal focus values 
in contrast (see right side of Figure 1.2) were all negatively correlated with the same 
worries (Schwartz et al, 2000).   
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In terms of the anxiety dimension, Schwartz et al, (2012) suggest that pursuit of 
conservation and self-enhancement values (bottom section of Figure 1.2) is 
generally intended to serve the motivation of coping with anxiety due to uncertainty 
in the social and physical world.  For example, people may seek to maintain social 
order (security values - conservation) and control threat (power values – self-
enhancement).  With reference to this, Schwartz, Sagiv & Boenke (2004) found 
significant positive correlations between personal worries (such as concern about 
own personal health, safety, success and finances) and self-enhancement values 
and negative correlations with self-transcendence values and some openness values 
which offers some support for this anxiety dimension.   
 
Indeed, further evidence from the European Social Survey (ESS) adds support to the 
assumption that conservation and self-enhancement values reflect greater personal 
anxiety than self-transcendence and openness values (top section of Figure 1.2) 
(Bilsky, Janik & Schwartz, 2011).  The ESS is carried out with representative national 
samples from at least 24 countries throughout Europe and incorporates a measure 
of the Schwartz basic values.  Analysing this data, Bilsky et al (2011) pointed to 
patterns of correlations between values and certain questions from the ESS to 
support the anxiety dimension.  For example, questions such as “how happy are 
you?”, “how satisfied are you with life as a whole?” and “how often have you felt 
cheerful and in good spirits in the last two weeks?” were correlated positively with all 
self-transcendence and openness values and negatively with all conservation and 
self-enhancement values.  This indicates that those individuals pursuing 
conservation and self-enhancement values may be putting their available resources 
in directions associated with generally trying to cope with life rather the pursuing 
wider well-being. 
 
In support of this, Schwartz (2008) also relates the structural opposition between 
conservation and openness values to Higgins’ (1997) two basic regulation systems.  
Conservation values are proposed to motivate self-regulation of the avoidance of 
punishment and prevention of loss in line with one of Higgins’ (1997) systems.  
Security needs, obligations and the threat of loss trigger this system which is in line 
with the underlying motivations of the conservation quadrant as these values guide 
attention and action to avoid or overcome actual or potential danger (Schwartz et al, 
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2012).  Openness values in contrast are believed to motivate self-regulation of the 
pursuit of rewards and promoting gain in line with the second of Higgins’ (1997) 
systems.  Nurturance needs, ideals and opportunities to gain trigger this system 
which is in line with openness values as these guide attention and action to 
rewarding social, intellectual and emotional opportunities (Schwartz et al, 2012).   
 
To support this, Van-Dijk & Kluger (2004) found that manipulations of promotion and 
prevention had the same effects as manipulations of openness and conservation 
values respectively.  In the first part of their experiment they manipulated the context 
of a scenario based measure such that participants were focused on a promotion 
(attainment) goal or a prevention goal and then gave them either positive or negative 
feedback on their performance to see what effects this had on subsequent ratings of 
effort.  It was found that those in the promotion condition who received positive 
feedback were likely to exhibit more effort as were those in the prevention condition 
who received negative feedback (Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004).  In their second study, 
Van-Dijk & Kluger (2004) found that those who had openness value priorities 
responded more strongly to positive feedback in terms of effort while those with 
conservation value priorities responded more strongly to negative feedback in line 
with the postulated link between Higgins’ (1997) self-regulation systems and the 
conservation and openness values motivational underpinnings (Schwartz et al, 
2012). 
 
Schwartz et al (2012) argue that the recent model provides greater precision of 
prediction and explanation for a diverse set of attitudes and beliefs than the original 
theory.  They also provide evidence that the 19 values model can still be collapsed 
into the original 10 values model and the four quadrants (Schwartz et al, 2012) and 
as such can add to the original model without invalidating it.  Likewise, whilst the 
overarching dimensions were not explicitly identified in the original model, they can 
still be related to the motivations underlying the 10 values as well as the 19 values 
due to the expanded model being based on the pre-existing model (Schwartz et al, 
2012).  As yet, there is no empirical evidence to support the assumption that the 19 
values model can better predict or explain behaviours than the original model, and 
as such the original values model is focused on within this research whilst taking 
account of the overarching categories that have more recently been identified.   
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1.3.3 Measuring Values 
 
There are several measures available for determining an individual’s values.  These 
include the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS, 1968) which is based on the values 
identified by Rokeach (1968; 1973), and more recently measures based on the 
Schwartz (1992) basic values theory; the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 
1992) and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 1994). 
 
Generally, one of the main difficulties when considering the measurement of values 
is the social desirability of responses and the issue that all values can be deemed by 
the majority of participants as being important to them.  This is related to the values 
as ‘truisms’ hypothesis work of Maio & Olsen (1998) which has shown that 
individuals will usually strongly support any given value as being important without 
necessarily having coherent arguments or evidence for why those values are 
important (Maio & Olsen, 1998; Karremans, 2007).  Indeed, Schwartz (1992) found 
in pre-tests of the SVS that respondents rated most values as being from mildly to 
very important to them which has important implications for developing measures 
that are meaningful  and prompted Schwartz to account for this in the response 
format of the final version of the SVS as described further below. 
 
Main measurement approaches are based on either a ranking procedure (as used in 
the RVS) or a Likert response scale (used for the SVS and PVQ).  The ranking 
system has ecological validity in the sense that individuals are asked to place one 
value as being more important than another in much the same way as someone 
would choose one value over another in everyday situations (Parks & Guay, 2009).  
However, a ranking system limits the statistical analyses that can be carried out and 
is potentially more difficult to administer to respondents, particularly outside of the 
laboratory context. 
 
There are also difficulties with a Likert response as the social desirability of the 
values being measured can lead to a positive bias in value responses (Schwartz, 
1992) and there are more general difficulties in that one individual may use a Likert 
scale very differently from another individual (e.g. Schwartz, 2005).  However, 
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Schwartz (2005) suggests methods for overcoming biased responding such as by 
standardising the scores for each individual (see methods section 2.6.3.2). 
 
Utilising a values measurement tool that is based on the Schwartz model (Schwartz 
1992, Schwartz  et al , 2012) allows for outcome data to be interpreted in line with 
the theoretical underpinnings of this.  Both the SVS and the PVQ have been 
investigated in terms of their psychometric properties, especially in relation to how 
well they fit with the Schwartz model (e.g. Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Hinz, Brahler, 
Schmidt & Albani, 2005; Vecchione, Casconi & Barbaranelli, 2009).   
 
The SVS includes items that express an aspect of the motivational goal of one value 
from the original model, for example in item 1, equality (equal opportunity for all) 
would be expressing the value of universalism (See Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1).  
Respondents are asked to rate the importance of each value item as a guiding 
principle in their life on a 9 point scale from ‘of extreme importance’ through to 
‘opposed to my values.’  The scale is non-symmetrical to allow more answer options 
around the ‘important’ end of the scale on account of the positive response bias seen 
when developing the measure (Schwartz, 1992).  The score for the importance of 
each value is the average rating given to items related to each value.  The number of 
items related to each value differs from three (hedonism) to eight (universalism) 
reflecting the conceptual breadth of the values as can be seen in Table 1.1.  Using 
both multi-dimensional scaling and confirmatory factor analysis methods, the SVS 
has been found to be a valid measure in terms of its convergent and discriminant 
validity as well as in terms of its relationship to the proposed model of underlying 
motivations (e.g. Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Fontaine, Poortinga, Delbeke & 
Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz, 1994, 2006). 
 
The Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz, 1994) is an alternative to the SVS 
developed to be less cognitively demanding (as the SVS is considered to be a very 
abstract measure of values) in order to measure the ten basic values (Figure 1.1) in 
samples of children, the elderly and those not educated in Western schools 
(Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz et al, 2001).  This questionnaire was 
also developed in order to assess whether the values theory is valid independent of 
the SVS method of data gathering and to provide a more implicit way of measuring 
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values.  The measure includes short verbal ‘portraits’, gender-matched with the 
respondent.  Each portrait describes a person’s goals, aspirations or wishes that 
point implicitly to the importance of a value (e.g. Item 3 – It is important to her that 
every person in the world be treated equally.  She believes that everyone should 
have equal opportunities in life).  Respondents answer ‘how much like you is this 
person?’ and respond from ‘very much like me’ through to ‘not like me at all’.  
Respondents’ own values are inferred from their self-reported similarity to people 
described implicitly in terms of particular values.  This measure therefore captures 
the person’s values without explicitly identifying values as the topic of investigation.  
The number of portraits corresponding to each value varies from three to six, again 
reflecting the conceptual breadth of the values as with the SVS.  Evidence from 
multi-dimensional scaling and confirmatory factor analysis studies gives support for 
the PVQs convergent and discriminant validity (e.g. Schwartz, 2005; Schwartz et al, 
2001) and its proposed underlying structure (e.g. Vecchione et al, 2009; Cieciuch & 
Schwartz, 2012; Cieciuch & Davidov, 2012) although there is some evidence that the 
structure of the four quadrants is more strongly supported than that of the individual 
values (Hinz, Brahler, Schmidt & Albani, 2005). 
 
The PVQ was also adapted for use in the European Social Survey (ESS).  The ESS 
version includes 21 PVQ items some of which have been revised in order to better 
cover the content of the ten basic values (Schwartz, 2003).  The 21 item ESS 
version was developed in order to capture the conceptual breadth of the ten basic 
Schwartz values rather than to gain homogeneity in distinguishing between the ten 
values.  This has led to some concerns about its discriminant validity (e.g. Davidov, 
2010; Davidov, Schmidt & Schwartz, 2008) although Bilsky, Janik & Schwartz (2011) 
analysed data from three rounds of the ESS and concluded that the vast majority of 
their analyses support the Schwartz (1992) circular model of human values.  
However, it has been recommended by some researchers (e.g. Hinz et al, 2005; 
Verkasalo, Lonnqvist, Lipsanen & Helkama, 2009) that individual value scores from 
the PVQ-21 should be collapsed into a more general ‘quadrant’ score rather than 
being used as individual scores.  This method has been shown by Verkasalo et al 
(2009) to provide an extremely robust two-dimensional structure which heightens the 
reliability of the 10 basic values being presented on their own.  They note the 
difficulty with reliability of the short PVQ in being able to measure all ten basic values 
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and instead advocate for investigating the two value dimensions.  The difficulties with 
the discriminant validity have been found to be within the separate quadrants rather 
than across quadrants (i.e. there is weak discriminant validity between conformity 
and tradition value items on the questionnaires but both of these values fall within 
the quadrant of ‘conservation’ rather than being values within two separate 
quadrants – see Figure 1.1). 
 
It is important to have effective and valid instruments available for measuring values 
in order to be able to investigate links between values and other concepts (e.g., 
personality, attitudes and emotions) and behaviour, and to be able to interpret 
relationships between these variables.  The Schwartz theory (Schwartz 1992; and 
Schwartz et al 2012) provides a useful framework for understanding the relationship 
between values and behaviours in terms of the underlying motivational conflicts.  As 
such the PVQ and SVS are both useful measures of values when utilising this theory 
and have been considerably researched in terms of their validity (e.g. Schwartz & 
Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz, 1994, 2006; Vecchione et al, 2009; Cieciuch & Schwartz, 
2012; Bilsky et al, 2011).  However, the PVQ has advantages over the SVS as it is a 
more implicit measure of an individual’s values which is less abstract to complete 
(Schwartz, 2003) and it also offers a short form version that has evidence for its 
utility (e.g. Bilsky et al, 2011; Verkasalo et al, 2012). 
 
1.3.4 The purpose of values 
 
Evidence suggests that people attach great importance to their values as 
behavioural guides and see them as central to their self-identity (e.g. Feather, 1990; 
Maio & Olsen, 1998; Schwartz, 1992; Seligman & Katz, 1996; Verplanken & Holland, 
2002).   
 
As such, our value priorities can affect choices about ordinary activities such as 
which newspapers we read and which films we watch (Allport, Vernon and Lindzey, 
1951), which university course we apply for (Feather, 1988), which political parties 
we vote for (Helkama, Uutela & Schwartz, 1991; Schwartz, 1996) and which career 
choices we make (Feather & O’Brien, 1987; Dawis, 1991).  These value-based 
choices, in turn, can create life circumstances to which we may also then adapt our 
values.  For example, Schwartz & Bardi (1997) show that people upgrade the 
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importance of values that they can readily attain while downgrading the importance 
of values, the pursuit of which, are blocked.  This also supports the view that unlike 
concepts such as needs or traits there is an element of choice in our values (Roccas, 
Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 2002) and that our individual values systems can be 
flexible depending upon our circumstances at any given time such that we will 
prioritise different values relative to the situation we find ourselves in (Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012). 
 
There is also evidence from work by Feather (1982a, 1982b & 1995) that the values 
people hold affect their initiation of new goal-directed activities, the degree of effort 
that they put into an activity, how long they persist at an activity in the face of 
alternative activities, the choices they make between alternative activities, and how 
they feel when an activity is undertaken (Feather, 1982a, 1982b, 1995). 
 
However, there is conflicting evidence around whether values predict intentional 
behaviours.  Some studies provide strong correlations between values and value 
congruent behaviours (e.g. Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Savig & Schwartz, 1995; 
Schwartz, 1996) indicating that there is a link, while others find values to be poor 
predictors of behaviours (e.g. Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996).  Subsequently, there has 
been much research attempting to identify which factors can mediate the relationship 
between values and behaviours (e.g. Karremans, 2007; Maio, Olsen, Allen & 
Bernard, 2001; Maio & Olson, 1995; Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman & Chaiken, 
2009; Pozzebon & Ashton, 2009).  Generally the evidence suggests that values only 
affect behaviour when they are activated in some way, such as through a priming 
procedure where the value is bought into the individual’s mind via an experimental 
task (e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Maio et al, 2009a; Parzuchowki & Wojciszke, 
2014).   
 
1.3.5 Activating Values 
 
Activation refers to a process whereby the value and its related concepts are 
‘primed’ or ‘readied for action’ cognitively.  Maio (2010) views values as mental 
representations that are available to us under certain circumstances (i.e. when we 
think about our values or when they are activated) while Schwartz & Bilsky (1987) 
defined them as cognitive structures (beliefs) that can be retrieved from memory 
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when needed.  These conceptualisations of values as cognitive structures are 
congruent with the theory of ‘spreading activation’ which suggests that activating one 
concept cognitively  spreads to activate other related concepts as well (e.g. Quillian, 
1962, 1967; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Bargh, 1996; Shroder & Thagard, 2012).   
 
There has been research to suggest that typical instantiations of values (i.e. more 
widely recognised examples) are more likely to lead to value congruent behaviour 
than atypical instantiations.  For example, Maio, Hahn, Frost & Cheung (2009) 
primed participants with a typical instantiation of the value equality (a black person) 
or an atypical instantiation of the value equality (a left-handed person) and found that 
those primed with the typical instantiation were more likely to engage in egalitarian 
behaviour (allocating points more fairly between groups) than those primed with 
atypical instantiations.  This suggests that priming the typical instantiation led to 
higher levels of activation because the concept was more recognisable as an 
example of a discriminated against population and so activation was more likely to 
spread to other related concepts of equality and fairness.  The atypical instantiation 
in contrast may not be a concept that the participant had considered before in 
relation to equality meaning that spreading activation to other related concepts was 
less likely to occur (Maio et al, 2009b).  There is also evidence to suggest that values 
that are most important to us are more accessible (e.g. Bardi, 2000), hence the 
effects of value centrality seen in many studies (eg. Verplanken & Holland, 2002).    
 
There are several levels of priming that have been put forward by researchers as 
being capable of activating values in this way (e.g. Bardi & Goodwin, 2011; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Maio & Thomas, 2007).  Generally there are conscious (effortful) 
methods, such as using persuasion or asking people to give arguments as to why 
certain values are important to them (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a; Karremans, 2007), and 
unconscious (non-effortful) methods, such as implicit priming tasks where an 
individual is asked to complete puzzles or word tasks themed around a specific value 
(e.g. Bargh, 2001; Hart & Albarracin, 2009; Verplanken, 2002; Maio et al, 2009a).  
There are also subliminal (non-effortful) methods where participants are asked to 
complete a task on a computer with subliminal primes flashed onto the screen (e.g. 
Neuberg, 1988; Smeesters, Wheeler & Kay, 2009).  Generally all of these 
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techniques have shown that they can be used successfully not only to prime values 
but to lead to value congruent behaviours.   
 
1.3.6 Summary of values section(s) 
 
Values have been defined as trans-situational, motivational concepts (Schwartz, 
1994) that can be linked to behaviour via mechanisms such as mental activation i.e. 
through priming tasks (e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Maio et al, 2009a,b).  The 
Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) has been empirically 
investigated by multiple researchers (e.g. Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Fontaine et al, 
2008; Vecchione et al, 2009; Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012; Cieciuch & Davidov, 2012) 
and has been used successfully in studies to understand the motivational conflicts 
underlying values and the subsequent effects of this on behaviour (e.g. Maio et al, 
2009a, Karremans, 2007). 
 
The Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) has also been explicitly 
linked to affect in terms of an underlying anxiety motivation dimension (Schwartz 
2006, 2009; Schwartz et al, 2012).  Evidence for this dimension suggests that there 
are certain values (i.e. conservation quadrant values) that are linked to a 
motivational need to protect against or avoid anxiety (e.g. Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004).  
There are also links between the anxiety dimension of the Schwartz model and 
general well-being (Bilsky et al, 2011) as well as relationships to more specific 
worries (Schwartz, Sagiv & Boenke, 2004). 
 
As we know that values can affect behaviour (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a, Karremans, 
2007) and that certain values are related to anxiety (Schwartz et al, 2012; Schwartz, 
Savig & Boenke, 2004) it is also possible that values can affect behaviours related to 
our mental health and well-being.  Indeed, several therapies for mental health 
difficulties utilise values as part of therapy (e.g. Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy; Hayes, 1994; Positive Psychology; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  
This will be explored further in the following section. 
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1.4 VALUES AND MENTAL HEALTH 
 
1.4.1 Overview 
 
This section demonstrates that values have a role to play within a mental health 
context by evidencing that the use of values in a therapeutic context is widespread 
and potentially extremely useful.  It also shows that at present there is a discrepancy 
between the ways that values are conceptualised within therapeutic contexts 
especially when compared with the general psychological literature around values 
and mental health and that current measures of values utilised within therapies are 
not empirically grounded.  This section also demonstrates that values have an 
important role to play in mental health by presenting evidence for links between 
values and mental health concepts. 
 
1.4.2 Role of values in therapies for mental health difficulties 
 
Many different therapies incorporate values as part of their approach to working with 
individuals with mental health difficulties.  For example, Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999); 
Narrative Therapy (White & Epston, 1990) ; Person-Centred/Client Centred 
Counselling (e.g. Rogers, 1951) and Positive Psychology Approaches (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) all use values in some way within their frameworks as do 
many others.  The common factor between all these therapies is that they seek to 
connect the individual with their value priorities in order for the individual to use these 
values to promote their well-being.  The method that the therapies utilise to do this 
as well as the extent to which this values work is the focus of the therapy varies.   
 
For instance, ACT (Hayes, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) focuses on 
moving an individual in a valued direction by helping them to build larger patterns of 
effective behaviour and helping them to experience what they feel and think ‘as it is’ 
and not ‘as it says it is.’  Hayes (1994) views values as qualities of action that can be 
instantiated in behaviour but not possessed like an object (i.e. values direct us 
towards goals and goal directed behaviour but are not the goals themselves).  ACT 
encourages clients to list values in different domains which then become the basis 
for setting achievable goals, performing concrete actions and living a ‘valued life’.  
Wilson & Murrell (2004) note that “… there is no good science that tells us precisely 
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how, in behaviour therapy, we can access the relative importance of these valued 
domains and harness them fully to our treatments” (pp 135; Wilson & Murrell, 2004).  
Generally values are derived within ACT through conversations between the 
therapist and client although there are several value clarification tools that have been 
designed to support this process.  For example, Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson (1999) 
developed a values assessment tool which asks clients to define values from nine 
domains; intimate relationships, family relations, friendships, career, education, 
recreation, spirituality, citizenship and health.  Other measures have since been 
designed which tend to focus on the same domains generally such as the Valued-
Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens & Roberts, 2010) which looks 
at 10 domains, Hayes et al’s (1999) original nine domains and a parenting domain, 
and the Values Compass (Dahl, Plumb, Stewart & Lundgren, 2009) which provides 
the client with a visual summary of their values and current ratings with regards to 
how consistently they are living their lives in line with their values.  Tools such as the 
VLQ (Wilson et al, 2010) give a more standardised method to identifying values that 
could assist with further research in this area.  However, these measures were not 
empirically derived but have rather been developed by practitioners as tools to 
support their work with clients in therapy (Hayes, 2004).  Therefore, it is unclear 
whether these tools are valid measures beyond the fact that they appear to have 
ecological validity and make sense for clients. 
 
Positive Psychology (e.g. Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) utilises the Values In 
Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS; Seligman, 2001) which is conceptualised as 
identifying character strengths or virtues that the individual person may value.  These 
‘character strengths’ are then utilised in a similar way to ACT by giving valued 
direction to behaviours to increase positive affect and meaning in an individual’s life.  
Whilst Peterson & Seligman (2004) do not conceptualise these ‘character strengths’ 
as values explicitly, there are considerable overlaps between the 24 character 
strengths and the value domains identified by Schwartz (1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 
2000).  For example, character strengths measured by the VIA-IS include ‘fair, kind, 
modest, leadership, learning, perseverance’ and so on.  Many of these can be seen 
in Table 1.1 (section 1.3.2) which outlined the individual items that underlie the 10 
Schwartz (1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 2000) basic values.   
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Also, within the area of positive psychology, there has been some research into the 
links between character strengths and concepts such as life satisfaction which 
suggests reliable and robust links between the character strengths of hope, vitality, 
gratitude, love and curiosity with higher life satisfaction (Park, Peterson & Seligman, 
2004).  More widely, there has also been research into whether the VIA-IS can be 
used to determine a universal human nature in terms of commonalities across 
cultures.  This has stemmed from similar responses on the VIA-IS being found 
among large samples of US respondents (Park et al, 2004; Peterson et al, 2006) and 
UK respondents (Linley, Maltby, Wood, Joseph, Harrington, et al, 2007).  However, 
this research appears to be in its infancy and the possible links with theories of 
human values appears to have been largely ignored although Peterson & Seligman 
(2004) acknowledge that this is a useful direction to consider. 
 
Within narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990) values, along with intentions, hopes 
and commitments, are used to ‘thicken’ life stories meaning that they are used to 
give more meaning to the stories that the client tells about themselves and their 
lives.  This is used to give alternative directions in life that have meanings that are 
removed from whatever the ‘problem’ was that they were seeking therapy for.  In the 
narrative therapy context there is a general lack of empirical evidence (Etchison & 
Kleist, 2000) and there is no conceptualisation of values beyond however values are 
understood by the individual as the therapist does not exert their own understanding 
of concepts such as values onto the client (White & Epston, 1990).  This is a similar 
approach to that which might be taken in person-centred Counselling (e.g. Rogers, 
1951) with regards to the use of values in therapy.  As such, there appears to be little 
empirical evidence with regards to the approach these therapies take to utilising 
values. 
 
There do appear to be conceptual links between values within ACT (Hayes, 1994) 
and positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and values within the 
Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, Schwartz et al, 2012).  Particularly, Hayes 
(1994) considers values to be trans-situational in much the same way as Schwartz 
(1992, Schwartz et al, 2012) conceptualises values.  It is also of interest that both 
ACT and positive psychology use values as a way of setting behavioural goals in 
terms of clients living their lives in meaningful value directed ways (Hayes, 1994; 
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Hayes et al, 1999; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  This suggests that values 
are considered to have motivational underpinnings within these therapies that can 
affect behaviour consistent with the Schwartz theory (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; 
Schwartz et al, 2012) and evidence of the effects of priming values on behaviour 
(e.g. Maio et al, 2009a,b; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Karremans, 2007).  Due to 
these potentially converging conceptual understandings of values it would be useful 
to consider the utility of the Schwartz model (1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) within the 
domain of mental health.  This could provide the ACT and positive psychology 
approaches with the empirical grounding with regards to their understanding of 
values that currently appears to be lacking (e.g. Wilson & Murrell, 2004). 
 
1.4.3 Relationship between values and mental health 
 
There has been research into the relationship between values and several 
constructs relevant for mental health such as general wellbeing (e.g., Bilsky & 
Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 2011; Joshanloo & Ghaedi, 2009), self-esteem (e.g., 
Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, Helkama, Andreyeva, Benzmenova et al, 2009), worry (e.g., 
Schwartz, Sagiv & Boehnke, 2000) and emotions (Sortheix, Olakivi & Helkama, 
2013; Silfver et al, 2008).   
 
There are several avenues of research into how values affect well-being.  The first 
takes the perspective that there are healthy values and unhealthy values, in that 
some values are more positively related to well-being while others are negatively 
related (Deci & Ryan, 2000).  There is indeed evidence that having strong self-
direction values, which emphasise independent thought and action, generally 
predicts higher well-being while other values such as power, which emphasise the 
need for control over others and social prestige, predicts lower well-being (Bilsky & 
Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 2011).  Considered in a slightly different way there is 
evidence that intrinsic values (those that promote acceptance and affiliation, such as 
self-transcendence values) benefit well-being while extrinsic values (focused on 
material success and fame, such as self-enhancement values) tend to harm well-
being (e.g. Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Vansteenkiste, Durietz, 
Simons & Soenens, 2006).   
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However, there is conflicting evidence as to which values are related to positive well-
being and this is further complicated by different definitions of well-being used in 
different research.  For example, Joshanloo & Ghaedi (2009) investigated hedonic 
(happiness/pleasure) and eudaimonic (living well and actualising potential) aspects 
of well-being in relation to values within a sample of university students.  They found 
that there were more significant relationships between values and the social aspect 
of eudaimonic well-being than for the psychological aspect of eudaimonic or hedonic 
well-being.  They also found results that were generally inconsistent with their 
predictions based upon the Schwartz model and they concluded that future research 
should be clear on which aspects of well-being they are attempting to measure. 
 
Another area of research into values and well-being is around value discrepancies 
(e.g. Savig & Schwartz, 2000).  This approach suggests that when the individual’s 
values do not adhere to the values they perceive as being dominant in the 
environment it can cause affective responses (such as anxiety and low mood) which 
have a negative effect on well-being (Savig & Schwartz, 2000; Lonnqvist et al, 2009).  
Consistent with this, individual value structures have been theorised to be flexible, 
such that we are capable of changing our value priorities to enable us to pursue 
values which are open to us while downgrading the importance of values of which 
our pursuit is blocked (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997).  This has been postulated to be due 
to the fact that experiencing value discrepancies is uncomfortable to experience as it 
causes adverse affective responses (e.g. Rees & Maio, 2009; cited in Maio, 2010).   
 
Many researchers and theorists have highlighted the strong emotional component of 
values (e.g. Maio & Olsen, 1998; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).  There is 
evidence that individuals can experience dejection or agitation when beliefs about 
their values are manipulated so that they believe there are discrepancies between 
which values they think are important to them and which values the researchers 
report are important to them from questionnaire measures (Rees & Maio, 2009; cited 
in Maio, 2010).  Maio et al (2009b) have also demonstrated using a computer based 
task that participants are quicker to link emotions to values than they are to link 
cognitions or behaviours to values.  The authors suggest that this demonstrates that 
we have stronger emotional links to our values than cognitive or behavioural links as 
our emotional links appear to be activated faster.   
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In terms of the Schwartz theory of values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 
2012) there is evidence that certain emotional concepts, such as guilt and empathy, 
are strongly related to certain values and more weakly related to others in patterns 
consistent with the circular values model (Silfver et al, 2008).  In their research, 
Silfver et al (2008) asked participants to complete the SVS along with measures of 
guilt, shame and empathy (which included a measure of personal distress) and then 
investigated the correlations between values and the emotional measures.  They 
found that guilt and empathy were positively related to universalism, benevolence, 
tradition and conformity values and negatively related to power, hedonism, 
stimulation and self-direction values.  Other concepts such as shame and personal 
distress were only weakly related to values of any kind which the researchers 
suggest reflects the fact that voluntary control is less important for these concepts 
compared to the others (Silfver et al, 2008).  They conclude that generally self-
transcendence and conservation values appear to be compatible with pro-social 
emotional tendencies such as guilt and empathy while self-enhancement and 
openness do not.  This would support the Schwartz model’s (Schwartz et al, 2012) 
overarching dimension of social focus versus personal focus (see Figure 1.2) by 
suggesting that there are certain emotional responses which occur in relation to 
other people and that individuals who more strongly endorse pro-social values will 
experience these emotions to a stronger degree than those who endorse pro-
individual values. 
 
In relation to anxiety, Schwartz, Sagiv & Boehnke (2000) investigated the 
relationships between values and worry particularly with regards to the perceived 
discrepancy from the desired state of an object and personal values.  In the context 
of their research they defined worry as “an emotionally disturbing cognition that a 
state of an object (micro or macro) in some domain of life (health, safety etc.) will 
become (or become more, or remain) discrepant from its desired state” (Schwartz et 
al, 2000, pp311).  They suggest that this definition can apply to everyday worries that 
apply to all individuals, up to intense and uncontrollable worries associated with 
severe anxiety (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & Dupree, 1983).  Schwartz et al 
(2000) also found expected relationships between macro worries (societal level 
concerns) being positively related to self-transcendence value priorities, especially 
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universalism, and suggest this is because these individuals are more likely to be 
focused on others.  They also found that micro worries (personal level concerns) 
were positively related to self-enhancement value priorities, especially power, as 
these individuals are more likely to be focused on the self.  There were negative 
correlations of micro worries and openness as people who value new, challenging 
and uncertain outcomes are less concerned about uncertain personal 
consequences.  Security values failed to correlate with overall micro worries 
although they correlated positively and consistently across samples with the more 
specific micro and macro safety/health worries.  Thus, security values may sensitise 
people only to narrow security related concerns with regard to both self and others.  
Generally the authors conclude that worries as an aspect of subjective well-being, 
are related to negative emotional responses to perceived discrepancies that may 
motivate action to reduce those discrepancies (Schwartz et al, 2000). 
 
In relation to this, Sortheix, Olakivi & Helkama (2013) investigated values related to 
life events and subjective well-being within a general population sample over a 
fourteen year timespan.  They initially investigated whether individual value priorities 
would predict the number of life events and found that openness values were 
positively correlated to life events and conservation values were negatively 
correlated.  Importantly this was only the case for controllable life events meaning 
that the value priorities had an effect on the decisions and behaviours of the 
participants over time.  This is in line with the Schwartz model (1992; Schwartz et al, 
2012) as it would predict that those who endorse openness values would be more 
open to seeking out new experiences and might hence have more life events 
generally when compared to those who endorse conservation values who might 
avoid uncertain experiences in favour of the safety of known experiences (Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).   
 
Sortheix et al (2013) also found that over time there was an increase in conservation 
values within the community which correlated with a decrease in life events 
generally.  On a measure of psychological strain including questions about 
nervousness, anxiety, depression and feeling fearful  they found that psychological 
symptoms were negatively related to security, conformity and benevolence (i.e. the 
stronger these values the less psychological symptoms) and that psychological 
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symptoms were positively related to hedonism and stimulation.  They suggest that 
this was related to the increased life events seen in the openness values leading to 
more impact on emotional resources.  There were mediating factors in this study to 
suggest that when personal values match the prevailing values in the environment, 
people enjoy higher well-being.  This study therefore gives support to the value 
discrepancies hypothesis with regards to the relationship between values and well-
being but also gives evidence in support of the opposing motivations of the 
conservation and openness value dimensions within the Schwartz model (Sortheix et 
al, 2013). 
 
Finally, Lonnqvist et al (2009) carried out an investigation into the relationships 
between the Schwartz (1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) values model and self-esteem in 
samples from five different nations.  They discovered overall that openness values 
(self-direction and stimulation) were positively related to self-esteem as were self-
enhancement values (achievement and power).  In contrast, conservation values 
(tradition) were negatively related to self-esteem as were self-transcendence values 
(universalism and benevolence).   There were, however some important differences 
seen between the samples such that those samples which showed that achievement 
and universalism values were important at a group level were more likely to show 
positive relationships between these values and higher self-esteem.  In contrast, 
self-direction and hedonism values were more positively related to self-esteem in 
samples where these values were less important at the group level (Lonnqvist et al, 
2009).  This suggests that the pursuit of some values is more likely to occur when 
there is already high self-esteem as would be expected in openness values where 
the focus is on the individual being independent and seeking out new experiences 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012). 
 
1.4.4 Summary of values section(s) 
 
Generally, there is evidence that values are related to certain mental health 
constructs such as general wellbeing (e.g. Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994; Joshanloo & 
Ghaedi, 2009) and that the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 
2012) can be particularly related to emotions such as guilt and empathy (Silfver et al, 
2008) as well as different aspects of worry (Schwartz, Sagiv & Boehnke, 2000).  In 
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addition to this, values have a potential role to play in the experience of high self-
esteem (e.g., Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, Helkama, Andreyeva, Benzmenova et al, 2009). 
 
There are also clear conceptual overlaps between the ways that values are 
conceptualised within some therapies for mental health conditions such as ACT 
(Hayes, 1994) and Positive Psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and the 
ways that values are conceptualised in the social psychology literature (e.g. 
Schwartz et al, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012). 
 
1.5 OBSESSIONALITY AND MENTAL HEALTH 
 
1.5.1 Overview 
 
This section demonstrates the relevance of obsessionality related to mental health 
and provides a rationale for researching this concept.  It also describes how 
obsessionality is related to values and how obsessionality can be measured. 
 
1.5.2 Defining obsessionality  
 
Obsessionality refers to tendencies towards thinking or behaving in certain ways in 
certain situational contexts and it tends to connote a repetitive or persistent thought 
or impulse (Turner, Beidel & Stanley, 1992; Rachman, 1985). The presence of these 
unwanted and uncontrollable mental events typically is viewed as outside of the 
person’s control.  Obsessions can also be stimulated by external stimuli (Parkinson 
& Rachman, 1981) with stimuli in the environment such as sharp objects, certain 
words or persons cuing the onset of obsessional ideation.  Although obsessionality 
can also be considered as an adaptive skill within our culture in terms of allowing for 
a sharp but narrow focus on things that are important or need to be done it is most 
often considered in relation to mental health difficulties such as Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD).  In fact, there is evidence that obsessionality and OCD 
can be considered as existing along a continuum (e.g. Mathews et al, 2004; Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005). 
 
In terms of OCD there are usually ‘obsessions’ present in terms of consistent, 
repetitive thoughts or images which tend to be based around one of several 
themes(e.g. Rachman, 1985).  Common themes are fears of contamination, safety, 
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doubting of memory or perception, fears of transgressions (often related to religion), 
need for order or symmetry and unwanted intrusive thoughts of an aggressive or 
sexual nature (e.g. Calamari, Wiegartz & Janeck, 1999).  Commonly these 
obsessions are accompanied by behaviours that the individual performs in order to 
counteract the thoughts although this is not always the case.  Common compulsions 
are cleaning/washing, checking (i.e. locks, stove, plugs etc.), counting/repeating 
actions a certain number of times of until it feels right, arranging objects, touching or 
tapping objects, hoarding, seeking reassurance and list making (e.g. Thordarson, 
Radomsky & Rachman, 2004). 
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) 
includes the following definition for OCD: the presence of obsessions, compulsions, 
or both with obsessions defined as recurrent and persistent thought, urges, or 
images that are experienced as unwanted and that cause marked anxiety or 
distress.  The definition also includes that the person attempts to supress or ignore 
the thoughts, impulses or images or attempts to neutralise them with some other 
thought or action.  Compulsions are defined as repetitive behaviours (e.g. hand 
washing, ordering, checking) or mental acts (e.g. counting, repeating words silently) 
in response to an obsession or according to rules that must be applied rigidly.  This 
also includes the behaviours or mental acts being aimed at preventing or reducing 
distress or preventing some dreaded event or situation but that the behaviours are 
either not connected in a way that could realistically neutralise or prevent whatever 
they are designed to address or they are clearly excessive.  Along with this is the 
need for the obsessions or compulsions to be time-consuming and to cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of 
functioning (DSM-V, American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   
 
The definition for obsessionality to reach clinical levels therefore, clearly incorporates 
a behaviour symptomatology alongside any purely cognitive obsessionality as well 
as high levels of distress or anxiety (Salkovskis, Wroe, Gledhill, Morrison, Forrester 
et al, 2000).  There have also been shown within the clinical OCD population to be at 
least five subgroups of obsessionality (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999).  Within their study 
Calamari et al (1999) used a well-established clinical symptoms checklist to assess 
over 100 patients with OCD.  They used cluster analysis and identified five 
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subgroups of symptoms which they labelled; harming, hoarding, contamination, 
certainty and obsessionals (Calamari et al, 1999).  Previous attempts to identify 
subgroups using factor analysis techniques have shown similar results.  For 
example, Van Oppen, Hoeakstra & Emmelkamp (1995) found factors of; impulses, 
washing, checking, rumination and precision while Leckman, Grice, Boardman, 
Zhang, Vitale et al (1997) found four factors of; obsessions and checking, symmetry 
and ordering, cleanliness and washing and hoarding.  There appear to be common 
obsessional difficulties around contamination/cleaning and checking as evidenced 
from these symptom clusters appearing across a range of studies (e.g. Calamari et 
al, 1999 Van Oppen et al, 1995 & Leckman et al, 1997).  There is evidently a wide 
range of symptomatology that falls within the concept of obsessionality within clinical 
populations and which could also apply to non-clinical populations as explored 
below. 
 
1.5.3 Obsessionality and the Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
continuum 
 
Obsessionality appears to exist on a continuum from normal experiences of 
obsessionality in the general population up to the experience of severe OCD in 
clinical populations which has an effect on general functioning in everyday life (e.g. 
Clark & Rhyno, 2005).  In support of this idea there is evidence that obsessionality in 
terms of obsessions and intrusive thoughts occurs in the general population to a 
significant degree without the presence of OCD (e.g. Rachman & DeSilver, 1978; 
Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984; Belloch, Morillo, Lucero, Cabedo & Carrio, 2004).  For 
example Rachman & DeSilver (1978) discovered that 80% of a non-clinical sample 
commonly experience intrusive thoughts.  These studies indicate that it is not 
unusual for individuals to experience obsessional thoughts and that it is not the 
occurrence of obsessive thoughts themselves that constitutes the presence of 
difficulties.  Rather it is the frequency, duration and intensity of intrusive thoughts and 
the appraisal of the thoughts that is different between clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Rachman & DeSilver, 1978; Salkovskis, Richard & Forrester, 1995; 
Rassin & Muris, 2006).   
 
However, a recent review of the evidence suggests that there are also differences  
between clinical and non-clinical samples in the content of intrusive thoughts as well 
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as the appraisals and responses leading from them and concludes that the 
continuum hypothesis cannot rest on the frequency of intrusive thoughts alone (Berry 
& Laskey, 2012).    
 
Further evidence for a continuum comes from studies which have investigated the 
structure of obsessionality, as it relates to OCD, in non-clinical samples which have 
found that the structure is similar within both populations (e.g. Mathews et al, 2004; 
Coles et al, 2003).  Mathews et al (2004) used the Leyton Obsessional Inventory 
short form in an undergraduate sample and found four factors within the data.  This 
suggested that the structure of obsessional symptoms were similar in their 
undergraduate student sample to previous findings among samples of young people 
with OCD.  Generally, the prevalence, symptom structure and patterns of 
comorbidity with anxiety and ADHD were similar to the patterns seen in adolescents 
with OCD.  They also found that 90% of their participants endorsed two or more 
OCD symptoms, 65% endorsed five or more and 10% endorsed fifteen or more.  
Similarly, Coles et al (2003) investigated ‘not just right’ experiences in undergraduate 
samples using the Padua Inventory.  They  found that the large majority of their 
student sample (95%) endorsed having experienced at least one ‘not just right’ 
experience over the past week and almost all of them (99%) reported having 
experienced one at some time in their lives.  Intensity and importance ratings of ‘not 
just right’ experiences rather than frequency was found to be related to the level of 
OCD features present consistent with previous research (e.g. Salkovskis, et al, 1995; 
Rassin & Muris, 2006). 
 
The continuum hypothesis (Clark & Rhyno, 1995) forms the basis for current 
cognitive models of OCD, which suggest that the individual’s understanding of 
‘normal’ obsessions is central to the development and maintenance of OCD.  
Cognitive theories emphasise the role of beliefs that ‘fuse’ the intrusive thought to 
the event or action (Rachman, 1997, 1998), that one is responsible for harm coming 
to oneself or others (Salkovskis, 1985, 1999) and meta-cognitive beliefs about the 
significance of intrusive thoughts (Wells & Matthews, 1994; Wells, 1997).  Such 
beliefs determine the individual’s appraisal of the intrusive thoughts, which in turn 
determines subsequent cognitive and behavioural responses.  As such there are 
significant mediating factors in the relationship between obsessionality in the clinical 
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and non-clinical populations (e.g. Salkovskis, 1985, 1999; Rachman, 1997, 1998, 
2002; Rheaume, Ladouceur, Freeston & Letarte, 1995) 
 
1.5.4 Obsessionality and Responsibility 
 
The cognitive model of OCD (Salkovskis et al, 1999, 2000) defines responsibility as 
the belief of possessing a pivotal role for leading or preventing negative and crucial 
outcomes, and highlights the central role of dysfunctional responsibility schema or 
inflated sense of responsibility for both the development and the maintenance of 
OCD (Rheaume et al, 1995).  Perceived sense of responsibility has most likely 
attracted the most attention in the literature with regards to mediating factors of OCD 
(e.g. Rachman, 1998, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1993; Salkovskis, Wroe, 
Gledhill, Morrison & Forrester et al, 2000; Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon & 
Thibodeau, 1993).  Many of these studies have found that there are increased levels 
of responsibility beliefs present in clinical OCD samples of the population when 
compared to other populations.  For example, Freeston et al (1993) used self report 
questionnaires of responsibility beliefs and found that patients with OCD endorsed 
more beliefs related to responsibility than a group of matched controls.  Arntz, 
Voncken & Goosen (2007) demonstrated that when responsibility was 
experimentally manipulated so that there was either a high or a low responsibility 
condition, subjective OCD like experiences and checking behaviour were higher in 
OCD patients in the high responsibility condition than all other groups. 
 
The relationship between excessive sense of responsibility and Obsessive-
Compulsive Symptoms (OCS) has also been supported in both clinical and non-
clinical samples by clinical observations (Rachman, 1993; Tallis, 1994), by 
questionnaires (e.g. Foa et al, 2002; Salkovskis et al, 2000), by experimental 
manipulations (e.g. Ladouceur et al, 1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995) and by 
treatment efficacy studies which showed that therapies focusing on inflated sense of 
personal responsibility (Freeston, Rheaume & Ladouceur, 1996; Ladouceur et al, 
1996) induced significant changes in the OCS.   
 
Rachman (2002) suggested that in checking behaviour the focus of inflated sense of 
responsibility is on mainly protecting others rather than self from coming to harm, 
whereas in cleaning behaviour self-focused responsibility operates.  Moreover, 
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empirical studies suggest that inflated responsibility has a more identifiable and 
salient role in checking symptoms as compared to cleaning symptoms (e.g. Foe et 
al, 2002; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Rachman, 1998; Rheaume, Freeston, Dugas, 
Letarte & Ladouceur, 1995; Smari, Glyfadottir & Halldorsdottir, 2003, Yorulmaz et al, 
2006). 
 
In terms of the measurement of responsibility there have been several measures 
devised including the Responsibility Appraisal Questionnaire (RAQ; Rachman, 
Thordarson, Shafran & Woody, 1995) and the Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RAS; 
Salkovskis et al, 1999) among others.  Generally these measures are used within the 
context of determining the level of disproportionate responsibility beliefs that an 
individual holds with regards to feeling responsible for harm.  The RAQ consists of 
four potentially different factors; responsibility for harm, responsibility in social 
contexts, positive outlook towards responsibility and thought-action fusion (Rachman 
et al, 1995). Rachman et al (1995) suggest that the thought-action fusion subscale is 
particularly significant within a clinical sample of participants with OCD.  The RAS 
(Salkovskis et al, 1999) is a measure designed using items initially generated by 
clinicians with expertise in using the cognitive theory of OCD within their clinical 
practice and validated using clinical and non-clinical samples (Salkovskis et al, 
2000).  As such, it is a strong measure with regards to its relevance to clinical 
practice and has been shown to have high internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability (Salkovskis et al, 2000). 
 
1.5.5 Measuring Obsessionality  
 
Many different measures have been developed to assess OCD symptoms and 
obsessionality over the years.  These generally take the form of self-report measures 
and are used to assess symptom severity and/or to monitor treatment progress 
(Overduin & Furnham, 2012).   
 
Some of the most widely used measures are the The Padua Inventory – Revised (PI-
R; van Oppen, Hoekstra & Emmelkamp, 1995), the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory 
- Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al, 2002), the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive 
Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson, Radomsky & Rachman, 2004), the Clark-Beck 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (CBOCI; Clark, Antony, Beck, Swinson & Steer, 
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2005) and the Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al, 
2010). The large number of measures and the revisions made to them over time 
reflects the difficulties with conceptualisations of obsessionality in the clinical 
population and the wide range of different symptom subscales that measures 
attempt to address.  For example, almost all measures include subscales for 
checking and contamination but there are differences in the inclusion (or not) of other 
subscales such as ordering, hoarding, obsessions, rumination, precision, impulses to 
harm and numbers (Overduin & Furnham, 2012).  There are also some differences 
in the scales that are used to complete the measures with some taking a rating scale 
approach for symptom severity (e.g. the VOCI) or distress caused by symptoms (e.g. 
OCI-R, PI-R) while others ask respondents to choose one of a series of statements 
(e.g. CBOCI) and some measure levels of distress created by symptoms as well as 
other factors such as effects on life (e.g. DOCS).  All of the measures above have 
been developed and validated utilising samples of clinical and non-clinical 
populations and have generally been found to have good internal consistency 
(Overduin & Furnham, 2012). 
 
The Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory is a 55 item self-report 
questionnaire used to measure six different subscales of symptoms related to 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.  Thordarson et al (2004) developed the tool to 
eliminate several limitations of the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
(MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977).  Thordarson et al (2004) note that the MOCI 
was developed in the ‘pre-cognitive’ era and as such misses some important aspects 
of assessing OCD as well as being limited in its measurement of the range of 
obsessive compulsive phenomena (the MOCI is biased towards washing and 
checking but is limited on obsessions, hoarding and covert rituals for example).  
They also note that the negatively worded items on the MOCI were confusing and 
difficult for respondents to answer.  The VOCI may be more useful when considering 
measuring obsessionality symptoms in non-clinical populations due to its simple 
response format which relies on experience of symptoms rather than distress caused 
by symptoms which might show less variability among non-clinical samples.  There 
is evidence for excellent internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the VOCI 
(Thordarson et al, 2004; Radomsky et al, 2006) and there are good correlations 
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between overall scores on the VOCI and other measures of OCD in clinical and non-
clinical samples (Thordarson et al, 2004). 
 
One of the disadvantages of the VOCI is that it lacks items which assess the 
ordering aspects of obsessionality.  As such the Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging 
Questionnaire (Radomsky & Rachman, 2004) is a useful tool as it was developed as 
a specific measure for ordering/arranging symptoms of OCD.  The authors argue 
that this aspect of OCD has often been overlooked even though it appears to be a 
common aspect in many OCD presentations.  They therefore set out to develop a 
measure to capture these phenomena in particular, that could then be used 
alongside other measures, particularly the VOCI.  Several previous reviews 
recommend that the SOAQ is used alongside the VOCI in order to provide a more 
rounded measure of OCD symptoms (e.g. Overduin & Furnham, 2012; Gonner et al, 
2010). 
 
1.5.6 Values related to obsessionality 
 
Considering the links between values and obsessionality we should first consider the 
links between the widest related concepts i.e. the anxiety dimension of the Schwartz 
model and the anxiety function of obsessionality.  Obsessionality is commonly 
conceptualised as being related to anxiety and this is almost certainly the case when 
considering obsessionality within clinical populations with regards to cognitive 
models of OCD (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 2000).  The Schwartz (1992, 1996; Schwartz 
et al, 2012) model conceptualises one of the outlying motivational dimensions as 
being between anxiety (conservation and self-enhancement values) versus anxiety-
free values (openness and self-transcendence values).  Schwartz et al (2012) 
postulate that this dimension represents a motivation of coping with anxiety due to 
uncertainly in the social and physical world (i.e. protecting self and others from harm, 
maintaining the status quo and avoiding unpleasant situations) versus a motivation 
of seeking to grow and expand where new opportunities are actively sought.  As 
previously highlighted there is evidence to support this anxiety dimension of the 
values model (e.g. Schwartz et al, 2000; Sortheix et al, 2013).   
 
Within obsessionality, the relationship to anxiety can be understood in similar terms 
with the individual seeking to reduce threat to self and others, wanting to protect and 
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maintain normality and trying to avoid unpleasant feelings.  This is supported by the 
literature around obsessionality within non-clinical populations which have 
highlighted that the experience of obsessionality often occurs alongside anxiety (e.g., 
Coles et al, 2003).  It is also consistent with the cognitive theory of obsessionality 
(e.g. Salkovskis et al, 2000) which highlights that it is the misinterpretation of 
obsessional thoughts that creates anxiety and makes obsessional difficulties 
increase and that disproportionate responsibility beliefs around needing to prevent 
harm to the self and others also contributes to this anxiety (e.g. Foa et al, 2002; 
Salkovskis et al, 2000; Ladouceur et al, 1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995).  As 
previously highlighted, there is evidence for the anxiety dimensions of the Schwartz 
model but most specifically linked to obsessionality, Schwartz et al (2000) found 
significant positive correlations between personal worries and values on the anxiety 
dimension and negative correlations between the same worries and values on the 
anxiety-free dimension and Schwartz (2011) also shows that the anxiety dimension 
is related to lower well-being than the anxiety-free dimension.   
 
Considering this a step further there is also evidence that the conservation quadrant 
versus the openness quadrant in particular is linked to mental health in terms of links 
to Higgins’ (1997) two basic regulation systems as well as links to personality factors 
such as openness, extraversion, conscientiousness and more tentatively to 
neuroticism (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz & Knafo, 2002).  Roccas et al (2002) 
measured the big five personality factors (extraversion, agreeableness, openness, 
neuroticism and conscientiousness) alongside a measure of the Schwartz (1992) 
values.  They discovered that conscientiousness is linked to conservation values 
(conformity in particular) while openness and extraversion were both related to 
openness values (self-direction and stimulation respectively).  They also found that 
two facets of neuroticism were related to the Schwartz values model in opposite 
directions.  An angry/hostile and impulsive facet of neuroticism was correlated 
positively with openness values (particularly stimulation) and negatively with 
conservation values (especially conformity).  An anxious, depressed, self-conscious 
and vulnerable facet of neuroticism was correlated positively with conservation 
values (particularly tradition) and negatively with openness values (such as 
stimulation).  However, the authors note that the correlations for the neuroticism 
findings were smaller than those for openness, extraversion and conscientiousness.  
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Taken together these findings, along with the commonalities between the 
motivations underlying the conservation quadrant and the first Higgins’ (1997) self-
regulation system add support to the conservation quadrant being related to anxiety 
as conscientiousness is related to taking care over actions and wanting to get things 
right while neuroticism is often linked to mental health difficulties such as anxiety 
(Roccas et al, 2002).  The findings of Roccas et al (2002) also add to the evidence 
for the openness quadrant being related to an anxiety-free dimension as those who 
are open and extrovert tend to be outgoing and seeking of new experiences in line 
with the second of Higgins’ (1997) self-regulation systems and the Schwartz model 
(Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 2012). 
 
Evidence also suggests that, related to anxiety to some extent, higher self-reported 
levels of guilt and empathy are positively related to conservation quadrant values 
and negatively related to openness values (Silfver et al, 2008) which could be related 
to the pro-social and pro-self dimension of the Schwartz model (Schwartz et al, 
2012).  This would also fit with the theory around obsessionality as the responsibility 
element of clinical obsessionality is often in relation to preventing harm to others as 
well as the self (e.g. Foa et al, 2002; Salkovskis et al, 2000).  In support of the 
anxiety motivation of the Schwartz model (Schwartz et al, 2012) as well as the links 
to the conservation quadrant, Sortheix et al (2013) found that psychological 
symptoms were negatively related to security and conformity values, which in the 
context of their study was related to the fact that people who gave importance to 
these values were more likely to avoid new potentially threatening experiences and 
were more likely to attempt to maintain the status quo.  This adheres with the 
motivations proposed to underlie the anxiety dimension as well as the motivations 
underlying the proposed mechanism of anxiety within clinical obsessionality (e.g. 
Salkovskis et al, 2000).   
 
There is also some experimental evidence that priming conservation values led to 
participants prioritising the use of cleaning wipes to clean their hands sooner while 
priming the opposing openness value led to this same cleaning behaviour being 
delayed (Maio et al, 2009a).  In their experiment Maio et al (2009a) primed 
participants with either conservation values or openness values in order to activate 
these values cognitively.  They then asked participants to complete some consumer 
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surveys with a leaky pen followed by the participants completing a colouring task 
with sticky crayons.  They measured the interval at which the participant asked for a 
non-leaky pen or used a cleaning wipe and found that the conservation primes asked 
sooner or used a wipe sooner compared to the openness primed participants who 
tended to delay the same behaviours (Maio et al, 2009a).  The researchers suggest 
that this is related to the underlying motivational conflicts between the conservation 
and openness quadrants in regards for the needs for security and sense of order.  
This study could also be particularly related to proposed links between conservation 
values and obsessionality, as cleaning is a behaviour often linked with the concept of 
obsessionality in a clinical obsessionality based context (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999 
Van Oppen et al, 1995 & Leckman et al, 1997). 
 
In terms of individual basic values and their links to mental health and obsessionality 
it has been demonstrated that although security values were not related generally to 
micro worries they were correlated positively and consistently across samples with 
safety and health worries specifically (Schwartz et al, 2000).  Tradition values have 
also been negatively related to self-esteem (Lonnqvist et al, 2009) to macro worries 
generally (Schwartz et al, 2000) and to guilt-proneness along with conformity values 
(Silfver et al, 2008).  The Schwartz et al (2000) finding in particular is relevant to 
obsessionality as research has highlighted that contamination and worries about 
harm are common in presentations of obsessionality (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999 Van 
Oppen et al, 1995 & Leckman et al, 1997).  However, the findings with regards to the 
tradition and conformity values are also of interest as taken together these results 
suggest that there are significant links between these values and different constructs 
relevant to mental health. 
 
Going a step further there are individual values within the broader basic values 
(Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 2000) which could be more linked to our 
understanding of obsessionality.  Considering the subtypes of obsessionality 
commonly found within clinical populations e.g. checking, ordering and fears of 
contamination (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999 Van Oppen et al, 1995 & Leckman et al, 
1997) there are links with values within the security basic value as well as the 
conservation quadrant more generally (e.g. Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz et al, 2000).  
Specifically, as shown in Table 1.1 (section 1.3.2), the security basic value 
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incorporates values of being clean and healthy which on the basis of the evidence 
above could be individual values that are most closely related to concepts of 
obsessionality (e.g. Schwartz et al, 2000; Calamari et al, 1999). 
 
1.5.7 Summary of obsessionality section(s) 
 
Obsessionality as a concept is clearly related to mental health particularly when 
considering difficulties such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD; APA, 2013).  
There is also substantial evidence that obsessionality in relation to OCD can be seen 
as a continuum that is present to some extent within the non-clinical population (e.g. 
Clark & Rhyno, 1995; Mathews et al, 2004; Coles et al, 2003).  This suggests that 
the study of obsessionality within non-clinical populations is useful and valid for 
application to our understanding of clinical obsessionality.  Responsibility has also 
been indicated as a significant factor that appears to mediate the relationship 
between the experience of obsessionality as being non-clinical or clinical (e.g. 
Salkovskis et al, 2000).  Of particular importance, considering the links generally 
between values and mental health and the use of values in therapies, there are also 
the foundations for clear links between obsessionality and values within the 
Schwartz model (e.g. Schwartz et al, 2000; Sortheix et al, 2013; Maio et al, 2009a).  
This suggests that investigating these links could be useful in terms of better 
understanding how obsessionality is linked to values and how these links can be 
utilised in a clinical context. 
 
1.6 PRIMING VALUES AND THE EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOUR: THE EVIDENCE 
 
1.6.1 Aim and scope of current literature review 
 
This literature review aimed to identify research in the area of priming social values 
that adds to our understanding of how priming values relates to behaviour.  As such 
it aimed to highlight the relevant research findings in relation to this and offer a 
critique of the work in this area.  Bringing the relevant research together in this way 
will enable a comprehensive understanding of the factors that contribute to the 
effects seen on behaviours when priming values. 
 
1.6.2 Systematic review question 
 
What evidence is there for the effect of priming social values on behaviour? 
49 
 
 
1.6.3 Method 
 
1.6.3.1. Literature Review Strategy 
 
The following databases were searched for articles relevant to the systematic review 
question: PsycINFO, PsycArticles, SCOPUS and Web of Science.  For SCOPUS the 
search was limited to subject areas ‘Psychology’ and ‘Social Sciences’ in two 
separate searches.  The Web of Science search was limited to research area 
‘Psychology.’ 
 
1.6.3.2 Search terms 
 
The following search terms were used to search each of the above databases 
individually: 
 
Prim* value* (PsycINFO & PsycArticles only, see below) 
Prim* value* and behav* (PsycINFO & PsycArticles only, see below) 
Priming value* 
Priming value* and behav* 
Primed value* 
Primed value* and behav* 
Activating value* 
Activating value* and behav* 
Manipulating value* 
Manipulating value* and behav* 
 
It was found that searching for prim* in combination with the terms value* and 
behav* returned over 10,000 results in the majority of the databases searched (aside 
from PsycINFO and PsycArticles which combined returned 754 results for these two 
searches).  This led to the full search terms ‘priming’ and ‘primed’ being used instead 
in the other databases. 
 
1.6.3.3 Inclusion criteria 
 
The following inclusion criteria were used to choose articles relevant to the 
systematic review question.  If a study did not meet the inclusion criteria it was 
excluded from the review.  Definitions of social values, priming and behaviour used 
for the inclusion criteria are included below. 
 
 Articles must be empirical studies 
 Study must have human participants 
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 Participants must be adults (age 18 and over) 
 Articles must be in English 
 Studies after 1980 until 2014 
 Published in peer reviewed journal 
 Study must include a priming task 
 Study must include at least one social value as the primed variable 
 Study must include a measure of behaviour that follows the priming task 
 
1.6.3.4 Defining social values  
 
For the purposes of this systematic review an operationalised definition of social 
values was necessary to determine those values that were relevant to the research 
question.  It was decided that the values being primed in the studies must be trans-
situational in nature to be in line with common definitions of social values in the 
existing values literature (i.e. Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).  That is, they 
must not be goals but rather concepts that can lead to a variety of goals around the 
concept.  It was also felt that wider concepts such as religion, morality, politics, 
culture, etc. should not be the priming focus as these are all concepts that include 
values as a part of them but are not exclusively related to values.  For example 
morality includes values but also incorporates virtues, norms, practices and identities 
to name only a few (e.g. Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014).  If studies were priming 
concepts, such as religion, rather than the individual values then it would be difficult 
to gauge the extent to which these studies were actually priming values rather than 
one of the other underlying variables. 
 
1.6.3.5 Defining behaviour 
 
A working definition of behaviour was also required to be able to complete the 
systematic review.  It was decided that any studies that measured observable 
behaviour should be included as should those that measured intentions to behave in 
certain ways (i.e. providing contact details to be passed on to a charity to be 
contacted about volunteering, e.g. Arieli, Grant & Sagiv, 2013).  Studies which 
included choices/decisions were also included.  A review of the behaviours seen in 
the included studies is incorporated into the write up of the literature review below. 
 
1.6.3.6 Defining Priming 
 
For the purposes of this systematic review priming was defined as any task that was 
used intentionally by a researcher to bring to mind (consciously or unconsciously) a 
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desired value or values in a participant.  A review of the priming tasks that were used 
in the included studies is incorporated into the systematic review narrative that 
follows. 
 
1.6.3.7.Review process 
 
A total of 3498 articles were identified using the search terms and databases 
outlined above.  These articles were then reviewed by title and abstract for relevance 
to the topic of priming values and the effects on behaviour.  Articles that clearly did 
not meet all of the inclusion criteria were eliminated at this point.  This process left 
293 abstracts which were then examined by the researcher in more detail to ensure 
that they were eligible for inclusion in the review.  Following this process 218 of the 
articles identified via the original database searches were eliminated from the review 
for either being duplicates (142) or clearly not meeting criteria (80) leaving a total of 
71 articles.  The references for these remaining articles were then searched to 
identify any further relevant articles.  A further 8 articles were identified from the 
references and the abstracts of these articles were reviewed to ascertain whether 
they were likely to meet the inclusion criteria.  This process yielded a further 4 
articles to include in the review taking the total number of articles up to 79.  These 79 
articles were then retrieved as full text articles and were examined in closer detail.  
At this stage several of these articles were reviewed by the researcher and her 
supervisor together in order to clarify if they met the criteria.  Each article was 
considered in relation to the inclusion criteria and any discrepancies between 
researcher and supervisor opinions were discussed with consensual decisions 
made.  Of the articles being considered at this stage of the review 46 included 
multiple experiments within the same paper and as such each individual experiment 
was reviewed with regards to whether it met the inclusion criteria.  If no experiments 
reported within the article met the inclusion criteria the article was discarded from the 
review.  If at least one experiment within an article met the inclusion criteria then the 
individual experiments were retained for inclusion in the review.  In total a further 54 
articles were excluded leaving a total of 25 articles which were eligible to be included 
in the systematic review which incorporated 54 separate experiments in total.  The 
process of article extraction is detailed in Appendix 1. 
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1.6.4 Results 
 
This section reviews the individual experiments based on aspects of the participant 
samples included in the studies, the values focused on, the priming tasks used, the 
behavioural measures used, the main effects seen and the mediating factors.  The 
table seen in Appendix 2 provides details of all the experiments included in the 
review and should be used alongside the narrative below. 
 
1.6.4.1 Samples 
 
1.6.4.1.1 Participant Samples 
  
The vast majority of studies used an undergraduate student sample.  There were 
only three exceptions to this.  Yang, Wu, Zhou, Mead, Vohs & Baumeister (2013, 
Ex1) used a convenience sample of market vendors for their first study while they 
also did not provide details of their participant sample in Experiment 4 rendering the 
sample unknown.  Shafran, Lee, Payne & Fairburn (2006) were the other exception 
as they used a sample of undergraduate students and community volunteers and it 
is unclear how many of the participants were drawn from which subject pools.   
 
1.6.4.1.2 Number of participants 
  
The numbers of participants in the studies varied greatly from 16 (Yang et al, 2013 
Ex1) up to 288 (Bargh, Gollwittzer, Chai, Barndollar & Trotschel, 2001 Ex3). 
  
1.6.4.1.3 Ages of participants 
  
Only 7 studies provided details of the ages of their participants.  This may have been 
due to the vast majority (all bar three) of the studies using undergraduate student 
samples thereby leading the reader to assume that the participants would be aged 
from 18 into their early 20’s.  Indeed those studies that did include a mean age of 
participants indicated that the mean ages were ranged from 20.0 (Karremans , 2007 
Ex2) and 24.1 (Bargh et al, 2001 Ex2). 
  
1.6.4.1.4 Gender of participants 
  
Fourteen of the Experiments did not include any indication of the number of male or 
female participants (Verplanken, Trafimow, Khusid, Holand & Steentjes,2009 Ex2; 
Verplanken & Holland, 2002 Ex1,2 & 3; Yang et al, 2013 Ex1; Smeesters, Wheeler & 
53 
 
Kay, 2009 Ex3; Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille & Yzerbyt, 2003 
Ex1,2,3 & 4; Rasinsky, Visser, Zagatsky & Rickett, 2005; Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 
2006 Ex1; Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1 & 2).  Those that did offer this information 
showed that the majority of participants were female.  For example, Shafran et al 
(2006) used a female only sample for their experiment while Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung 
& Rees (2009a) Ex2 had 72% female, Ex3 90% female, Ex4 82% female and Ex 5 
60% female.  Maio, Olsen, Allen & Bernard (2001) Ex 1 had 55% female and Ex2 
had 86% female.  Karremans (2007) Ex1 had 63% females, Ex2 76% female 
participants.  These are representative examples of the general data.   
 
There were two exceptions to this with Bargh et al, (2001 Ex 1) and Neuberg (1988) 
using male only samples.  This could again be a factor of the samples used in the 
vast majority of the studies – undergraduate students.  While there are potentially 
equal numbers of males and females that go on to university if samples are drawn 
from undergraduate psychology courses it is likely that the majority of participants 
will be female based on the ratios of male to female present on these courses. 
 
1.6.4.2 Values focus of the studies 
 
There were a range of values focused on across studies and these are broken into 
sections arranged by general value types.  
 
1.6.4.2.1 Pro-social values 
  
The majority of studies, twenty in total, investigated what could be considered pro-
social values such as cooperation (Hertel & Fielder 1998 Ex1 & 2; Bargh et al, 2001 
Ex 1&2), equality (Maio et al, 2009a Ex 1,3 & 4; Maio et al, 2001, Ex1), helpfulness 
(Karremans, 2007,Ex2; Maio et al, 2001, Ex2), care for the environment (Verplanken 
& Holland, 2002, Ex 1,2 &3), honesty (Parzuchowski & Wojciszki, 2014, Ex 1 &2, 
Rasinsky et al, 2005), fairness (Jonas, Sullivan & Greenberg, 2013, Ex3), generosity 
(Jonas, et al, 2013, Ex2) and loyalty (Hertel & Kerr, 2001).  One study looked at pro-
social values more generally using the term ‘benevolence’ to encompass a wider 
category of pro-social value instantiations (e.g. Arieli et al, 2013 Ex2) and two others 
used the term ‘collectivist’ to refer to a pro-social orientation (Bechtoldt, Choi & 
Nijstad, 2012; Verplanken et al, 2009 Ex2). 
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1.6.4.2.2 Social order values 
 
There were fourteen studies which included values which could be considered to 
serve a function of maintaining society and social values such as, cleanliness (Yang 
et al, 2013, Ex 1-7), conformity (Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1&2), politeness (Bargh et 
al, 1996 Ex1), tradition (Maio et al, 2009a Ex1; Maio et al, 2001 Ex2) and security 
(Maio et al, 2009a Ex 3&4).  These values all have a common motivation of 
maintaining certain societal standards although they can also be considered within 
the pro-social frame. 
 
1.6.4.2.3 Pro-Individual values 
 
Sixteen other studies investigated what could be considered more pro-individual 
values such as high personal standards (Shafran et al, 2006), competitiveness 
(Neuberg, 1988), competence (Utz, Ouwerkerk & van Lange, 2004 Ex1&2) and 
achievement (Hart & Albarracin, 2009; Harris, Coburn, Rohrer & Pashler, 2013 
Ex1&2; Bargh et al, 2001 Ex1, 3, 4&5).  Other pro-individual values that are more 
focused on personal needs include stimulation (Maio et al, 2009a Ex2), self-direction 
(Maio et al, 2009a Ex2&3) and living a varied life (Karremans, 2007 Ex2). The 
Bechtoldt et al (2012) and Verplanken et al (2009 Ex2) studies also used the terms 
‘individualist’ and ‘private-self’ respectively to refer to these more pro-self values in 
their studies. 
 
1.6.4.2.4 Multiple competing values 
 
Several studies focused on priming more than one value.  In some cases this was 
done to investigate the effects of priming two opposing values (i.e. values with 
different underlying motivations) on behaviour relating to one or both of the values.  
For example Hertel & Fielder (1998, Ex 1&2) and Smeesters  et al (2009a, Ex3) both 
primed cooperation and competition values in different groups of participants to see 
the effects on sharing behaviour while Karremans (2007, Ex1) primed 
honesty/loyalty and successfulness/ambition in different groups to investigate effects 
on helping behaviour.  Maio et al (2009a) carried out a series of experiments with a 
focus on the effects of priming motivationally opposing values on behaviours.  These 
experiments included a focus on tradition values versus stimulation values to look at 
modesty (Ex2), security versus self-direction to look at cleanliness (Ex 3) and 
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curiosity (Ex 4) and achievement versus benevolence to investigate willingness to 
volunteer and achievement related behaviours (Ex 5).   
 
Bechtoldt et al (2012) primed individual and collectivist self-construals, and therefore 
more individual vs pro-social values, in their participants to investigate the effects on 
creativity while Verplanken et al (2009 Ex2) also primed the private versus collective 
self to determine how this affected use of the value of loyalty when making a 
decision.  
 
Two further studies (Neuberg, 1988 & Wheeler, Morrison, DeMaree & Petty, 2008) 
both primed opposing politeness and rudeness in order to see the effects on how 
long it would take participants to interrupt the experimenter.  Similarly, Epley & 
Gilovich (1999 Ex1&2) primed conformity and non-conformity in their participants to 
determine the effects on conforming to group pressure.  This study is a little different 
from the others that prime different values in opposition to each other as conformity 
will always come to mind when priming non-conformity (unlike helping vs 
achievement for example).  Using the Schwartz model to consider conformity it 
would be expected that values related to stimulation would be best used to counter 
conformity rather than non-conformity per se. 
 
One study primed different groups with the varied values of helpfulness, equality, 
successfulness and a varied life in order to investigate the effects of all of these 
primes on egalitarian behaviour (Karremans, 2007 Ex2). 
 
1.6.4.3 Priming tasks utilised 
 
All studies primed participants without them being told that this was the nature of the 
study and they utilised a range of priming techniques. 
 
1.6.4.3.1 Subliminal Priming Tasks 
 
Five studies used unconscious subliminal primes such as participants being primed 
during a computer based lexical decision task (Smeesters et al, 2009 Ex3; 
Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex3; Neuberg, 1988; Hart & Albarracin, 2009 Ex3 & Wheeler 
et al, 2008).  Participants would be presented with the prime words for very short (i.e. 
one tenth of a second) periods before a string of x’s would appear (or a string of 
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random letters) followed by a target letter string.  Participants would then have to 
decide whether the target letter string was a real word or not and press the 
corresponding key on the keyboard before the next trial would begin.  Smeesters et 
al (2009a, Ex3) used this methodology as did Smeesters et al (2003, Ex3).  Neuberg 
(1988), Hart & Albarracin (2009 Ex3) and Wheeler et al (2008) all used similar 
methodologies.  The only notable difference was that Neuberg (1988) asked 
participants to decide which side of the screen the ‘flash of light’ appeared rather 
than decide on letter strings but the flashing up and masking of the prime words was 
similar in design. 
 
1.6.4.3.2 Conscious (Explicit) Priming Tasks 
 
Some priming tasks focused on more explicit ways of priming values.  These are 
outlined in more detail below. 
 
Writing tasks 
 
There were three studies that utilised a writing based priming task, Arieli et al (2013 
Ex2), Bechtoldt et al (2012) and Verplanken et al (2009 Ex2).  These tasks all 
differed in terms of what the participant was asked to write about but all aimed to 
bring values to mind.  Arieli et al (2013 Ex2) asked participants to write stories about 
their own benevolent experiences of being kind to others as well as asking them to 
write persuasive essays about the benefits of being kind.  Bechtoldt et al (2012) 
wrote statements about the ways that the participants were similar or different to 
others depending upon whether they were being primed for the collectivist or 
individual self-construal.  Verplanken et al (2009 Ex2) asked participants to write 
what they had in common with or how they differed from people they felt close to in 
order to prime the collective-self or private-self. 
 
Impression Formation 
 
Two experiments used an impression formation task to prime participants, 
Verplanken et al (2002, Ex1&3).  Participants were provided with a list of attributes 
about a target person and were asked to form an impression of the person, including 
the attributes related to them and to write about the person (Verplanken et al, 2002).   
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Providing reasons for values 
 
There were five experiments that asked participants to provide reasons for values as 
a priming task, Maio et al (2009b, Ex1); Karremans (2007, Ex1&2); Maio et al (2001, 
Ex1&2).  This methodology of priming is less implicit but all studies that use this 
method take careful measures to ensure that participants do not link this task with 
what they are asked to do during the rest of the session.  Maio et al (2001, Ex1) 
investigated the use of this method of priming versus a more implicit method of 
simply making the values salient via a scrambled words task and they found that the 
priming effects were greater for the group that provided reasons for the values when 
compared to the values salient group and that this effect was not due to awareness 
of the prime.  Likewise, Karremans (2007, Ex2) found that the helpfulness reasons 
group were more likely to be egalitarian than the helpfulness salient group who had 
completed a word puzzle around the theme of helpfulness.   
 
1.6.4.3.3 Sub-conscious (Implicit) Priming Tasks 
 
Some priming tasks focused on priming values in more implicit ways as described 
below. 
 
Reading Stories 
 
In total, six experiments primed participants via a reading task, Maio et al (2009a, 
Ex3&4), Yang et al (2013, Ex, 6&7), Jonas et al (2013, Ex2) and Arieli et al (2013, 
Ex2).  Typically, participants were asked to read a passage of text (e.g. Maio et al, 
2009a, Ex3&4) or an article (Yang et al, 2013, Ex 6&7; Jonas et al, 2013, Ex2; Arieli 
et al, 2013, Ex2) that is manipulated to include elements of the target value within it.   
 
Physical primes 
 
There were seven experimental in total that used a physical prime, Yang et al (2013, 
Ex 1-5) and Parzuchowski & Wojciszki (2014, Ex 1&2).  In the case of Yang et al 
(2013, Ex 1-5) participants were asked to count dirty or clean money or dirty or clean 
paper to prime them to the value of cleanliness (Ex 2-5).  In Yang et al (2013) Ex1 
market vendors were given dirty or clean money to pay for goods as a prime to the 
cleanliness value.  Parzuchowski and Wojciszki (2014) took a different approach in 
which they asked participants to either place their hand on their heart or on their hip 
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(Ex1) or shoulder (Ex2) when doing different tasks in order to prime participants to 
the value of honesty. 
 
Word Search 
 
In total seven experiments used a word search task to prime participants, Harris et al 
(2013, Ex1&2); Bargh et al (2001 Ex1,3,4&5) and Hart & Albarracin (2009 Ex4).  As 
with the scrambled sentences task (below), participants were asked to complete a 
word search task that incorporates words related to the prime value target.  
Participants are given a list of words to find within the word search and are generally 
given as long as necessary to find the target words. 
 
Memory task 
 
There were five experiments that used a memory based task, Hertel & Fielder (1998, 
Ex1&2); Hertel & Kerr (2001) and Maio et al (2009a, Ex3&4).  Both Hertel & Fielder 
(1998) and Hertel & Kerr (2001) studies asked participants to memorise words 
displayed on a sheet of paper and then informed the participants that the words 
could be put into groups to aid with the task.  Hertel & Fielder (1998) also included 
an element of priming positive and negative evaluative words related to the target 
values.  In the case of Maio et al (2009a, Ex3&4) participants were provided with a 
sheet presented as a memory task that contained words related to the prime value 
and other words unrelated to the prime.  Similarly to the Hertel & Fielder (1998) and 
Hertel & Kerr (2001) studies, participants were afterwards told that the words could 
be divided into different groups and were asked to do the task again in order to see if 
they could now remember more of the words after thinking about them in groups. 
 
Unscrambling sentences 
 
Overall, thirteen experiments used an unscrambling sentences priming task, Maio et 
al (2009a, Ex2&3); Verplanken et al (2002, Ex2); Smeesters et al (2003, Ex 1,2&4); 
Jonas et al (2013, Ex3); Bargh et al (2001 Ex2); Bargh et al (1996 Ex1); Epley & 
Gilovich (1999 Ex1&2) and Utz et al (2004 Ex1&2).  This task usually incorporates 
five words in a scrambled order, four of which when unscrambled will make a 
sentence.  It is usually the case that a majority of the sentences will include a target 
word that is related to the prime value.  Usually the prime value itself is not 
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presented as one of the words but rather semantically related words are presented in 
order to bring the target prime unconsciously to mind. 
 
1.6.4.4 Behavioural measures used in the studies 
 
The studies within the review utilised a range of behavioural measures.  Some 
studies focused on asking participants to make decisions or choices (Verplanken et 
al, 2002 Ex1,2&3; Yang et al, 2013 Ex5; Bargh et al, 2001 Ex5; Hart & Albarracin, 
2009 Ex3; Verplanken et al, 2009 Ex2), others asked them to complete self-reports 
of some form (Maio et al, 2009a Ex2; Yang, 2013 Ex3; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 
2014 Ex3&4; Rasinsky et al, 2005).   
 
The most commonly used behavioural measure was related to sharing money or 
points usually through the use of economic games such as the prisoners dilemma 
game or the minimal group paradigm (Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex1&2; Yang et al, 
2013 Ex2,4,6&7; Smeesters et al, 2009a Ex3; Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex1,2,3,&4; 
Jonas et al, 2013 Ex3; Neuberg, 1988; Utz et al, 2004 Ex1&2).  Other experiments 
focused on other forms of sharing behaviour (Maio et al, 2009a Ex1,2&3; 
Karremans, 2007 Ex2; Maio et al, 2001 Ex1; Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Bargh et al, 2001 
Ex2).   
 
There were also studies that included observable behavioural measures such as 
studies that investigated volunteering behaviour (Arieli et al, 2013 Ex2; Maio et al, 
2009a Ex5; Maio et al, 2001 Ex2), helping behaviour (Karremans, 2007 Ex1), 
donating behaviour (Jonas et al, 2013 Ex2) and others which are described below 
(Maio et al, 2009a Ex3&4; Yang et al, 2013 Ex1; Shafran et al, 2006; Bargh et al, 
2001 Ex4; Bargh et al, 2006 Ex1; Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1&2; Bechtoldt et al, 
2012; Wheeler et al, 2008).  Further studies included performance based behaviours 
such as performance on word searches (Harris et al, 2013 Ex1&2; Bargh et al, 2001 
Ex1&3; Hart & Albarracin, 2009 Ex4). 
 
1.6.4.4.1 Making decisions 
 
Seven experiments focused on making choices (Verplanken et al, 2002 Ex1,2&3; 
Yang et al, 2013 Ex5; Bargh et al, 2001 Ex5; Hart & Albarracin, 2009 Ex3; 
Verplanken et al, 2009 Ex2).  In the Verplanken et al (2002) experiments the 
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participants were asked to make a decision on which one out of 20 television sets 
they would choose to buy based on the information they were presented with.  The 
information that the participants used to guide their decision was based on seven 
different attributes one of which was the target attribute of environmental 
friendliness.  As such the decision that the individual made was considered by the 
experimenters in relation to how environmentally friendly it was (Ex 1 & 2) or in 
relation to how many environmentally related pieces of information the individual 
requested to view in order to inform their decision (Ex 3).  In the Verplanken et al 
(2009) experiment a similar paradigm was utilised in which participants were asked 
to decide which apartment they would choose to move into based upon the 
information available.  Again the information available was based on seven different 
attributes with the target attribute of loyalty being among them.  The decision the 
participant made was investigated in relation to the rating of loyalty their chosen 
apartment had been given (Verplanken et al, 2009 Ex2).  In the Bargh et al (2001, 
Ex5) and Hart & Albarracin (2009, Ex4) studies, participants were asked to choose 
whether they wanted to continue working on a word based puzzle task that they had 
already started or whether they would like to move onto a fun cartoon based task 
and this was used as a measure of perseverance behaviour.  The Yang (2013, Ex5) 
study investigated the decisions of participants of whether  to accept the fair or unfair 
offers made to them on a money sharing game. 
 
1.6.4.4.2 Self-report measures 
 
Another five studies included self-report type measures as measures of behaviours 
(Maio et al, 2009a Ex2; Yang et al, 2013 Ex3; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014 
Ex3&4; Rasinsky et al, 2005; Shafran et al, 2006).  In the Parzuchowski & Wojciszke 
(2014 Ex3 & 4) studies the participants rated the attractiveness of faces (Ex3) or told 
the researchers how many correct answers they had scored on a maths test (Ex4) 
as measures of honesty.  The Rasinsky et al (2005) study likewise used a self-report 
measure of undesirable drinking behaviours as a measure of honesty.  In the Maio et 
al (2009a Ex2) study the participants completed a measure rating themselves in 
relation to others on positive and negative traits as a measure of modesty behaviour.  
While Shafran (2006), looked at the amount of food actually eaten by participants (as 
recorded in a food diary) over a 24 hour period in relation to amount of high calorie 
foods eaten.   
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1.6.4.4.3 Economic games 
 
There was a total number of 15 experiments that focused on behaviours around 
sharing money fairly or showing cooperative behaviour around sharing money 
(Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex1&2; Yang et al, 2013 Ex2,4,6&7; Smeesters et al, 2009a 
Ex3; Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex1,2,3,&4; Jonas et al, 2013 Ex3; Neuberg, 1988; Utz 
et al, 2004 Ex1&2).   
 
Hertel & Fielder (1998 Ex 1&2) were interested in how fairly participants shared 
money between themselves and another in an economic game and Yang et al 
(2013) likewise utilised a variety of different economic games in order to investigate 
sharing behaviour including a trust game (Ex2), a game involving cooperation (Ex4) 
and the dictator game (Ex 6&7) where the participant allocates money to themselves 
and a supposed other.   In the same vein, Smeesters et al (2009a, Ex3) also used a 
non-reciprocal dictator game to measure sharing behaviour and Smeesters et al 
(2003, Ex1,2 &3) looked at cooperative behaviour in a prisoners dilemma game 
where the participant is led to believe that they are playing with another participant 
and that they have the option to make cooperative choices (which will result in 
money being shared if the partner also chooses to cooperate) or non-cooperative 
choices (which will result in them keeping all the money if the partner chooses to 
cooperate but will result in them losing all the money if the partner also chooses not 
to cooperate).  In Ex4, Smeesters et al (2003) used a give some game where 
participants were asked to decide how much money to give to others to measure 
sharing behaviour.   Jonas et al (2013 Ex3) also utilised the dictator game to 
measure sharing behaviour, while Neuberg (1988) and Utz et al (2004, Ex1 &2) also 
used versions of the prisoners dilemma game to measure cooperative behaviour. 
 
A further seven experiments focused on sharing behaviour in other contexts (Maio et 
al, 2009b Ex1,2&3; Karremans, 2007 Ex2; Maio et al, 2001 Ex1; Hertel & Kerr, 2001; 
Bargh et al, 2001 Ex2).  Of these experiments six utilised a point allocation task, 
commonly known as the minimal group paradigm, whereby participants are asked to 
allocate points between members of their own group (the in-group) and members of 
another group (the out-group) by choosing one formation of allocations from a 
number of grids made available to them (Maio, 2009b Ex1,2&3; Karremans, 2007 
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Ex2; Maio, 2001 Ex1; Hertel & Kerr, 2001).  The grids generally allow participants 
options to allocate points fairly across the two groups or to favour their own group 
when allocating points and hence the task is seen to be a measure of egalitarian 
behaviour.  Similarly, Bargh et al (2001, Ex2) used a fishing game to measure the 
sharing of resources between self and community such that participants had to 
decide how many of the fish they had caught they should keep and how many they 
should return in order to allow the fishing stocks to replenish and benefit the general 
community. 
 
1.6.4.4.4 Observable behaviours 
 
A total of three experiments focused on volunteering behaviours (Arieli et al, 2013 
Ex2; Maio et al, 2009a Ex5; Maio et al 2001 Ex2).  All three of these experiments 
focused on whether participants were willing to volunteer either for a charity (Arieli et 
al, 2013, Ex2) or to complete further research studies for no payment (Maio et al, 
2009a Ex5; Maio et al, 2001 Ex2) and in the case of the latter two studies measured 
how much time participants were willing to volunteer as well.  There was one study 
which focused on helping behaviour (Karremans, 2007 Ex1) in terms of whether 
participants helped the experimenter pick up pencils that had been knocked over and 
another one which focused on donating behaviour (Jonas et al, 2013 Ex2) related to 
how much money participants donated to a charity when prompted at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
A further five experiments investigated performance on word searches as a measure 
of behaviour (Harris et al, 2013 Ex1&2; Bargh et al, 2001 Ex1&3; Hart & Albarracin, 
2009 Ex4).  All of these studies utilised similar methodologies in that participants 
were provided with several word searches and were scored depending upon how 
many words they were able to find in the allocated timespan. 
 
There were ten experiments which focused on other observable behaviours (Maio et 
al, 2009a Ex3&4; Yang et al, 2013 Ex1; Shafran et al, 2006; Bargh et al, 2001 Ex4; 
Bargh et al, 2006 Ex1; Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1&2; Bechtoldt et al, 2012; Wheeler 
et al, 2008).  Among these experiments, Maio et al (2009a Ex3&4) measured how 
long it took for participants to request a new pen or to use a cleaning wipe when 
asked to complete tasks with a leaky pen and sticky crayons (Ex3) and measured 
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how curious participants were to find out more information about the answers on a 
quiz task as indicated by the participants ticking a box to request further information 
(Ex4).  Yang (2013, Ex1) measured how fair market vendors were in providing the 
weight of vegetable asked for by weighing the vegetables.  Bargh et al (2001 Ex4) 
looked at whether participants persevered at a scrabble based work task past the 
allotted time limit as a measure of perseverance.  Two studies measured polite 
behaviour by investigating how long it took for participants to interrupt the 
experimenter (Bargh et al, 2006 Ex1; Wheeler et al, 2008).  As a measure of 
conformity behaviour, Epley & Gilovich (1999, Ex1&2) measured how strongly 
participants agreed with confederates about the interestingness of a task that had 
been performed.  Finally, Bechtoldt et al (2012) included a measure of creativity 
based upon two dimensions of the number of ideas and the originality of ideas that 
participants were able to think of when asked about ways to improve teaching at a 
university. 
 
1.6.4.5 Main results – direct effects of prime on behaviour 
  
The majority of studies, 42 experiments in total, found main effects of priming values 
on behaviour in the directions predicted.  However, for twenty seven of these studies 
there were also mediating factors that contributed to these main effects.  In the case 
of the twelve studies where there were no main effects found for the primed values 
on behaviour, ten of them found significant interactions between the prime and 
another variable included in the study or found a significant effect between other 
variables in the study and behaviour.  There were only two exceptions to this (Harris 
et al, 2013 Ex 1&2) which did not find any effects of the primed values on behaviour 
at all.  The direct effects of the primes on behaviour are outlined further below with 
the mediating effects highlighted in the section that follows. 
 
1.6.4.5.1 Priming pro-social values 
 
Generally, priming pro-social values increased the likelihood of participants behaving 
in pro-social ways.  For example, Arieli et al (2013) found that priming benevolence 
increased the likelihood of participants being willing to volunteer for a charity when 
compared to controls while Jonas et al (2013 Ex2) found that being primed for 
kindness led to more generosity in donating money to charity.  Priming equality led to 
a decrease in in-group favouritism and more equal sharing in a points allocation task 
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(Maio et al 2009b, Ex1,3&4; Maio et al, 2001 Ex1) and similarly priming fairness led 
to sharing more money on a money allocation task (Jonas et al, 2013 Ex3).   
 
In terms of priming other pro-social values, Maio et al (2001, Ex2) found priming 
helpfulness led to more time being volunteered to take part in further research 
studies while priming cooperation also led to more cooperative behaviour in an 
environmental resources game (Bargh et al, 2001 Ex2).  It was also found that 
priming honesty led to more honest ratings of attractiveness for unattractive faces 
(Parzuchowski and Wojciszke, 2014 Ex3), more honest self-reports of maths 
performance (Parzuchowski and Wojciszke, 2014 Ex4) and more honest self reports 
of undesirable drinking behaviours (Raskinsky et al, 2005).  In terms of caring about 
the environment Verplanken & Holland (2002 Ex1&2) found the expected effects of 
those being primed with environmental values being more inclined to make more 
environmentally friendly choices. 
 
There were two studies which primed pro-social values and did not find direct effects 
of the prime on behaviour (Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Verplanken & Holland, 2002 Ex3), 
although both reported mediating effects which are highlighted further below.   
 
1.6.4.5.2 Priming social order values 
 
Priming social order values generally increased the pro-social and social order 
behaviours that were the focus of the experiments.  It was found that priming 
cleanliness via handling clean or dirty money had direct effects on how fair market 
vendors were in providing the weight of vegetable asked for (Yang et al, 2013 Ex1) 
with those given clean money providing a fair weight while those given dirty money 
were less fair.  It was also found that clean money primes led to participants being 
more willing to cooperate in sharing money when compared to those primed with 
dirty money and controls (Yang et al, 2013 Ex2, 4 & 5), and that this effect was also 
found when reading about clean or dirty money as the prime rather than handling 
actual money (Yang et al, 2013 Ex 6&7).   
 
It was also found that priming conformity values led to more agreement with others 
ratings on the interestingness of a task when compared to those primed with non-
conformity and controls (Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1&2).  Bargh et al (1996 Ex1) 
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found a direct effect of primes such that priming rudeness led to participants 
interrupting the experimenter significantly faster than those in the neutral or polite 
prime conditions. 
 
Wheeler et al (2008) did not find direct effects of the prime of rudeness on 
subsequent interrupting behaviour but they did find effects that mediated the 
relationship which are highlighted in the mediating effects section below. 
 
1.6.4.5.3 Priming pro-individual values 
 
Priming pro-individual values appeared to have expected effects on behaviour 
measures of performance i.e. increases in perseverance and self-restraint, while 
they decreased pro-social cooperation.  There was however one study which found 
no effects of the priming task on performance behaviour (Harris, 2013 Ex 1&2). 
 
Priming high personal standards was shown to have an effect on certain behaviours 
related to eating such as eating less high calorie foods, feeling more guilt after eating 
and showing increased restraint (Shafran et al, 2006).  It was also found that priming 
achievement related values enhanced performance on a word search task (Bargh et 
al, 2001 Ex1&3), predicted whether participants persevered with a task beyond the 
time limit set (i.e. heightened the participants’ need to achieve; Bargh et al, 2001 
Ex4) and determined whether participants chose to persevere with a less fun task 
already started rather than switch to a fun cartoon based task (Bargh et al, 2001 
Ex5) all when compared to control participants.   
 
Hart & Albarracin (2009 Ex 3&4) and Utz et al (2004 Ex 1&2) did not find direct 
effects of the primes of achievement or competence on their behavioural measures 
but both found mediating factors which are included in the section that follows. 
 
One notable exception to all the experiments noted above was the paper by Harris et 
al (2013 Ex1&2) in which two experiments are reported which were carried out as 
direct replication attempts of the Bargh et al (2001 Ex1&3) studies.  Harris et al 
(2013) did not find any effects of the achievement prime on subsequent word search 
performance unlike the initial Bargh et al (2001 Ex1&3) studies which found that the 
66 
 
achievement prime enhanced performance on word searches when compared to 
controls and did not find any mediating factors.  
 
1.6.4.5.4 Priming opposing values (pro-social vs pro self) 
 
Generally priming opposing values showed opposite effects on the same behaviours 
as predicted, such that priming pro-social values increased pro-social behaviours 
while priming pro-individual values decreased pro-social behaviours. 
 
For example, Maio et al (2009a Ex5) found the expected effects of priming two 
opposing values (achievement and benevolence) on an achievement based task (a 
word search) and a benevolence task (willingness to volunteer for research).  It was 
shown that those participants primed with achievement performed better on the 
achievement based task than the benevolence primed group or controls while those 
primed for benevolence values were more likely to volunteer more time than the 
achievement group or controls.  Similarly, Karremans (2007, Ex1) also primed 
benevolence or achievement values in participants and found that the benevolence 
group were more likely to help pick up dropped pencils than the achievement primed 
group or controls.   
 
Further to this, Karremans (2007 Ex2) also found that those participants primed with 
helpfulness or equality (via a providing reasons for values priming task) were more 
likely to allocated points fairly among the in-group and out-group than those primed 
with successfulness or a varied life (via the same priming task) or helpfulness 
(primed via a different task – without reasons for the value given) and controls.  
Similarly Smeesters et al (2009a Ex3) found that priming cooperation led to more 
equal sharing of money than did priming competition.  Smeesters et al (2003 
Ex1,2,3&4) also found that priming morality (as opposed to might) led to more 
cooperation and sharing in games involving decisions about allocating money to self 
or other.   
 
Priming the collective self, as opposed to the private self, influenced participants to 
use the value of loyalty more when making a decision about which apartment they 
would choose from a list (loyalty was one attribute of seven that were rated for each 
apartment; Verplanken et al, 2009 Ex2).  It was also the case that priming collectivist 
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values as opposed to individual values led to more creativity on a dimension of 
fluency (i.e. individual participants came up with more ideas when working in a small 
group primed with collectivist values; Bechtoldt et al, 2012). 
 
Hertel & Fielder (1998 Ex 1&2) and Neuberg(1988) did not find any direct effects of 
priming cooperation versus achievement on subsequent measures of pro-sociality 
and cooperation but they did both find mediating factors which are outlined in the 
mediating factors section below. 
 
1.6.4.5.5 Priming opposing values (social order vs personal development) 
 
Similar effects were seen when priming social order versus personal development 
such that there were opposite effects of the value primes on the same behaviour.  
Priming rudeness in participants, as opposed to politeness, led to participants being 
more likely to interrupt the experimenter (Bargh et al, 1996 Ex1; Wheeler et al, 
2008).  When Maio et al (2009a Ex2) primed tradition values or stimulation values in 
their participants they found that those primed with tradition were more likely to be 
modest when comparing themselves on positive and negative traits to other students 
whereas those primed with stimulation values decreased in modesty compared to 
the control participants.   
 
Investigating security and self-direction values, Maio et al (2009a Ex 3&4) found that 
those primed with security values asked for a clean pen or used a cleaning wipe 
quicker than controls, whereas those primed with self-direction values were more 
likely to delay asking for a new pen or using a cleaning wipe compared to controls 
(Maio et al, 2009a Ex3).  They also found that those primed with self-direction values 
were subsequently more curious about finding out new knowledge than control 
participants while those primed with security values were less curious than controls 
(Maio et al, 2009 Ex4). 
 
1.6.4.6 Mediating effects on the prime to behaviour relationship 
 
There were twelve studies which did not find direct effects of the prime on behaviour 
(Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Verplanken & Holland, 2002 Ex3; Wheeler et al, 2008; Hart & 
Albarracin, 2009 Ex3&4; Utz et al, 2004 Ex 1&2; Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex 1&2; 
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Neuberg, 1988; Harris et al, 2013 Ex1&2).  Of these studies the first ten found that 
there were other factors that mediated the relationship of the prime to the behaviours 
measured or that significantly interacted with the primes.  The only exceptions to this 
were the Harris (2013 Ex 1& 2) experiments which did not show any effects of the 
primes on behaviour.  There were also significant mediating effects found in twenty 
seven of the studies which had shown direct prime to behaviour effects.  The 
mediating factors from all of these studies are outlined further below arranged by the 
type of mediating factors. 
 
1.6.4.6.1 Value Centrality 
 
Value centrality was shown to have a mediating effect in twelve studies (Verplanken 
et al, 2002 Ex1,2 &3; Utz et al, 2004 Ex1&2; Bechtoldt et al, 2012; Smeesters et al, 
2003 Ex 1,2,3&4 and Arieli et al, 2013; Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex 1&2).  Generally 
within these twelve studies the fact that the participants identified the values in 
question as values that were of high priority to them mediated the effect between 
priming and value congruent behaviours.   
 
For example, Verplanken & Holland (2002 Ex1,2&3) found in their study of priming 
environmental values on the use of environmental information to make consumer 
choices (choosing a TV) that reliable priming effects were only seen if caring about 
the environment was a value that was considered to be central to the participants i.e. 
was already an important value for them.  In Ex2, Verplanken et al (2002) found 
direct effects of the primes on behaviour but also that value centrality mediated this 
effect.  In Ex3 they did not find main effects of the prime on behaviour but did find 
significant interactions between value centrality and primes (Verplanken et al, 2002 
Ex3).  The mechanism for this could be that the prime increased the importance (or 
the salience) of the value for the participants for whom the value was already 
important which then mediated the effect by making these individuals more likely to 
use environmental information at their disposal to make their decisions.  In support of 
this Verplanken et al (2002 Ex1) also found that the effect of the priming 
manipulation was due to the perceptions of the environmental attribute as being 
important, such that those participants who gave high importance to the 
environmental information available were more likely to choose a TV that was better 
for the environment.   
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Utz et al (2004 Ex1&2) also found an interaction between the value prime and value 
centrality.  They found that priming competence affected those who were considered 
to be competitors on a ring measure of value centrality but that the prime did not 
affect those classified as pro-socials or individualists (Utz et al, 2004 Ex1).  It was 
also found that the competence prime reduced cooperation for competitors, 
increased cooperation for pro-socials, and had no effect for individualists (Utz et al, 
2004 Ex2).  Utz et al (2004 Ex 1&2) also found that having a cooperative partner led 
to greater cooperation among pro-socials and that there was a main effect of 
strategy such that a cooperative partner elicited more cooperation than a non-
cooperative partner.  The effect of strategy was stronger for pro-socials and 
individualists than it was for competitive participants (Utz et al, 2004). 
 
In the study carried out by Arieli et al (2013 Ex2) it was found that the change in 
benevolence values following the priming intervention mediated the relationship to 
volunteering behaviour.  In essence, the priming tasks only had an effect on 
volunteering behaviour for those participants for whom benevolence values became 
high priority values. 
 
There were significant interactions between the priming task and social value 
orientation found in the studies carried out by Smeesters et al (2003 Ex1,2,3&4).  
Participants were measured with regards to whether they had a pro-social or pro-
individual value orientation which was found to have an effect on cooperative 
behaviour such that those who had pro-social orientations were generally more likely 
to be cooperative than those who had pro-individual social value orientations 
(Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex1,2,3&4).  They also found an interaction effect which 
demonstrated that those who were low in consistency with regards to their social 
value orientation were more likely to be affected by the primes.  This meant that 
individuals who were low-consistent pro-individuals were as likely as low and high 
consistency pro-socials to show effects of the morality (pro-social) primes on 
cooperative behaviour (Smeesters, 2003 Ex 1,2,3&4).  In a later study, Smeesters et 
al (2009, Ex3) also found that the effects of cooperation and competition primes on 
cooperative behaviour were related to perceptions of the supposed ‘other’ taking part 
in the cooperative game and that this relationship was also mediated by having a 
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communal value orientation.  This meant that those who had communal value 
orientations, as opposed to individual focused value orientations, were more likely to 
perceive others as being cooperative and were more likely to behave in a 
cooperative way regardless of primes. 
 
Similarly to the above, Hertel & Fielder (1998 Ex1&2) found that pre-dispositions to 
values was the only strong predictor of cooperative behaviour in their studies such 
that those with cooperative pre-dispositions were likely to behave cooperatively while 
those with individualist pre-dispositions were less likely to be cooperative.  There 
was also a consistency main effect such that those who were low in consistency on 
their pre-dispositions were more likely to be cooperative following the cooperation 
prime, meaning that the primes were more likely to have an effect on those 
individuals who did not have strong dispositional tendencies (Hertel & Fielder, 1998 
Ex1&2).     
 
Finally, Bechtoldt et al (2012) found that creativity, as measured by originality of 
ideas, was mediated by an interaction between value orientation and self-construal 
prime as either collective versus individual.  They found that there were more original 
ideas when those who were in the collective value orientation groups had been 
primed with the individual self-construal rather than being in the collective value 
orientation group and being primed for collectivist self-construal.  They argue that 
this is related to the collective group working better as a team when each member 
within it is working to individual motivations and strengths. 
 
1.6.4.6.2 Expectations of others 
 
There were seven experiments that showed that expectations of others had a 
mediating effect on the prime to behaviour interactions (Parzuchowski & Wojcizke, 
2014 Ex3; Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex 1&2; Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Smeesters, 2003 Ex 
2,3&4; Smeesters et al, 2009 Ex3). 
 
For example, Parzuchowski & Wojciszke (2014 Ex3) found an interaction between 
attractiveness and prime such that the honesty prime only affected ratings of 
attractiveness for unattractive faces (as had been determined via a pilot study) and 
not for attractive faces.  The interpretation of this is that there is no need to be 
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dishonest when someone is attractive whereas there is a social expectation that we 
will exaggerate someone’s attractiveness when they are unattractive rather than be 
honest.  The honesty prime was thought to reduce this social expectation by 
promoting the concept of honesty. 
 
In their studies on priming conformity, Epley & Gilovich (1999 Ex1&2) found that 
conformity primes increased adherence to the answers given by confederates but 
they also found that priming non-conformity led to more adherence than those in the 
control group.  They suggest that priming non-conformity also primes conformity by 
the fact that non-conformity is understood within the context of being the opposite of 
conformity (Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1).  They also found that there were no priming 
effects seen in the absence of pressure from others for either conformity or non-
conformity primes.  That is, when control participants were given the same priming 
task and were then asked the same questions about the interestingness of the task 
without others being present there were no differences in the ratings across the 
priming tasks (Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex2).  They suggest that this means 
conformity is a concept that can only be seen in relation to other people as it serves 
a societal function of group cohesiveness.  
 
Hertel & Kerr (2001) noted that perceived expectations and norms mediated the 
relationship between priming loyalty and equality values on egalitarian behaviour.  
Specifically when participants were primed for loyalty they had stronger expectations 
of in-group favouritism as the in-group norm but when they were primed for equality 
there were lower expectations of in-group favouritism being the in-group norm.  As 
such the loyalty prime led to higher in-group favouritism compared to the equality 
group due to this interaction between primes and subsequent expectations of group 
norms.  They also found a significant effect of the type of matrices that they used 
within the minimal group paradigm such that priming loyalty led to higher in group 
favouritism when using intergroup matrices but not when using intragroup matrices. 
 
With regards to cooperative behaviour Smeesters (2003 Ex2, 3 &4) found that 
participants’ expectations of their supposed ‘partners’ cooperation had an effect on 
subsequent cooperative behaviour.  It was found in Experiment 2 that those primed 
with morality (pro-social) compared to might (pro-individual) primes had higher 
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expectations of cooperation (Smeesters, 2003 Ex 2&4).  In further studies they found 
that pro-socials expected more cooperation than pro-individuals (Smeesters et al, 
2003 Ex3&4) and that correlations of these expectations and actual cooperative 
behaviour were also significant (Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex3&4).  
 
1.6.4.6.3 Personality factors 
 
A total of five studies indicated that there were personality factors that mediated the 
prime to behaviour effects in their participants (e.g. Hart & Albarracin, 2009 Ex 3&4 
and Wheeler et al, 2008; Neuberg, 1998; Shafran et al, 2006). 
 
Chronic achievement motivation was one of the factors investigated in relation to 
personality.  Hart & Albarracin (2009 Ex3&4) measured chronic achievement 
motivation in their participants prior to priming achievement values (Ex 3&4) and also 
manipulated the frames given to the behavioural task (i.e. giving a fun context, 
achievement context or generic/neutral context for a word-search task) in Ex4.  They 
found that the achievement prime increased the probability that the people with 
chronically high achievement motivation would choose to resume an interrupted 
achievement focused task and that people with low chronic achievement motivation 
would choose to switch to a fun task that was offered as an alternative (Hart & 
Albarracin,2009 Ex3).  Hart & Albarracin (2009 Ex4) also found that there was an 
interaction between the chronic achievement motivation and achievement prime that 
was dependent upon the task frame.  In the fun frame condition the achievement 
prime increased performance for chronically low achievement motivators but 
decreased performance for chronically high achievement motivators.  In the 
achievement frame condition the achievement prime reduced performance for 
chronically low achievement motivators but improved performance for high 
achievement motivators. 
 
Related to the Hart and Albarracin (2009 Ex3&4) findings, Neuberg (1988) found that 
there was a significant interaction between prime type and behavioural 
predisposition such that participants with a competitive behaviour disposition 
displayed more competitive behaviour when exposed to competitive primes than 
those with cooperative behavioural dispositions exposed to competitive primes.  
There was also a main effect of behavioural tendency such that those who were 
73 
 
more competitive on their first move of the prisoners’ dilemma game played more 
competitively afterwards.  They also found a main effect for partners initial move 
such that if the partner was competitive on the first move the participant played more 
competitively themselves compared to when their partners first move was 
cooperative.   
 
In their study of the effects of priming rudeness on interrupting behaviour, Wheeler et 
al (2008) found that self-monitoring, internal state awareness and self-reflectiveness 
were all related to the pattern of results seen in their study.  They found that 
assimilation to rudeness or politeness primes, that is displaying behaviour in 
accordance with the primed concept, only occurred in those who were low self-
monitors, those who had low internal state awareness, and those who were high in 
self-reflectiveness.  Further personality factors seen in the studies included the 
finding by Shafran et al (2006) that there were significant differences between the 
high standards primed group and the low standards primed group on measures of 
perfectionism following the prime.  They suggest that differences in perfectionism 
could have mediated the effects of the prime on behaviour and link this to the 
evidence for a relationship between perfectionism and eating disorders within clinical 
populations. 
 
1.6.4.6.4 Having goals consistent with behaviours 
 
Five studies suggested that having a more conscious reason for engaging in the 
primed behaviours mediated the prime to behaviour effects.  For example, Maio et al 
(2001 Ex1&2) and Karremans (2007 Ex1&2) both utilised a priming technique which 
asked the participants to provide reasons  in support of the target values while Bargh 
et al (2001 Ex2) provided participants with an explicit aim of being cooperative during 
the behavioural task as using a priming task.  These studies are outlined below. 
 
In the studies carried out by Maio et al (2001 Ex1&2) the priming task used involved 
asking participants to provide reasons for and against the target values.  It was found 
that the nature of the reasons given were related to subsequent effects on 
behaviour.  For example, Maio et al (2001 Ex1) analysed the reasons that 
participants gave in support of or against the value of equality and found that the 
more clear and concrete the reasons given were the less in-group favouritism the 
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participant exhibited on the behaviour measure i.e. the more egalitarian they were. 
Similarly, when they analysed the reasons given for and against helpfulness they 
found that participants who gave more clear and concrete reasons volunteered 
significantly more time than those who gave less clear reasons (Maio et al, 2001 Ex 
2).  In line with these findings Karremans (2007, Ex1&2) also found that higher 
favourability of the reasons given in support of benevolence of or helpfulness values 
was correlated with subsequent behaviours.  In Experiment 1 Karremans (2007) 
found that favourability of benevolence reasons was significantly positively correlated 
with helping behaviour while in Experiment 2 they found that favourability of reasons 
for helpfulness and equality were significantly correlated with choosing to share 
points equally among the in-group and out-group. 
 
In a similar fashion, Bargh et al (2001 Ex2) found that were was a main effect of 
giving the participant a conscious goal on subsequent behaviour.  Although there 
was a main effect of priming cooperation on the behaviour measure, it appeared that 
those participants who were given the aim of completing the task in a cooperative 
way were also more likely to behave more cooperatively.  The intentions between all 
participants to behave cooperatively were measured as being the same so it was 
concluded that the conscious goal that was given interacted with the priming task to 
effect subsequent cooperative behaviour (Bargh et al, 2001 Ex2).   
 
1.6.4.6.5 Attitudes 
 
Three studies suggested that there were relationships between certain attitudes and 
the effects seen within the experiments (e.g. Yang et al, 2013 Ex 5,6 &7).  For 
example, Yang et al (2013 Ex5) found that when participants were primed with clean 
or dirty money the relationship between whether they accepted the money offers 
made in a sharing game were shaped by their subsequent attitudes to low and unfair 
offers.  As such, those primed with clean money were less likely to accept low offers 
from the supposed ‘partner’ they were playing with but were especially unlikely to 
accept low and unfair offers.  Those primed with dirty money were less likely to be 
discriminate in this way.  Similarly, Yang et al (2013, Ex6) found that favourable 
evaluation and attitude towards trade-related words mediated the effect of the 
participants primed with clean money giving more generously than those primed with 
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dirty money.  The effects of the prime were rendered non-significant when the 
evaluations of the trade-related words were entered into the analysis. 
 
In another experiment, Yang et al (2013 Ex7) found that fairness and greed attitudes 
had mediating effects.  They primed participants with articles about how clean or 
dirty the money in circulation in their country was and then asked participants to take 
part in a money sharing game to measure fairness.  They found that those primed 
with the clean money were fairer than those primed with dirty money.  A mediating 
factor within this was individual ratings of favourability towards fairness or greed 
such that those who were primed with clean money were more likely to endorse 
fairness and allocate money fairly while those who were primed with dirty money 
were more likely to endorse greed and to keep more of the money for themselves. 
 
1.6.4.6.6 Other Mediating Factors 
 
There were several other studies which had mediating effects which did not fit into 
the categories above.  For example Bargh et al (2001 Ex5) found that gender had an 
effect such that more women than men chose to persevere with an achievement 
based task rather than choosing to change to a fun task.  This effect was not 
explored further within the Bargh et al (2001) paper.  In the same paper, Bargh et al 
(2001 Ex3) also found that there was a significant effect of a time delay on 
achievement based behaviour following an achievement prime.  They utilised two 
different tasks to measure the effects of achievement based primes and they found 
that achievement based attitudes tended to extinguish over the time delay so that on 
a subsequent impression formation task the participants were less likely to develop 
impressions of the individual as being achievement focused but that in terms of the 
achievement behaviour the performance was better after a time delay than 
immediately following the prime.    
 
In a different study but also related to time delay, Rasinski et al (2005) found that 
there was an effect of task order.  When they primed their participants for honesty 
they found that when the target questions about undesirable drinking behaviours 
immediately followed the prime, participants were more likely to answer them 
honestly compared to when the questions came later in the questionnaire. 
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In their experiments investigating priming kindness on generosity and fairness Jonas 
et al (2013 Ex2&3) were also interested in the effects of mortality salience on the 
behaviours that followed the primes.  In Experiment 2 Jones et al (2013) allocated 
participants to a mortality salience or dental pain group with tasks to bring these two 
different situations to mind and then within each of these groups, participants were 
either primed for generosity and kindness or a neutral non-value based prime.  They 
found that in the mortality salience group the generosity/kindness prime led to more 
money being donated to charity compared to the neutrally primed participants who 
were found to give less money.  In the dental pain condition there was no influence 
of prime on donating.  These results were in line with the expectations of the 
researchers such that bringing to mind the possibility of a participant’s own death 
should reduce the likelihood of them focusing on others and being willing to be 
charitable, as seen in the neutral prime condition, but that introducing the prime 
increased focus on others and overcame this commonly seen effect of mortality 
salience.  They also found that there were significant correlations and a significant 
interaction between mortality salience and money importance.  In a further 
experiment, Jonas et al (2013 Ex3) showed that there was a significant effect of a 
fairness prime on donating money across the mortality salience and dental pain 
groups.  They also found that there was a significant interaction between the fairness 
prime and whether participants were in the mortality salience or dental pain groups 
such that they found that the participants primed with fairness gave more money in 
the mortality salience condition than in the dental pain condition. 
 
1.6.4.7 Limitations 
 
There are several common limitations apparent in the studies included in this review 
and these are explored further below.  For example, there is an obvious bias towards 
undergraduate student samples of participants which limits the generalisability of this 
area of research.  There are also occasionally small sample sizes which can lead to 
questions about the power and validity of the results.  Other methodological 
weaknesses and limitations within individual studies are explored further below. 
  
1.6.4.7.1 Small sample sizes 
 
There were 14 experiments from the 54 reviewed which had less than 20 
participants per condition (Arieli et al, 2013 Ex2; Maio et al (2001) Ex2; Maio et al 
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(2009b) Ex3; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014 Ex4; Bargh et al, 2001 Ex2; 
Verplanken & Holland, 2002 Ex1; Yang et al, 2013 Ex1&2; Bargh et al, 1996 Ex1; 
Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1; Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex1; Karremans, 2007 Ex2; Maio 
et al, 2009 Ex3&4).  This makes it difficult to interpret the results from these 
experiments with confidence as the results may lack good effect sizes.  In contrast to 
this however, many of the studies reviewed have large sample sizes which means 
that the majority of the results within this review can be considered to have power.  
Many of the effects seen in the experiments noted above have also been replicated 
or explored within further experiments with larger participant samples which means 
that more generally the effects seen within the literature as a whole have good effect 
sizes. 
 
1.6.4.7.2 Lack of control group 
 
In total 18 of the studies do not report having a control group as part of their design 
(Jonas et al, 2013 Ex2&3; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014 Ex3; Hertel & Kerr, 
2001; Yang et al, 2013 Ex2,3,4&5; Shafran et al, 2006; Wheeler et al, 2008; Epley & 
Gilovich, 1999 Ex1; Bargh et al, 2001 Ex3; Utz et al, 2004 Ex1&2; Smeesters et al, 
2009 Ex3; Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex2; Verplanken et al, 2009 Ex2; Bechtoldt et al, 
2012).  In some cases this is due to the researchers using a control group from a 
previous study where they were intending to replicate the same procedures and 
measures (e.g. Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex2).  However, this methodology does not 
take account of other factors such as the potential for a different environment being 
used for the new study or other such confounding variables which would mean that 
the control group from the previous research may have been tested under different 
conditions to the current experimental participants.  Other studies utilised 
participants from other conditions within the study as their control groups.  For 
example, Yang et al (2013 Ex2,3,4&5) used four groups of participants in their 
studies, with two groups being primed with the clean or dirty money conditions, while 
other participants were asked to count clean or dirty paper.  However, there were 
significant interactions between the dirty and clean paper and dirty and clean money 
conditions in all of their studies which makes it difficult to judge how participants 
would have responded to the behavioural measures if they had not been exposed to 
money or paper primes at all. 
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1.6.4.7.3 Experimenter not blind to conditions  
 
It is not clear in the reporting of some of the studies as to whether the experimenters 
were blind to conditions (e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 2002 Ex1,2&3; Smeesters et al, 
2003 Ex 1-4) while in at least one study it was clear that they were not (Arieli et al, 
2013 Ex2).  This is one of the strengths of the methodologies around priming values; 
that experimenters take lengths to ensure that they are not biasing their own 
behaviour when carrying out their research in order to get results in favour of their 
hypotheses.  Generally, the experiments reviewed carefully considered their 
methodology so that the individual experimenters did not know which conditions the 
participants were allocated to in order to avoid any conscious or unconscious 
changes in experimenter behaviour.  The procedures for this were clearly highlighted 
within several studies (e.g. Harris et al, 2013 Ex1&2; Neuberg, 1988; Karremans, 
2007 Ex1&2) with almost all (excepting those initially highlighted above) outlining 
some details of these procedures within their methods sections. 
 
1.6.4.7.4 Participants not probed for suspicion 
 
There were six studies that did not report whether they probed the participants for 
suspicion at the conclusion of the study (e.g. Arieli et al, 2013 Ex2; Yang et al, 2013 
Ex1,2&4, Shafran et al, 2006; Karremans, 2007 Ex2).  The importance of this is that 
these studies are investigating the activation of values at an unconscious cognitive 
level.  In order to understand how priming values affects behaviours we need to see 
participants responding to tasks in as natural a way as possible.  If participants 
suspect links between tasks that are administered then there is a chance that they 
will change their behaviour accordingly.  By probing participants for suspicion at the 
conclusion of the study the experimenter is able to ascertain whether the effects that 
they have seen in the experiment are genuinely due to the manipulations that they 
have made in the study rather than due to the participant changing their behaviour 
consciously to attempt to meet the experimenter’s expectations.  As such, we cannot 
be certain within these studies whether the participants were aware of the priming 
task or not and whether this awareness affected their behaviour.   
 
Due to the nature of the Shafran et al (2006) paper being related to keeping a food 
diary over the course of a week following the signing of an explicit contract we can 
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ascertain that these participants would have been aware of the nature of the study 
and may have guessed its purpose.  In the case of Arieli et al (2013 Ex2) we know 
that they carried out this study as a direct attempt to increase individuals’ 
benevolence values and they utilised a range of persuasive priming procedures in 
order to do this.  As such, participants may have been explicitly aware of the 
attempts of the researchers and part of the behaviour that the researchers then saw 
in terms of volunteering with a charity may have been related to demand effects.  
Yang et al (2013 Ex1) did not debrief their participants due to this being a field 
research study but a debrief procedure could have given the researcher an idea of 
any confounding variables such as individual differences in whether their market 
vendor participants had felt angry or rushed which led to less fair behaviour rather 
than unfair behaviour being related to the dirty money prime. 
 
In several studies the researchers report that there was some participant awareness 
of the primes which was acknowledged during the debriefing procedure (e.g. 
Neuberg, 1988; Maio et al, 2009a) and these participants were then removed from 
further analysis so as not to bias the rest of the sample.  As such, these are 
important procedures to include within priming studies to ensure unbiased data. 
 
1.6.4.7.5 Random allocation to conditions 
 
The majority of studies noted that the participants were randomly allocated to 
conditions but at least three studies did not specify this (e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 
2002 Ex1,2&3).  This is important because random allocation to conditions is another 
aspect of reducing bias in experiments through ensuring that all the participants are 
allocated without the experimenter choosing which participant goes into which 
condition based upon some other pre-determined criteria which might favour their 
hypotheses.  
 
1.6.4.7.6 Mediating effects not considered 
 
Given the range of mediating effects that have been noted in the previous section of 
this review, it is perhaps surprising that some studies have not considered any 
mediating factors within their research.  For example, Maio et al (2009a Ex2,3&4) do 
not consider any other factors which could have affected their results beyond their 
interpretation in line with the Schwartz values model although they do acknowledge 
80 
 
that there could be other values impacting on the behaviour measure and that we 
cannot be certain which values are having the effect.  Bargh et al (2001 Ex1) also do 
not consider any mediating factors in their study.  This could be a limitation as the 
actual priming effects in many of the studies included in the review appear to be 
mediated by other factors and as such studies which do not consider the inclusion of 
mediating factors may overestimate the direct effects of the priming tasks on 
behaviour. 
 
1.6.4.7.7 Validity of behaviour measures 
 
There are several limitations in the literature with regards to measures of behaviour 
as related to values.  Of note is the fact that we cannot be certain which values are 
having an effect on many behaviours because values themselves are considered as 
‘trans-situational’ and as such are related to many different behaviours.  Likewise, 
behaviours can be related to many different values (Maio et al, 2009a Ex2,3&4; 
Bargh et al, 2001 Ex2).  In the Bargh et al (2001 Ex2) study participants complete a 
resources allocation game as a measure of cooperation between the self and the 
wider community.  However, this game is ambiguous in relation to the values it is 
actually measuring as it could also be related to caring about the environment as 
well as being related to values concerned with social order and survival in terms of 
maintaining social order and following group rules. 
 
Another important issue is the general validity of the measures being utilised.  For 
example, Maio et al (2009a Ex3&4) use novel behavioural tasks as measures of 
curiosity and cleanliness in relation to openness and security values respectively.  As 
these are novel behavioural measures it is unclear how valid they are in terms of 
how well they actually measure the values that they are proposed to measure and 
how standardised they are in terms of how participants will respond to the 
behaviours to give an idea that they are actually measuring differences due to the 
primes rather than individual differences.  
 
Another example of a measure that may not be valid is the measure of rudeness 
behaviour seen in the Bargh et al (2006 Ex1) experiment.  A number of participants 
within this experiment did not interrupt the experimenter at all during the allocated 
time suggesting that the measure was not entirely valid.  This was similar to that 
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seen by Wheeler et al (2008) when they attempted to use the same measure of 
behaviour.  In this case there could be other factors to take into account, such as the 
motivation for the participant to interrupt the experimenter.  For example, there may 
have been reasons why some participant needed to finish the study more quickly 
than others.  There was also the confounding factor that the person the rudeness 
was aimed at was someone in a position of authority which adds a further dimension 
to the requirement to be rude or polite. 
 
In another study Hertel & Fielder (1998 Ex1&2) use the ring measure of social values 
as a way of measuring participants’ behaviour in terms of whether they are altruistic, 
cooperative, individualistic, competitive or aggressive.  One of their main findings is 
that the cooperative behaviour of participants, as measured by the ring measure, is 
not related to cooperation primes but is instead qualified by an interaction between 
primes and pre-dispositions indicating the pro-social predispositions (altruistic and 
cooperative) are more likely to display cooperative behaviour.  Smeesters et al (2003 
Ex1-4) used the same measure to determine their participants’ pre-dispositions prior 
to priming and measuring behaviours using an economic game and they concluded 
that the participants’ pre-dispositions interact with the primes to affect behaviour.  
This raises questions as to what exactly the ring measure of social values is 
measuring and whether it can be considered a measure of cooperative behaviour or 
rather a measure of pre-dispositions.   
 
There is a general difficulty with the economic games utilised in many of the studies 
included  in this review in that they tend to rely on hypothetical monetary payoffs and 
even those studies where the participants are given monetary rewards they are a 
fraction of the actual money used in the games.  As such there is a question over 
how well these games actually apply to real-life behaviour in relation to cooperation, 
sharing and equality (Smeesters et al, 2003).  Many of the studies also incorporate a 
single trial of one of these games (e.g. Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex1-4) which assumes 
that the participant is making that one choice based upon the primed value and that 
this is enough to constitute behaviour.  However, many other studies also utilise 
behaviour measures that are based on one decision only (e.g. Verplanken et al, 
2002) and the argument for this is that the primes are potentially having an effect on 
the participants’ decision making process in terms of the information that they use to 
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make their decision as well as other factors such as considering the social context.  
As such, these experiments may be more applicable to real life settings than they 
first appear to be. 
 
There are some examples where the behaviour measures are biased in favour of 
seeing certain behaviour.  For example, Maio et al (2009b Ex1, 3&4) gave 
participants options for allocating points between two groups which substantially 
favoured the in-group over the out-group with the rationale that if participants chose 
to allocate points equally this indicated a conscious effort.  However, they do not 
consider that the matrices being biased towards the in-group may have inadvertently 
primed their other participants towards the in-group which would have biased their 
results.  It would have been helpful for the researchers to have demonstrated that 
the control group would favour the in-group when they had options favouring the out-
group and the in-group available to them in order to then compare the choices made 
by the equality primed participants.   
 
Other general concerns with the measures used include the Jonas (2013 Ex2) study 
in which they measure the amount of money participants are willing to donate to 
charity.  The researchers themselves acknowledge that this measure relies on the 
amount of money the participants had available to them at the time.  Jonas et al 
(2013) attempted to overcome this by paying the participants in cash at the start of 
the study so that they at least had a small amount of money available to donate but 
other measures of volunteering of donating would have been useful to consider. 
 
1.7.4.7.8 Conceptualisation of values 
 
Some studies such as Maio et al (2001); Maio et al (2009ab); Karremans (2007); 
Verplanken et al (2009); Verplanken & Holland (2002) and Arieli et al (2013) clearly 
conceptualise the values under investigation in relation to available models within the 
values literature (e.g. Schwartz model of basic human values; Schwartz 1992, 1994). 
 
However, within many of the studies there are unclear conceptualisations of values 
with regards to the concepts being primed.  Many of the studies used in this review 
do not offer a framework for understanding values and do not acknowledge that their 
experiments are related to the values literature at all (e.g. Neuberg, 1988; Hertel & 
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Kerr, 2001; Epley & Gilovich, 1999; Utz et al, 2004; Wheeler et al, 2008; Bargh et al, 
2001; Shafran et al, 2006; Jonas et al, 2013; Hart & Albarracin, 2009; Smeesters et 
al, 2003 Ex1-4; Smeesters et al, 2009a Ex3; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014).  
Despite this all of these studies are priming concepts which fit with current 
conceptualisations of social values.  For example, Smeesters et al (2003 Ex1-4) use 
the terms ‘morality’ and ‘might’ as concepts that are being primed to investigate the 
effects on cooperative behaviours.  When studying the actual target primes that are 
being used within the priming procedure it is apparent that the term ‘morality’ refers 
to pro-social values including; cooperative, helpful, fair, caring and so on, while the 
term ‘might’ refers to pro-individual values including; powerful, striving, smart and 
persistent (Smeesters et al, 2003).  However, the fact that these studies do not 
conceptualise their research in terms of social values but rather in relation to other 
concepts such as social norms, stereotypes, morality, goals and traits suggests that 
there are large overlaps in the conceptualisations of these concepts within the field 
of social psychology.  As such, it may be difficult to interpret results in the area of 
priming values without reference to a consistent framework such as the Schwartz 
model (Schwartz, 1992; 1994). 
 
One further factor related to this is that it is unclear what concepts some studies are 
priming.  For example, Epley & Gilovich (1999 1&2) prime conformity and non-
conformity in different groups of participants to see the effects on behaviours related 
to conforming with the opinions of others which are unlikely to be accurate reflections 
of the participants’ actual experience.  They found that priming conformity made the 
participants more likely to agree with the confederates opinions but they also found 
that priming non-conformity had the same effect to a slightly letter degree.  They 
suggest that this indicates that priming the opposing motivation (non-conformity) had 
the same effect as priming conformity.  Another viewpoint is that rather than non-
conformity representing the opposing motivation to conformity it actually represents 
another aspect of conformity.  This means that because words used to bring to mind 
non-conformity such as ‘oppose, rebel, confront and defy’ are still semantically linked 
to those used to bring to mind conformity e.g. ‘comply, respect, obey and uphold,’ 
either of these priming groups is likely to prime conformity to some extent.  This was 
also supported by the Hertel & Fielder (1998 Ex1&2) studies which used prime 
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words semantically related to cooperation that were both positive and negative in 
nature to successfully prime the value. 
 
1.7.4.7.9 Confounding factors 
 
There are further instances of confounding factors, not covered in the sections 
above, within some of the studies.  For example Bargh et al (2001 Ex1) instructed 
their participants to ‘find as many words as possible’ within a word search task which 
could have added an extra element of priming which they do not account for in their 
interpretation of results.  This is especially pertinent in relation to the fact that Bargh 
et al (2001 Ex2) subsequently found that providing participants with the conscious 
goal to cooperate (i.e. instructing participants to cooperate as much as possible 
while completing a resource allocation game) had an effect on behaviour and 
interacted with the prime in accounting for the effects seen. 
 
In another Bargh et al (2006 Ex1) study the perceptions of the participants in relation 
to their feelings about the researcher were measured to investigate whether this had 
any mediating effect on whether the participant interrupted the experimenter of not 
(i.e. did the participant perceive the experimenter as being rude or not).  They found 
that ratings did not change across participants primed for rudeness or those primed 
for politeness and concluded that there were no differences in perceptions.  
However, they do not take account of the fact that there may be other factors at play 
such that the participants may not have wanted to get the experimenter into any 
trouble by saying that they were rude and priming rudeness may not have overcome 
such strong social norms as these.   
 
In terms of other examples, Harris et al (2013 Ex1&2) included procedures which 
could have made it explicit to participants that the experimenter was not aware which 
condition the participant was taking part in (i.e. asking the participant to keep 
materials face down) which could inherently raise suspicion within the participant as 
to the nature of the conditions.  Harris et al (2013) also note that they added 
measures to ensure experimenter impartiality in their replication attempt of Bargh et 
al (2001) but they do not consider whether there were other differences between 
their experiments such as the impact of samples from different universities which 
could have explained the fact that they found no effects of the prime on behaviour. 
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In relation to the priming tasks themselves there are examples where it is unclear 
which priming task had an effect and for what reason the effects occurred.  For 
example, Arieli et al (2013 Ex2) used four different priming tasks with the same 
group of participants as an ‘intervention’ for increasing benevolence values (pro-
social) values.  It is therefore difficult to interpret which of the priming tasks had an 
effect on the behaviour or whether all priming tasks contributed to the effects seen.  
In another study Maio et al (2001 Ex2) used two priming tasks, one that focused on 
providing reasons for values and another that focused on rating feelings in relation to 
a value.  They found that the priming task asking for reasons for the values had more 
of an effect on subsequent behaviour than that asking for ratings of feelings about 
the value but they do not account for the fact that the reasons prime group were 
given more time to complete the priming task than the other group.  It is possible that 
the more time spent thinking about the value had an effect more than the actual 
nature of the priming task itself. 
 
1.6.4.7.10 Generalisability 
 
As highlighted in the results section above 52 out of the 54 studies included in the 
review use undergraduate samples of participants which means that the results are 
difficult to generalise to other populations and one of the remaining 2 studies does 
not specify its participant sample (Yang et al, 2013 Ex4).  The only exception to the 
undergraduate student samples was Yang et al (2013; Ex1) who utilised an 
opportunistic sample of market vendors.  It is also noted that Shafran et al (2006) 
used a mixed undergraduate and community sample of volunteers for their study 
although they do not state the proportions of each in their final sample.  The ages of 
participants, where these were provided, appeared to be similar as mean ages 
ranged from 20 years (Karremans, 2007 Ex2) up to 24.1 years (Bargh et al, 2001 
Ex2).  This is in line with general undergraduate student samples but also limits the 
generalisability of the priming effects seen within the literature reviewed to wider age 
ranges.  It was also noted that 33 out of the 40 studies that provided information on 
the gender of participants utilised samples that were predominantly female.  This 
again highlights potential difficulties with being able to generalise to a wider sample. 
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The biggest difficulty with generalisability of the priming literature results, however, 
comes from the predominantly laboratory based research paradigms that are 
commonly used.  Although one of the strengths of many of the studies reviewed here 
is that they tend to adhere to stringent procedures in order to reduce bias, there has 
to be a question asked about how these findings are applicable to the real world.  
The use of subliminal computer based priming techniques and economic games are 
highly controllable paradigms that are replicable in further experiments but in relation 
to decisions and behaviours in everyday life there are more applicable methods such 
as attempting to measure observable behaviours (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a; Maio et al, 
2001; Wheeler et al, 2008; Bargh et al 1996; Epley & Gilovich, 1999; Bargh et al, 
2001; Karremans, 2007) and using priming paradigms that rely on materials readily 
available such as asking participants to think about values or reading values related 
materials (e.g. Maio et al, 2001; Arieli et al, 2013; Maio et al, 2009b; Karremans, 
2007; Jonas et al, 2013 Ex2; Yang et al, 2013 Ex6&7). 
 
1.6.4.8 Summary of Review Results 
 
The majority of studies investigating the effects of priming values on behaviour 
appear to be related to priming pro-social values (e.g. Maio et al, 2001 Ex 1&2; Arieli 
et al, 2013; Maio et al, 2009b Ex1,3&4) although there has also been considerable 
research into other areas of values such as pro-individual values (e.g. Bargh et al, 
2001 Ex 1,3,4&5; Hart & Albarracin, 2009 Ex 3&4) and pro-societal standards values 
(e.g. Yang et al, 2013 Ex1-7; Epley & Gilovich, 1999 Ex1&2).  Importantly, there 
have also been studies investigating the effects of priming values with opposing 
motivation on behaviours (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a Ex2-5; Smeesters et al, 2009a Ex3; 
Hertel & Fielder, 1998 Ex1&2)  
 
There has been a wide range of priming tasks used to prime values including 
subliminal computer based priming tasks (e.g. Neuberg, 1998; Wheeler et al, 2008), 
implicit tasks (e.g. Jonas et al, 2013 Ex2&3; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014 Ex 
3&4) and more explicit priming tasks (e.g. Maio et al, 2001 Ex1&2; Karremans, 2007 
Ex1&2) which have all shown success in leading to value congruent behaviours.  A 
number of different behaviours have also been investigated in relation to values and 
the behavioural measures used varies greatly across studies from behaviours 
around making decisions and choices (e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 2002 Ex 1,2&3;  
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Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex1-4) through to behaviours directly observed by the 
experimenter (e.g. Bargh et al, 2001 Ex1; Karremans, 2007 Ex1). 
 
In terms of the results of the experiments there is evidence from the majority of 
studies reviewed that priming values has direct effects on value congruent 
behaviours in the predicted directions (e.g.Arieli et al, 2013 Ex2; Maio et al, 2009 Ex 
1,3&4; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014 Ex3&4; Rasinsky et al, 2005; Epley & 
Gilovich, 1999 Ex1&2).  There were also a large number of studies that indicated 
that there are important mediating factors that can influence the relationship between 
priming values and value congruent behaviours such as value centrality (e.g. 
Verplanken & Holland, 2002 Ex2&3) and certain personality factors (e.g. Hart & 
Albarracin, 2009 Ex3&4). 
 
In terms of limitations, there are some common factors between studies such as a 
general bias towards undergraduate student samples of predominantly female 
participants of similar ages.  This limits the applicability of most results within this 
area to wider samples.  However, one of the strengths of the experiments reported is 
that there are generally strong methodological procedures in place to reduce 
experimenter bias, such as the experimenters being blind to conditions, randomising 
participants to experimental groups, using control groups and probing the 
participants for suspicion during a de-briefing procedure although occasionally 
studies do not report whether they have considered these factors.  
 
Other more specific limitations refer to the nature of the behavioural measures used 
in individual studies and how valid these are as measures of values and behaviour.  
For example, some studies rely on observable behaviours which can be difficult to 
measure (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a; Karremans, 2007 Ex1; Wheeler et al, 2008; Bargh 
et al, 2006 Ex1) while others rely on economic games which can be argued to have 
little practical relationship to real world decisions (e.g. Smeesters et al, 2003; Yang 
et al, 2013 Ex 2,4-7; Utz et al, 2004). 
 
There are also clearly differences in how values are conceptualised within different 
studies with many using the concepts of traits, stereotypes, social norms and goals 
to discuss their research (e.g. Neuberg, 1988; Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Epley & Gilovich, 
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1999; Utz et al, 2004; Wheeler et al, 2008; Bargh et al, 2001; Shafran et al, 2006; 
Jonas et al, 2013; Hart & Albarracin, 2009; Smeesters et al, 2003 Ex1-4; Smeesters 
et al, 2009a Ex3; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014) when there are clear 
overlapping factors in common between these concepts. 
 
1.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
 
This chapter has introduced the concept of social values and has defined them in 
terms of the Schwartz (1992, 1994; Schwartz et al, 2012) model of human values.  
The Schwartz model has been demonstrated to have been extensively researched in 
terms of its structural validity (e.g.Vecchione et al,2009; Bilsky et al, 2011) and it has 
been used in multiple studies which give supporting evidence for its underlying 
motivation structure as it relates to behaviour (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a; Karremans, 
2007).   
 
The process of activating values via a priming mechanism has been demonstrated to 
be a robust methodology for investigating how values can affect behaviour (e.g. Maio 
et al, 2009ab; Arieli et al, 2013; Karremans, 2007).  A variety of different values have 
been used within these priming studies with generally consistent effects although 
mediating factors have also been identified in the priming to behaviour pathway (e.g. 
Smeesters et al, 2003).  For example, value centrality has been shown to be a 
significant factor (e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 2002). 
 
The chapter has also described how values are conceptualised in a therapeutic 
context and provided evidence for the relationship between values and mental health 
generally (e.g. Savig et al, 2000; Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994; Silfver et al, 2008).  
Generally it has been highlighted that there is a lack of consistency in how values 
are utilised in therapies and that a more coherent structure of values within a therapy 
context would be useful. 
 
An overview of obsessionality has been provided including how obsessionality can 
be understood to be a continuum within the population (e.g. Clark & Rhyno, 1995; 
Mathews et al, 2004).  As such, obsessionality has been researched within clinical 
and non-clinical populations with relation to obsessionality symptoms (e.g. Coles et 
al, 2003; Thordarson et al, 2004).   Responsibility has also been highlighted as an 
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important aspect of obsessionality within cognitive theories of obsessionality (e.g. 
Salkovskis et al, 2000) and has been extensively researched in the literature (e.g. 
Rachman, 1998, 2002; Salkovskis et al, 2000; Freeston et al, 1993). 
 
Obsessionality has also been related to values within the Schwartz model at varying 
levels and links have more specifically been demonstrated between the conservation 
quadrant and obsessionality (e.g. Sortheix et al, 2013; Schwartz et al, 2000).  
 
1.8 INTRODUCTION TO CURRENT STUDY 
 
The current study was designed to investigate the relationship between the Schwartz 
structure of social values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) and obsessionality.  
Values have been shown to be trans-situational concepts that can have far-reaching 
implications for our behaviour and the choices that we make in our lives.  As such 
values have been readily incorporated into different forms of therapeutic 
interventions for mental health difficulties (e.g. Hayes, 2004; Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) with little investigation into how values can be structured in 
relation to mental health concepts (e.g. Wilson & Murrell, 2004).  The Schwartz 
model has been shown to be empirically supported (e.g. Bilsky et al, 2011) and has 
been systematically related to a variety of different concepts including some related 
to mental health (e.g. Silfver et al, 2008).  As such, it provides a useful way of 
understanding how values can be related to mental health.  As the strength of the 
Schwartz model is its dynamic structure of motivational influences underlying the 
social values it can readily be related to motivations to behave in different ways (e.g. 
Maio et al, 2009a).  This has potentially important implications for therapeutic 
interventions specifically related to behavioural therapies. 
 
The evidence from the literature review undertaken also suggests that priming 
values can have a large effect on behaviour (e.g. Maio et al, 2009ab; Karremans, 
2007, Arieli et al, 2013; Verplanken & Holland, 2002).  This is important, as therapies 
such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 2004) focus on the use 
of values to direct client behaviour in value congruent directions.  As such it would be 
important to know whether priming obsessionality related values could have effects 
on behaviours related to obsessionality as value congruent behaviours are seen to 
follow value primes. 
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Specifically the current study aims to primarily investigate the impact of priming 
values from the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) that are 
theoretically related to obsessionality (e.g. Schwartz et al, 2000) on obsessionality 
congruent behaviours.  As such measures of checking, ordering and cleaning 
behaviours are included in the experimental design as these appear to be common 
subtypes of obsessionality symptoms (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999; Lechman et al, 
1997).  As responsibility has been shown to be such as strong factor within cognitive 
models of obsessionality (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 2000) it will also be investigated as a 
potential mediating variable.  Responsibility also appears as a value within the 
benevolence basic value of the Schwartz model and as such there may be specific 
reasons to suggest that a responsibility measure may be related to values outside of 
the conservation quadrant (Schwartz, 1992).  Further background information for 
each of the hypotheses is outlined below. 
 
1.9 HYPOTHESES 
 
Hypothesis 1 - Taking into account the values priming literature and the proposed 
links between obsessionality and conservation values of the Schwartz model we 
predict that priming conservation values (clean, healthy and self-discipline) will lead 
to more obsessionality related behaviours while priming non-obsessionality related 
openness values (freedom, curiosity and variation in life) would lead to less of the 
obsessionality related behaviours.  More specifically:  
 
H1a. Priming obsessionality related conservation values (i.e. clean, healthy 
and self-discipline) will lead to more time spent completing a letter checking 
task compared to controls.  
 
H1b. Priming non-obsessionality related openness values (i.e. freedom, 
curiosity and variation in life) will lead to less time spent completing a letter 
checking task compared to controls. 
 
H1c. Priming obsessionality related conservation values will lead to increased 
scores of orderliness when putting colouring pens away compared to controls. 
 
H1d. Priming non-obsessionality related openness values will lead to 
decreased scores of orderliness when putting pens away compared to 
controls. 
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H1e. Priming obsessionality related conservation values will lead to more use 
of cleaning wipes when completing a gluing task compared to controls. 
 
H1f. Priming non-obsessionality related openness values will lead to less use 
of cleaning wipes when completing a gluing task compared to controls. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – As control group participants are not going to be primed to any 
values we would expect to see general relationships between questionnaire 
measures of obsessionality and responsibility and the obsessionality related 
behaviours that are unaffected by the primes.  As such we should see that the higher 
the self-report measure of obsessionality and responsibility the higher the levels of 
obsessionality related behaviours. 
 
H2. Control group participants will show positive correlations for higher scores 
on obsessionality and responsibility questionnaire measures being related to 
higher scores on obsessionality behavioural measures and lower scores on 
the questionnaire measures being related to lower scores on the behavioural 
measures.  
 
Hypothesis 3 – Based on the evidence for the strength of priming effects we predict 
that within the experimental groups the levels of obsessionality as measured on the 
questionnaire measures will interact with the quadrant being primed but that the 
effects of priming will also outweigh the effects of levels of obsessionality in terms of 
levels of obsessional behaviour seen.  This basically means that although we expect 
that those who have high self-reported obsessionality will perform more 
obsessionality related behaviours we also expect that priming obsessionality related 
values will have stronger effects.  
 
H3a. Participants who score high on self-reported obsessionality on 
questionnaire measures who are also primed for obsessionality related 
conservation values will show the highest scores on obsessionality related 
behavioural measures. 
 
H3b. Participants who score low on self-reported obsessionality on 
questionnaire measures who are also primed for non-obsessionality related 
openness values will show the lowest scores on obsessionality related 
behavioural measures. 
 
H3c. Participants who score low on self-reported obsessionality on 
questionnaire measures who are primed for obsessionality related 
conservation values will show higher subsequent scores on obsessionality 
related behavioural measures than those who are high on self-reported 
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obsessionality on questionnaire measures who are primed for the non-
obsessionality related openness  values. 
 
Hypothesis 4 – In line with the role of responsibility as a potentially mediating factor 
in the nature of obsessionality we also predict that there will be similar relationships 
between self-reported responsibility on questionnaire measures and the 
obsessionality related behaviours.  As such we predict that within the experimental 
groups the levels of responsibility as measured on the questionnaire measure will 
interact with the quadrant being primed but that the effects of priming will also 
outweigh the effects of levels of responsibility in terms of levels of obsessional 
behaviour seen.  
 
H4a. Participants who score high on self-reported responsibility on 
questionnaire measures who are also primed for obsessionality related 
conservation values will show the highest scores on obsessionality related 
behavioural measures. 
 
H4b. Participants who score low on self-reported responsibility on 
questionnaire measures who are also primed for non-obsessionality related 
openness values will show the lowest scores on obsessionality related 
behavioural measures. 
 
H4c. Participants who score low on self-reported responsibility on 
questionnaire measures who are primed for obsessionality related 
conservation values will show higher subsequent scores on obsessionality 
related behavioural measures than those who are high on self-reported 
responsibility on questionnaire measures who are primed for the non-
obsessionality related openness  values. 
 
Hypothesis 5 – In line with the research outlined in section 1.6.4.6.1 we expect that 
value centrality will have an impact on the measures of obsessionality.  As such we 
would expect that those participants who rate obsessionality related conservation 
values as their value priorities will show higher self-reported ratings of obsessionality 
as well as more obsessionality related behaviours than participants with other value 
priorities.  It is expected that the reverse pattern would be seen in those participants 
who rate non-obsessionality openness values as their value priorities.  It is also 
expected that responsibility will show a similar relationship with relation to the self-
transcendence value quadrant as responsibility is seen as a value within this 
quadrant of the Schwartz model.  As value centrality has been shown to be a 
mediating factor on whether value congruent behaviour is seen following priming of 
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values within previous priming studies it is expected that value centrality will have 
effects beyond the presence of the priming of obsessionality versus non-
obsessionality related values. 
 
H5a. Participants who rate the obsessionality related conservation values as 
being of highest priority to them (relative to other values) will show higher self-
reported obsessionality on questionnaire and behaviour measures of 
obsessionality compared to participants who rate non-obsessionality 
openness  values as being of highest priority to them (relative to other 
values). 
 
H5b. Participants who rate the self-transcendence values as being of highest 
priority to them (relative to other values) will show higher self-reported 
responsibility on questionnaire measures of responsibility compared to 
participants who rate self-enhancement values as being of highest priority to 
them (relative to other values). 
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Chapter two: Methods 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will describe the methods used for this research study.  This will include 
details of the design, sample of participants, measures used, the procedure for 
gathering the data and details of clinical governance. 
2.2 DESIGN 
 
In line with the aims of the study, a quantitative methodology was employed and a 
cross-sectional (between subjects) design was used.   The data was analysed using 
factorial design (ANOVA) techniques which are further described in the analysis 
section. 
2.3 POWER ANALYSIS 
 
A power analysis was carried out using G Power.  As there was a wide variation in 
effect sizes when reviewing previous studies it was felt that a range of power 
calculations would be beneficial to give an indication of the range of potential sample 
sizes required to have adequate power.  Effect sizes were obtained from similar 
studies reported by Maio et al, 2009a; Maio et al, 2009b and Verplanken et al, 2002.  
The effect sizes ranged from small to large (0.13 up to 0.73).  ANOVA power 
analyses were carried out with the various effect sizes with the number of groups set 
to 3 and response variables at 3.  A total sample size between 39 and 576 was 
identified using the effect sizes from the studies above (Maio et al, 2009a; Maio et al, 
2009b and Verplanken et al, 2002).  
 
The actual sample size for the current study was then calculated by taking an effect 
size from the middle of those seen in previous studies (i.e. 0.35) which yielded a 
sample size of 84.  This was rounded up to 90 for the study to allow for any 
participant data being excluded based on suspicions around the purpose of the 
study. 
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2.4 INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
 
There were no specific inclusion and exclusion criteria for the study aside from those 
noted below. 
 
Inclusion: 
Participants had to be adults, aged 18 or above and registered to access the 
Experimental Management System at Cardiff University. 
 
It was assumed that all participants were capable of giving informed consent (see 
section 2.10 below). 
2.5 SAMPLE 
 
The study sample comprised of 90 participants containing three groups of adults 
over the age of 18.  All of the participants were drawn from a student and community 
population and the three groups all had similar demographics as shown in Table 2.1 
below (see Results section 3.3.1, Table 3.1).  The three groups each comprised of 30 
participants and included two experimental groups and one control group. 
 
Table 2.1 – Participant Demographics across groups 
 1 - Conservation 2 - Openness 3 – Control 
Mean age (stD) 20.80(4.44) 21.07 (4.43) 22.63 (7.41) 
Age Range 18-40 18-40 19-50 
% Female 90% 90% 80% 
% White British 90% 83% 70% 
2.6 MEASURES 
 
Participants in the two experimental groups (conservation and openness) were 
asked to complete a priming task which provided a measure of the strength of their 
cognitive support for the values to which they were primed.  These participants were 
asked to consider reasons why conservation values (clean, healthy and self-
disciplined) or openness values (freedom, curiosity and variation in life) were 
important and to write these reasons on the sheet provided (see section 2.8).  
Behavioural measures of obsessionality (checking, ordering and cleaning 
behaviours) were embedded within the next two tasks that participants were asked 
to complete.  These tasks and behavioural measures are described further below 
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(see sections 2.6.1 & 2.6.2).  Further variables under examination in this study were 
participant value priorities, self-reported levels of obsessionality and self-reported 
levels of responsibility beliefs.  In addition to the demographic questionnaire, four 
established questionnaires were used to measure these variables and these five 
components together made up the questionnaire battery.  Details of the 
questionnaire measures can be found in section 2.6.3 below. 
2.6.1 Priming task – listing reasons for importance of values 
 
Participants in both of the experimental groups were asked to complete a priming 
task (see Appendix 3 and 4) while participants in the control group were asked to 
complete a similar task which did not involve priming any values (see Appendix 5).  
This task was the manipulating variable in the study.  The task involved the 
participant giving reasons for different values being important.  Participants were 
asked to consider this from the perspective of why the values were important to them 
personally as well as why they felt the values would be important to society in 
general.  Participants in the experimental conditions were primed to values on 
opposing sides of the Schwartz model.  Conservation values are most closely 
associated with aspects that could be considered as being related to mental health 
difficulties such as OCD.  For example values such as being clean, healthy and self-
disciplined all fall within the conservation quadrant and more specifically within 
conformity and security values.  These values are also hypothesised to be related to 
a wider anxiety-avoidance and self-protection based motivation as shown by the 
latest revised version of the Schwartz model (Schwartz et al, 2012) as well as being 
part of a more general community based (social) motivation.  These wider 
motivations of the conservation values are in conflict with the opposing values within 
the openness to change quadrant i.e. self-direction and stimulation values which 
have motivations that are more about being anxiety free and personal growth.  
 
In light of the above, participants in the conservation values condition were primed 
with the values ‘clean,’ ‘healthy’ and ‘self-discipline’ while participants in the 
openness to change values condition were primed with the values ‘freedom,’ 
‘curiosity’ and ‘variation in life.’  In both conditions participants were given 9 minutes 
to list as many reasons as possible as to why the values were important to them and 
to society in general. 
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2.6.2 Behavioural measures 
 
Participants’ behaviours related to checking, ordering and cleaning were measured 
in the study.  Most behavioural measures were carried out covertly with participants 
being de-briefed at the conclusion of the study (see section 2.8).  All participants 
completed these three measures as they were related to Hypothesis 1 (see section 
1.9) which required all three participant groups’ responses to the tasks. 
 
2.6.2.1 Checking behaviour 
 
Checking behaviour was measured through recording the time interval at which a 
participant completed a task asking them to identify all the letters ‘t’, ‘g’ and ‘h’ in a 
passage of text by putting a line through each letter and writing the total numbers of 
each letter found at the bottom of the page (see Appendix 6).  Participants were also 
asked to use a different coloured pen for each of the three letters so as to 
legitimately introduce the colouring pens that were subsequently used for the 
ordering task (see section 2.6.2.2 below).  When participants indicated that they had 
finished the task they were also then prompted with the question “you have some 
time left, would you like to check your answers before we move on.”  This gave the 
participants a motive and opportunity to spend time checking their answers.  The 
total amount of time that participants spent on this task was recorded.  Longer times 
spent on this task indicated more checking behaviour with less time spent on the 
task indicating less checking behaviour.  
 
2.6.2.2 Ordering 
 
Ordering was measured through the novel task of whether participants put away 
colouring pens at the end of a task according to the order indicated on the pack.  
That is, whether they arranged the colouring pens in an ordered way.  Following the 
letter checking task participants were asked by the experimenter whether they could 
put the colouring pens away while the experimenter got the materials for the next 
task ready.  The experimenter then made a note of the order in which the pens had 
been placed in the packet while the participant completed the next task.  In order to 
gain a varied measure of ordering an overall score was calculated by adding 
together the total number of pens for each individual which were placed within 2 slots 
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of their correct position.  This gave a score of 0-12 on the ordering measure for each 
participant with higher scores indicating closer adherence to the order prescribed.   
 
2.6.2.3 Cleaning 
 
Cleaning behaviour was measured through recording the time interval at which a 
participant used a cleaning wipe whilst completing a messy task.  This measure has 
been previously used by Maio et al (2009b).  In their study, it was found that those 
participants primed for security values were quicker to use a cleaning wipe than 
those who were primed for the opposing self-direction value.  In the current study 
participants were asked to glue stars onto a piece of paper using a messy glue stick 
while a pack of cleaning wipes were provided in front of the participant during the 
task.  Whether the participant used a cleaning wipe or not was recorded as the 
measure of cleaning behaviour and the time interval for the point at which the 
participant used a wipe was also recorded.   
 
2.6.3 Questionnaire Measures 
 
All participants were administered the questionnaire measures in the following order: 
 
 Demographic questionnaire 
 The Portrait Values Questionnaire 21 item version (PVQ - 21) 
 The Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (VOCI) 
 The Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ) 
 The Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RAQ) 
 
2.6.3.1 Demographic questionnaire 
 
All participants were asked to complete a demographic information sheet.  The 
information collected from this questionnaire included the participant’s age, gender 
and ethnicity (see Appendix 7). 
 
2.6.3.2 Portrait Values Questionnaire 21 item version (PVQ 21) 
 
The PVQ 21 (see Appendix 8) was completed by all participants (n=90) as 
participant value orientations were used to test hypothesis five (see introduction, 
section 1.9).  The PVQ 40 was developed by Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess 
& Harris (2001) to measure the ten basic values of the Schwartz model.  It is an 
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alternative to the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) which has been found to be too 
abstract for use with some samples of individuals.  The PVQ is considered a more 
implicit measure of an individual’s value priorities than the SVS which uses more 
explicit methods to discover an individual’s most strongly held values.   
 
There are two versions of the PVQ at present, a 40 item version and a shorter 21 
item version which was developed specifically for use in the European Social Survey 
(ESS).  The ESS is a cross-national survey that has been conducted every two years 
since 2001 in order to measure the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of 
diverse populations.  The shorter 21 item version was used in the current study to 
reduce the burden on participants due to the number of tasks and questionnaires 
they were being asked to complete.  
 
The PVQ 21 includes short verbal portraits of 21 different people, gender-matched 
with the respondent (Schwartz, 2005; Schwartz et al, 2001).  Each portrait describes 
a person’s goals, aspirations or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a 
value.  For example: item 2 on the female version measures the value ‘power’ by 
stating ‘It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and 
expensive things.’  For each portrait the respondent answers: “how much like you is 
this person?”  The respondent can choose from the options: very much like me, like 
me, somewhat like me, a little like me, not like me, and not like me at all.  
Respondents own values are therefore inferred from their self-reported similarity to 
other individuals being described implicitly in terms of their particular values.  There 
are two items related to each value, with the exception of ‘universalism’, for which 
there are three items representing the wider conceptual breadth of the universalism 
value compared to other values.   
 
As it is possible that some respondents might answer that all of the portraits are very 
much like them (or conversely not like them at all) the PVQ is scored by looking at 
each respondents respective value priorities.  As such the PVQ is scored by 
subtracting each individual’s mean response to all of the value items from their 
response to each item.  This gives an indication of the individual’s value priorities.  In 
the case of the current research, which is interested in the individual’s value 
quadrant priorities, the scores for values within each quadrant are then summed and 
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averaged for each individual participant.  The four value quadrants are then ranked 
in terms of importance from the lowest score (indicating high priority) to the highest 
(indicating low priority) score for each participant.  This method has been shown by 
Verkasalo et al (2012) to provide an extremely robust two-dimensional structure of 
an individual’s value priorities across quadrants. 
 
The internal consistency of the PVQ-40 version has been shown to be good 
(Schwartz, 2005; Schwartz et al, 2001) although there have been some concerns 
with regards to the internal consistency of the PVQ-21 (e.g. Davidov, 2010; Davidov 
et al, 2008).  However, the construct validity of both has been strongly supported 
(PVQ-40 Vecchione et al, 2009; Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012; PVQ-21 Bilsky et al, 
2011) especially with regards to the quadrant level structure (PVQ-40 Hinz et al, 
2005; PVQ-21 Verkalalo et al, 2012). 
 
2.6.3.3 The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI) 
 
The VOCI was completed by all participants as it was used to test hypothesis three 
(see section 1.9) which includes comparisons across all three groups.  The VOCI 
(see Appendix 9) consists of 12 items related to contamination, 12 items related to 
obsessions, 12 items related to ‘just right’ feelings, 7 items related to hoarding, 6 
items related to checking and 6 items related to indecisiveness.  Each item on the 
questionnaire is scored on a five-point Likert-type scale of 0-4 with the respondent 
being asked to rate each statement based on ‘how much is each of the following 
statements true of you’ with possible responses being ‘not at all,’ ‘a little,’ ‘some,’ 
‘much’ and ‘very much.’  This means that a person can score between 0 and 220 for 
OCD symptoms overall with scores obtainable for each of the various subscales.  All 
the items are positively cued and are related to current concerns and behaviour. 
 
The current study did not aim to use the VOCI as a diagnostic tool but was instead 
interested in looking at the relationship of human values to an overall measure of 
obsessionality as related to obsessive compulsive disorder in particular.  The VOCI 
was chosen for the current study as it has a scoring system which is easier for a 
non-clinical student sample to respond to, compared to other measures of OCD 
symptomatology which often ask for a rating of the level of distress related to various 
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symptoms as well as frequency (e.g. the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory, Foa et al 
1998).  The main advantages of the VOCI is that it assesses a range of both 
cognitive and behavioural aspects of OCD.   Overduin and Furnam (2012) point out 
that the VOCI lacks items for assessing ordering/arranging symptoms or doubts and 
mental neutralising.  Therefore it is often suggested that the Symmetry, Ordering and 
Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ) is used as a supplement to the VOCI.  
 
There is evidence for excellent internal consistency and good test-retest reliability of 
the VOCI from the original development study (Thordarson et al, 2004) as well as 
more recently (Radomsky et al, 2006; Chiorri, Melli & Smurra, 2011).  It has been 
noted that there are some difficulties with the factor structure within the VOCI 
(Thordarson et al, 2004; Chiorri et al, 2011) but there are good correlations between 
overall scores and other measures of OCD in clinical and non-clinical samples 
(Thordarson et al, 2004).  It is also reported by Overduin & Furnham (2012) that the 
VOCI has good reliability and adequate validity overall and Chiorri et al (2011) 
conclude that the VOCI is a useful tool for use in non-clinical populations.   
 
2.6.3.4 The Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ) 
 
The SOAQ was completed by all participants as it was used to test hypothesis three 
(see section 1.9) which includes comparison across all three groups.  The SOAQ 
(Radomsky & Rachman, 2004)(see Appendix 10) was developed as a specific 
measure for ordering/arranging symptoms of OCD.  It was also developed using an 
undergraduate student sample as the ordering and arranging symptoms are thought 
to occur on a continuum throughout the population.  The SOAQ is a self-report 
measure that consists of 20 items related to orderliness/arranging with each item 
scored on a scale of 0-4 with participants being asked to ‘please circle the number 
from 0-4 to indicate how much you agree with each statement.’  The response 
options include ‘not at all (0),’ ‘slightly (1),’ ‘moderately (2),’ ‘very (3),’ and ‘extremely 
(4)’.  This means that a person can score between 0 and 80 on the SOAQ giving a 
total score for an ‘orderliness’ subscale.   
 
There is evidence for high internal reliability of the SOAQ and very high test-retest 
reliability (Radomsky & Rachman, 2004).  There was also evidence found to support 
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the structure of the SOAQ as a measure of a single construct (Radomsky & 
Rachman, 2004). 
 
2.6.3.5 The Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS) 
 
The RAS was completed by all participants as it was used to test hypothesis four 
(see section 1.9) which includes comparison across all three groups.  The RAS 
(Salkovskis et al, 1999) (see Appendix 11) was developed as a measure of 
responsibility beliefs as these have been shown to be related to the development 
and maintenance of OCD. 
 
The questionnaire consists of 26 items related to different responsibility beliefs.  
Each item is scored on a scale of 0-6 meaning that a person can score between 0 
and 156 on this measure.  Respondents are asked to read a list of different attitudes 
or beliefs which people sometimes hold and to show their answers by putting a circle 
around the words which best describe how they think.  For example item one states: 
“I often feel responsible for things which go wrong” and the response options are 
“totally agree, agree very much, agree slightly, neutral, disagree slightly, disagree 
very much or totally disagree.”  The same response options are given for all 26 
items.  Responsibility beliefs are not used to diagnose mental health difficulties such 
as OCD but measures such as the RAS are sometimes used in clinical settings in 
order to gain an understanding of factors relevant to the individual’s development 
and maintenance of their mental health difficulties. 
 
There is evidence for the high internal consistency and high test-retest reliability of 
the RAS from a study conducted by Salkovskis et al (2000).  
2.7 RECRUITMENT 
 
Participants were recruited via the online Experimental Management System at 
Cardiff University, which is a system provided by the university psychology 
department which allows researchers to advertise their studies on the site and 
participants to sign up to available studies online.  The current study was advertised 
with the name of the study, length of time required to participate, amount of payment 
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for participation, available timeslots for participation and details for contacting the 
researcher if required.  As the current study paid participants £4 for their participation 
it was open to all potential participants with access to the online system.  This 
included undergraduate and postgraduate students from any school within the 
university and individuals from the community who wish to participate in studies for 
payment.  Participants were able to view the study information via the online system 
and volunteered to take part by booking themselves onto available time slots.  
Participants were then given a copy of the information sheet at the start of their 
session and could then decide whether to take part in the study or not.   
2.8 PROCEDURE 
 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three conditions.  Randomisation 
of participants to condition was carried out via the 90 packs of participant materials 
(30 packs relating to each of the three conditions) being randomly ordered by an 
independent person unrelated with the experiment prior to any participants being 
recruited.  The researcher then used the packs in the randomised order with the 90 
participants in turn.   
 
As stated in the recruitment section above, the participants were recruited via an 
online system that allowed them to volunteer for participation in the study.  When 
participants arrived for their individual timeslot with the researcher they were given 
the information sheet for the study to read and be able to ask questions (see 
Appendix12).  If participants were willing to continue with the study they were then 
asked to complete the consent form (see appendix 13). 
 
Those in the experimental conditions were next asked to complete the priming task 
and were given 9 minutes to complete this (appendix 3 & 4) which was timed using a 
stop watch by the experimenter.  Those in the control group were asked to complete 
a similar task asking for why they like or dislike different beverages (appendix 5) and 
they were also given 9 minutes to complete this task to ensure similar levels of effort 
across groups. 
 
All participants then completed the other tasks and measures in the following order: 
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Checking behaviour measure – letter identification task 
 
The researcher asked the participants to work through a brief passage of text 
crossing out all of the letter ‘t’s’, ‘g’s’ and ‘h’s’ in the text and recording the number of 
each letter at the bottom of the page (appendix 6).  Participants were asked to 
assign a different coloured pen to each of three different letters.  Participants were 
told to work as quickly as possible but to avoid making any mistakes.  They were 
also told that the experimenter was going to be timing them.  When participants 
indicated that they had finished the task the stop watch was halted and they were 
asked whether they wanted to check their answers.  Their response to this statement 
was recorded and for those who did not want to check their answers the time was 
recorded.  For those participants who did want to check their answers the stop watch 
was restarted and the participants were allowed to check their work for as long as 
they required.  When participants indicated that they had finished checking the total 
time taken to complete the task was recorded.  The work sheet was retrieved from 
the participants and the measure of ordering behaviour was instigated as below. 
 
Ordering behaviour measure – putting away the colouring pens 
 
At the end of the letter identification task the researcher asked whether the 
participant would mind putting the colouring pens away while the researcher got the 
next set of materials ready.  The experimenter pointed towards the cardboard packet 
for the pens which was placed face up on the table so that the participant could see 
the colour order in the front of the pack (see Appendix 14).  The experimenter then 
proceeded to retrieve the materials for the next task from a bag giving the participant 
time to put the pens away.  Before the participant started the next task the packet of 
pens were removed from their desk, ostensibly to make room for the next set of 
materials, so that the order in which the pens were put away could be recorded.  The 
participant then proceeded to the next task. 
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Cleaning behaviour measure – sticking stars task 
 
For this task the researcher asked the participant to stick different sized stars onto a 
piece of paper with star templates printed on it (appendix 15).  Participants were 
instructed that they should stick the stars as carefully as possible and that this was 
more important than the speed at which they completed the task.  They were also 
informed that they had five minutes to work on the task and that they did not have to 
complete all of the stars in this time as it was more important to be neat and careful.  
The participants were given a stick of glue to use for the task and an open pack of 
cleaning wipes were placed on the table in front of the participant along with the 
other materials.  They were then told that the experimenter would tell them when 
their 5 minutes had elapsed.  Whether the participant used a cleaning wipe was 
recorded along with the interval at which the wipe was first used. 
 
Questionnaire measures 
 
Following the tasks above, the participant was then given a questionnaire pack 
which asked them to complete the questionnaire measures in the following order: 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) 
Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (VOCI) 
Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ) 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS) 
 
Debriefing procedure 
 
Once all of the measures were complete the participants were verbally debriefed as 
to the true nature of the study and were assessed for suspicion as to the nature of 
the experiment.  The verbal debrief followed a funnel debriefing procedure previously 
used by Maio et al (2009) which initially involved asking participants about their ideas 
of what the study might be investigating before giving them further details and asking 
questions aimed at discovering any suspicions about the nature of the study.  It was 
explained as part of this procedure that sometimes participants are not told the 
hypotheses beforehand as this could affect their responses to the tasks and 
questions being asked (appendix 16).  Participants were told what the study was 
investigating and were told about what the different tasks were measuring, 
specifically in relation to the behaviours that were being recorded.  Following the 
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verbal debrief, during which participants had the opportunity to ask questions and 
withdraw from the study if they wished to, participants were provided with a paper 
debrief sheet to keep.  This debrief sheet also contained the information in the verbal 
debrief along with researcher contact details if the participant had any subsequent 
questions or concerns (appendix 17). 
 
Following completion of the session all data was entered into the Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences Version 20 (SPSS 20; IBM Corp, 2011) for analysis. 
2.9 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The current study employed quantitative methodology because the data was 
obtained using standardised questionnaires, as well as interval and ratio measures. 
 
The data was inputted to SPSS 20 which was then used to store and analyse the 
data.  Data was first explored in terms of meeting the assumptions for using 
univariate methods of analysis (ANOVA).  There were difficulties with the data 
meeting assumptions specifically with some measures showing deviation from a 
normal distribution and non-linearity (see results section 3.2.5).  As such, the data 
was analysed using non-parametric statistical methods.  Specifically Kruskal-Wallis 
ANOVA tests were used to examine Hypothesis 1 with regards to analysing 
differences between the three groups with regards to checking and ordering 
behaviour and Chi-square was used with regards to cleaning behaviour.  Kendall’s 
Tau was used to measure correlations within the control group for Hypothesis 2.  
Mann-Whitney U tests (for checking and ordering) and chi-square (for cleaning) were 
used to analyse differences between those scoring high on 
obsessionality/responsibility questionnaire measures or scoring low in 
obsessionality/responsibility for hypotheses 3 (obsessionality) and 4 (responsibility). 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was again used in order to analyse relationships between 
value orientation and the relationship with questionnaire measures for Hypothesis 5 
(see hypotheses section 1.9).  
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2.10 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
As the study was conducted using a university student and community sample 
ethical approval to conduct the research was sought from and granted by a 
University Ethics Board (see Appendix 18). 
 
The following points were given particular ethical consideration in this study. 
 
Informed consent  
All potential participants were provided with participant information sheets (see 
appendix 12) explaining the purpose of the study and what they would be expected 
to do if they chose to take part.  It was made clear to participants that participation 
was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any point without giving 
a reason.  All participants signed consent forms to indicate that they had read the 
information sheet, been able to ask questions, understood that they could withdraw 
at any time and that they were willing to participate. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality  
Participants were not asked to provide any personal details whilst completing the 
questionnaires and other tasks, thus ensuring anonymity.  The consent forms were 
stored separately from the other data in a locked filing cabinet in the school of 
psychology building.  The online system used for recruitment showed the principle 
researcher the names of the participants who had signed up for the study but this 
information was password protected and available to no other individuals.   
 
Participants’ well-being  
It was not anticipated that the research would cause participants to become 
distressed.  However, there was the possibility that completing some of the 
questionnaires may have been distressing for a few participants.  If this were to 
happen, the participants were advised via the information sheet and de-briefing 
sheet to discuss this with the principal researcher or that they could contact the 
researcher’s Academic Supervisor, who was a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, to 
discuss the issues raised in more depth (see appendix 17). 
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Chapter 3 - Results 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The chapter begins by giving details of any excluded data from the analysis and how 
missing values were handled.  It moves on to explain how outliers were dealt with 
and how assumptions for statistical testing were met.  It then shows how the data 
was statistically analysed in order to test the main hypotheses of the study.  
 
3.2 MANAGING THE DATA 
 
3.2.1 Excluded Data 
 
One participant from the conservation priming group was excluded from all analyses 
due to demonstrating suspicion as to the purpose of the priming task within the 
study.  The majority of participants (49%) were able to identify that the study was 
concerned with aspects of OCD during the funnel debriefing when asked what they 
thought the questionnaires were measuring.  None of these participants accurately 
related their suspicions about OCD to the other tasks being measured in the study.  
For example 21 participants identified the sticking stars task as a measure of 
precision/neatness related to OCD when the behaviour actually being measured 
during this task was the use of cleaning wipes which only the one excluded 
participant identified.  No participants, other than the one excluded, demonstrated 
any awareness of the nature of the link between the priming task and the other tasks 
they were asked to complete.  One other participant failed to follow through on the 
request to put the pens back in their pack so had no score available for this one 
behavioural measure, however their other data was retained for inclusion in the 
analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Data handling  
 
All statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS 20 (IBM Corp., 2011).  
 
3.2.3 Missing Value Imputation 
 
Four participants did not answer all of the questions in the questionnaires.  Two 
participants missed one question on the Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
(VOCI; items 29 and 33 respectively), one participant missed one question on the 
Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ; item 8) and one 
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participant failed to answer one question on both the VOCI (item 14)and the SOAQ 
(item 16).  These missing scores were pro-rated using the participants’ existing 
scores.  To pro-rate scores on the VOCI the sub-section that contained the missing 
value was used to establish the average score for the existing answers which then 
provided the score for the missing value.  For example, if a participant did not 
provide a score on the ‘checking’ subscale then their other scores from the checking 
subscale would be used to identify their average score for items on this subscale and 
this average score would be attributed to the missing value.  For missing scores on 
the SOAQ the scores were pro-rated using the whole scale scores.  This pro-rating 
method is commonly used to obtain complete datasets where minimal data is 
missing. 
 
Further information is provided below, in the relevant sections, about how 
questionnaire and behavioural measures were managed during the data analysis. 
 
3.2.4 Extreme scores and Outliers 
 
3.2.4.1Questionnaire measures 
 
Extreme scores were identified by studying boxplots of the questionnaire data in 
SPSS.  The data was initially investigated by overall means across the groups.  Two 
extreme scores were found on the SOAQ.  These scores were checked in the data 
files and were found to be accurate.  A Windsorising method was applied to these 
scores whereby they were changed to match the next highest score on the SOAQ 
that was not an extreme score (Field, 2013). This resulted in the outlying scores of 
59 and 49 being changed to 46. 
 
The data gathered from three of the questionnaire measures (VOCI, SOAQ and 
RAS) was then explored to identify potential outliers.  Box-plots were obtained and 
studied (see Appendix 20) for each of the measures to look at overall scores and 
scores by experimental group.  It was found that there were outliers identified for the 
SOAQ (n = 6) and RAS ( n = 1).  Given that these represented 6.7% and 1.1%, of 
each respective measure, these scores were all Windsorised to match the highest 
score that was not an outlier. This resulted in the outlying scores of 34, 42, and 46 
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(x3) being changed to 28 on the SOAQ and an outlying score of 175 being changed 
to 154 on the RAS. 
 
As the study was interested in investigating the differences between groups on the 
dependent behaviour measures of checking, ordering and cleaning the questionnaire 
measures were also checked for outliers at this level as well.  Further outliers were 
identified for the control group on the VOCI (2) and outliers were also found for the 
conservation group for the SOAQ (n = 2) and RAS (n = 1).  There were no further 
outliers identified for the openness group.  All of the outliers identified by group were 
again dealt with by Windsorising the outlier scores. This resulted in the outlying 
scores of 28 and 25 being changed to 23 on the SOAQ, 90 and 101 being changed 
to 88 on the VOCI and a score of 50 being changed to 78 on the RAS. 
 
The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) data was not included in the checks for 
extreme scores and outliers due to the nature of the analysis that was planned with 
the PVQ.  As this questionnaire was to be used to rank each individual participants’ 
value scores (following a standardisation procedure as recommended by Schwartz, 
2005) against their other individual value scores it was unnecessary to remove 
extreme scores and outliers.  Further details of the procedure for analysing the PVQ 
data can be found in the Method (section 2.6.3.2) and below (section 3.4.5).  
 
3.2.4.2 Behaviour measures 
 
One extreme score was identified on the checking behaviour measure and this was 
Windsorised to match the next highest score that was not an extreme score. This 
resulted in the outlying score of 487 being changed to 415. 
 
Box-plots obtained for the behaviour measure of checking and ordering showed that 
there were several outliers for both overall measures (see Appendix 20).  There were 
6 outliers identified for the checking scale and 10 outliers identified for the ordering 
behaviour scale.  These outlier scores were also Windsorised.  This resulted in the 
outlying scores of 415 (x2), 410, 389, 377 and 374 being changed to 347 on the 
checking behaviour measure.  On the ordering measure scores of 10 and 12 (x8) 
were changed to 9, as well as a score of 0 being changed to 2.  There were no 
further outliers identified by experimental group. 
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The cleaning behaviour was not checked for extreme scores and outliers because it 
was categorical (Yes/No) in nature rather than a scaled measure. 
 
3.2.5 Tests of Assumptions for Analysis of Variance  
 
The design of the study was cross-sectional (between subjects).  The data were 
checked for assumptions prior to analysis to determine the most suitable methods to 
employ in order to test the hypotheses.  The main assumptions of 1) dependent 
variables measured at the interval or ratio level, 2) independent variables consist of 
two or more categorical, independent groups, 3) independence of observations, 4) 
adequate sample size, 5) no univariate or multivariate outliers, 6) multivariate 
normality, 7) linear relationships between pairs of dependent variables, 8) 
homogeneity of variance and 9) no multicollinearity are outlined below with further 
details. 
 
1) The dependent variables should be measured at the interval or ratio level. 
 
The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory (VOCI), Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ) and 
Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RAS) are all interval based measures with responses 
given on a scale.  Checking behaviour was measured by time taken to complete a 
letter identification task (in seconds) and so is interval in nature and the ordering 
measure is based on the number of pens placed in certain positions with scores 
falling from 0-12.  Cleaning behaviour is ratio (number of participants who do use a 
wipe versus those who do not). 
 
2) The independent variable should consist of two or more categorical, 
independent groups. 
 
All independent variables consisted of two or more categories from independent 
groups of participants.  There were different independent variables investigated 
depending upon the hypotheses being tested.  For example Hypothesis 1 focused on 
the independent variable of the three groups (conservation, openness and control) 
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whereas Hypothesis 3 focused on high obsessionality participants versus low 
obsessionality participants.   
 
3) There should be independence of observations 
 
Participants were randomly allocated to the main experimental groups (conservation 
prime, openness prime and controls) which were mutually exclusive.  All other 
groups used i.e., high versus low obsessionality were also mutually exclusive.  As 
such, there were different participants between each group and there was 
independence between the observations within each group. 
 
4) There should be an adequate sample size 
 
The power analysis previously completed (see method section 2.3) indicated that 
there was sufficient power.  The power analysis estimated that 86 participants were 
necessary in order to show sufficient power based on previous similar experiments 
(e.g. Maio et al, 2009).  The current study had 89 participants (29 in conservation 
group, 30 in openness group and 30 in the control group) meaning that there was a 
sufficient sample size.  
 
5) There are no univariate or multivariate outliers 
 
This is previously outlined and was dealt with in section 3.2.4 (above) 
 
6) There is multivariate normality 
 
Skew and kurtosis scores were obtained for all of the measures (aside from the PVQ 
and the cleaning behaviour, for the reasons outlined above) as were Q-Q Plots and 
histograms to study the distribution of the scores (see Appendix 21-26).  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were also carried out for each measure and were 
interpreted in conjunction with the other information available (as recommended by 
Field, 2013).  This was initially done for the measures as overall scores (using the 
scores from across the three experimental groups) before being repeated for scores 
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within the three experimental groups separately.  The interpretation of this analysis 
for each measure is outlined below. 
 
Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (VOCI) 
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that the distribution of the overall VOCI scores 
deviated significantly from normal (D(89) = .149, p<.001) and this was supported by 
studying the relevant Q-Q plot as well as skew and kurtosis scores (see Appendix 
21).  There was particularly significant positive skew (z = 3.557, p<.001) within the 
overall measure.  There were mixed results when the VOCI was investigated using 
the individual groups with the conservation group (D(29) = .208, p<.01) and the 
control group (D(30) = .210, p<.01) both showing significant deviation from normal. 
The openness group (D(30) = .148, p=.09) was found to not deviate from a normal 
distribution.  However, within the openness and control groups the distributions of 
scores were found to be significantly positively skewed (p<.05 and p<.01 
respectively) suggesting that normal distribution should not be assumed. 
 
Symmetry Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ) 
Indications of significant positive skew were seen in the overall measure (z = 2.894 
p<.01) and within the conservation and openness groups (z = 2.002, p<.05 and z = 
1.991, p<.005 respectively).  Studying the Q-Q Plots and histograms suggested that 
the distribution could be close to normal in some of the subgroups (see Appendix 
22).  Kolmogorov-Smirnov analysis indicated that the distribution of the overall 
SOAQ scores deviated from normal (D(89) = .121, p<.01).  However, the individual 
group scores suggested that the SOAQ did not deviate from normal (conservation, 
D(29) = .177, p=.02; openness, D (30) = .148, p=.09; control, D(30) = .130, p=.20).  
This discrepancy could be due to the sample sizes as the K-S test has been shown 
to be overly stringent with larger sample sizes where very small deviations from a 
normal distribution can lead to significant results.  However the significant skew 
scores for the conservation and openness groups suggest that normal distribution 
should not be assumed (Field, 2013). 
 
Responsibility Appraisal Survey (RAS) 
The RAS in contrast had very small positive skew scores and small negative kurtosis 
scores generally across the three groups indicating that this scale was closer to 
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being  normally distributed than the VOCI and SOAQ and this was supported by  
examining  the Q-Q plots (see Appendix 23).  A subsequent Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
analysis (D(89) = .086, p=.10) indicated that the distribution of the overall RAS 
scores did not deviate from normal.  The distribution across the individual group 
scores were also found to not deviate from normal (conservation, D(29) = .083, 
p=.20; openness, D(30) = .112, p=.20; control, D(30) = .145, p=.10).  Therefore the 
RAS can be considered to have a normal distribution. 
   
Checking behaviour 
There were general positive skew and negative kurtosis scores within the checking 
behaviour measure which approached significance levels although the histogram 
and Q-Q Plots suggested that the overall measure was close to normally distributed 
(see Appendix 24).  Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses indicated that the overall 
checking measure did not differ significantly from a normal distribution (D(89) = .091, 
p=.067).  Within all three of the groups the Checking behaviour measure was found 
to not differ significantly from a normal distribution (conservation, D(29) = .072, 
p=.20; openness, D(30) = .150, p = .09; control, D(30) = .148, p<.10).  Considering 
all of the information available a normal distribution could be assumed for this 
measure. 
 
Ordering behaviour 
The Q-Q plot along with the significant positive skew score (z = 2.447, p<.05) and a 
negative kurtosis score which approached significance indicated that there was 
significant deviation from a normal distribution across this measure (see Appendix 
25).  Supporting this, Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses suggested that the distribution 
of the overall ordering behaviour measure differed significantly from normal (D(88) = 
.201, p<.001).  This was also the case within the conservation group (D(29) = .172, 
p< .05), the openness group (D(30) = .271, p<.001) and the control group (D(30) = 
.160, p<.05) which all showed positive skew and negative kurtosis although only the 
openness group skew score reached significance (p<.05).  With this in mind a 
normal distribution could not be assumed. 
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7) There is a linear relationship between each pair of dependent variables for 
each group of the independent variable 
 
Scatterplot matrices were obtained for all of the variables comparing the 
questionnaire measures against the behaviour measures at the group level (i.e. for 
the conservation, openness and control groups).  Indications were that linearity could 
not be assumed (see Appendix 27) with r2 scores of 0.058 at the highest and 0.003 
at the lowest.  Linearity refers to whether the amount/rate of change, between scores 
on two variables is constant for the entire range of scores.  If the relationship 
between the variables is non-linear then using statistical methods that assume a 
linear relationship will underestimate the strength of the relationship, or will fail to 
detect the existence of a relationship (Field, 2013). 
 
8) Homogeneity of variance 
 
The homogeneity of variance was also assessed in the questionnaire data.  
Levene’s test showed that for the VOCI and the SOAQ homogeneity of variance 
could be assumed (VOCI, F(2, 86) = .691, p = .50; SOAQ, F(2,86) = .531, p = .60).  
Whereas for the RAS the Levene’s test indicated that the variances of scores were 
significantly different between the conservation, openness and control groups 
(F(2,86) = 6.003, p<.01) meaning that for this measure homogeneity of variance 
could not be assumed.  The checking and ordering behaviour measures both 
showed that homogeneity of variance could be assumed (Checking, F(2,86) = .909, 
p = .41; Ordering, F(2,86) = .057, p = .95).  When the variance ratios were calculated 
it was shown that none of the ratios for any of the measures fell above the critical 
value (F(2,86) = 3.09) suggesting that the Levene’s tests might be overly stringent 
(Field, 2013).  Generally homogeneity of variance was therefore assumed. 
 
9) There is no multicollinearity 
 
The correlation matrix below in Table 3.6 (section 3.4.2) shows that the correlations 
between the questionnaire measures are between -0.496 & 0.586 which are 
significant correlations.  This indicates that there could be difficulties with 
multicollinearity if regression analyses are used as two closely related independent 
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variables could cause the predictive value of the regression model to be inflated.  
However, there are simple strategies for dealing with these difficulties and Field 
(2013) recommends removing one of the strongly correlated variables from the 
analysis to ensure that the regression model is not biased.   
 
3.2.6 Summary of Assumptions 
 
Several of the measures did not meet assumptions for using parametric tests.  In 
particular the VOCI and ordering behaviour measures did not show a normal 
distribution and none of the measures showed linearity when independent variables 
were mapped against dependent variables.  However, the majority of the measures 
did show normal distributions and all measures showed homogeneity of variance 
could be assumed. 
 
Three options were considered to deal with the violation of assumptions: 
 
1) Transforming the data 
2) Leaving the data as it is, as ANOVA is robust to violations 
3) Using non-parametric  equivalents  
 
1) The main arguments for transforming data are that it changes the relationship 
between the variables in question to account for violated assumptions.  
Transforming data can maintain the different relationships in the data between 
participants while changing the data values in a systematic way to better fit 
with the assumptions of the model.  However, there are also difficulties with 
transforming data.  Firstly, as there were several measures in the current 
study that violated assumptions, the nature of the analysis would mean that all 
of the measures would need to be transformed to be meaningfully compared.  
Secondly, transforming the data means that the nature of the hypothesis 
being tested would be changed and so interpreting the results would be more 
complicated (Grayson, 2004).  Thirdly, there is considerable debate as to 
whether transforming data actually improves the accuracy of the analysis 
subsequently carried out (e.g. Levine and Dunlap, 1982; Games, 1984).   
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2) ANOVA is considered to be robust to several assumptions such as deviation 
from a normal distribution and non-homogeneity of variance (Field, 2013).  
However, with the current data showing non-linear relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables parametric analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) tests would not be appropriate as they rely on a linear model. 
 
3) The benefit of using non-parametric tests is that they are robust to violations 
of assumptions as they generally make fewer assumptions about the data.  
Although non-parametric tests are considered to have less power, this is only 
true if the sampling distribution is normal which in the current study in not 
consistently the case across the variables (see section 3.2.5 above).  There 
are, however, less non-parametric tests available meaning that often more 
sophisticated experimental designs are not able to be analysed using these 
techniques (Field, 2013). 
 
As there were concerns about transforming the data, it was decided that the best 
way to proceed with analysis would be to use robust statistical methods.  In the 
current circumstances this meant using non-parametric statistical methods to 
analyse the data in line with the hypotheses.  Further details of the statistical 
methods used are given below in the relevant sections.  
 
3.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
 
Demographic information was gathered for all participants.  In total there were 89 
participants included in the data-analysis.  There were 29 participants in the 
conservation group, 30 in the openness group and 30 in the control group.  Table 3.1 
outlines the age, gender and primary ethnicity of the three groups of participants.   
 
In terms of ethnicity, of the participants in the conservation group the majority were 
White British (90%) as was the case with the openness group (83%) and the control 
group (70%).  In all three groups the remainder of the participant sample constituted 
participants of varying ethnicities. 
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics of participants 
 Conservation Openness Control 
Age Range 18-40 18-40 19-50 
Mean age (StD) 20.76 (4.51) 21.07 (4.43) 22.63 (7.41) 
Gender (%female) 90% 90% 80% 
Ethnicity (%white British) 90% 83% 70% 
 
A one-way ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between the 
two experimental priming groups and the control group in terms of age 
(F(2,86)=.947, p=.392).  A chi-square analysis of variance showed that there were 
no significant differences in terms of the ethnicity of the three groups (x2= 3.860, 
p=.145).  The expected frequencies for a chi-square of the gender ratios showed 
50% of the expected frequencies were below 5 suggesting that the test should not 
be carried out.  The percentages observed in the Table 3.1 above would suggest 
that there are unlikely to be significant differences between the gender ratios seen in 
the three groups.   
 
Overall there was a significant difference between gender observed in the overall 
sample (x2(1) = 47.472, p<.001) with more females being present in the sample than 
would occur by chance alone.  Likewise there was a significant difference between 
the primary ethnicity observed in the overall sample (x2=67.978, p<.001) with more 
white British participants making up the sample than all other ethnicities together. 
 
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Measures 
 
3.3.2.1 Questionnaire Measures (Independent Variables) 
 
The descriptive statistics for the Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (VOCI), 
Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ) and Responsibility 
Attitudes Scale (RAS) are shown below in Table 3.2.  The Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ) data is presented in Table 3.3.  The descriptive data for the 
behaviour measures are shown in Tables 3.4 to 3.6.  The mean scores, standard 
deviations and the scale ranges obtained from the overall sample and from the three 
experimental groups are presented for each measure with the exception of the 
cleaning behaviour for which the percentages for each response are shown.  The 
PVQ data is presented as showing the proportion of participants from each 
experimental group (and overall) who rated each value quadrant as their highest and 
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lowest value priority.  Several participants had more than one equally ranked 
quadrant priority and these participants were excluded from the PVQ analysis.   
 
Table 3.2 – Descriptive statistics for questionnaire measures 
  Overall Conservation Openness Control 
VOCI Mean (sd) 33.830 (25.33) 33.793 (24.37) 24.097 (27.78) 33.600 (24.51) 
Range(Min-Max) 97 (3-100) 85 (5-90) 97 (3-100) 84 (4-88) 
SOAQ Mean (sd) 9.973 (8.12) 8.759 (7.36) 10.037 (8.57) 11.083 (8.47) 
Range (Min-Max) 28 (0-28) 23 (2-23) 28 (0-28) 29 (0-28) 
RAS Mean (sd) 104.98 (20.67) 102.24 (15.27) 106.60 (20.41) 106.00 (25.37) 
Range (Min-Max) 91 (63-154) 50 (78-128) 86 (68-154) 91 (63-154) 
 
Generally the data in Table 3.2 show that there was some variance between the 
three groups across the obsessionality and responsibility belief questionnaire 
measures.  The data for the VOCI showed that the conservation and control groups 
had similar means and standard deviations, which were in keeping with the VOCI 
overall mean score.  The openness to change group by contrast had a lower mean 
score with a slightly larger standard deviation than the other groups and a larger 
range of scores.  The mean scores of the SOAQ differed slightly across the groups 
although this questionnaire had smaller standard deviations and ranges as well with 
the conservation group showing the lowest mean, standard deviation and range.  
The RAS scores showed similar means across groups but the standard deviations 
differed with the conservation group showing the lowest standard deviation as well 
as the lowest range and the control group showing the highest standard deviation 
and range. 
 
Overall mean scores for the VOCI are generally consistent with published scores 
obtained for similar populations.  For example, Thordarson et al (2004) report mean 
VOCI scores of 36.37 (StD 26.56) for their student sample while Radomsky and 
Rachman (2004) report a mean score of 44.9 (StD 30.52) within their student 
sample.  Mean VOCI scores for OCD populations in comparison have been 
published as 86.26 (StD 37.47; Thordarson et al, 2004) and 81.27 (StD 36.93; 
Gonner et al, 2010).  Mean scores on the SOAQ are lower within the current sample 
than when compared to published scores for similar populations reported by 
Radomsky & Rachman (2004; mean SOAQ score 18.6, StD 16.0) and Chiorri et al 
(2011; mean SOAQ score 22.91, StD 19.46) although the standard deviations are 
also much higher in these two studies than in the current study.  Within an OCD 
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population Gonner et al (2010) report a mean SOAQ score of 30.85 (StD 23.59) for 
comparison.  The RAS mean score for the current sample is slightly higher when 
compared to scores published by Salkovskis et al (2000) for a non-clinical student 
and community sample.  Salkovskis et al (2000) give mean scores calculated as an 
individual question response as opposed to an overall questionnaire mean (i.e. mean 
RAS score 3.48, StD, 1.01 compared to an equivalent mean RAS score of 4.03 in 
the current sample).  For comparison, Salkovskis et al (2000) give a mean score of 
4.69 (StD 1.01) for an OCD diagnosed sample.  There are no published 
recommended clinical cut-off criteria for the VOCI, SOAQ or RAS at present, but it 
appears from the published mean scores outlined above that the current participant 
sample show mean scores largely consistent with previous student or community 
populations as opposed to clinical populations. 
 
In terms of the value priorities of participants, Table 3.3 shows that generally very 
few participants rated conservation values as being their highest priority values 
whilst the vast majority of participants in all three groups rated self-transcendence 
values as being their highest value priorities.  Openness to change values and self-
enhancement values were equally likely to be the highest value when considering 
participants overall.  In contrast conservation values were the most likely to be rated 
as least important with self-transcendence values least likely to be rated as of lowest 
importance. 
 
Table 3.3 – Highest and lowest quadrant priorities for the PVQ 
 Overall Conservation Openness Control 
 Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest 
Conservation 
 
3 
(3.5%) 
35 
(40.7%) 
1 
(3.7%) 
12 
(42.9%) 
1 
(3.6%) 
11 
(37.9%) 
1 
(3.3%) 
12 
(41.4%) 
Openness 
 
13 
(15.3%) 
22 
(25.6%) 
6 
(22.2%) 
6 
(21.4%) 
2 
(7.1%) 
7 
(24.2%) 
5 
(16.7%) 
9   
(31%) 
Self-
Enhancement 
13 
(15.3%) 
24 
(27.9%) 
3 
(11.1%) 
7  
(25%) 
5 
(17.9%) 
10 
(34.5%) 
5 
(16.7%) 
7 
(24.2%) 
Self-
Transcendence 
56 
(65.9%) 
5 
(5.8%) 
17 
(63%) 
3 
(10.7%) 
20 
(71.4%) 
1 
(3.4%) 
19 
(63.3%) 
1 
(3.4%) 
Total 85 86 27 28 28 29 30 29 
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3.3.2.2 Behaviour Measures (Dependent Variables) 
 
Table 3.4 – Descriptive statistics for Checking and Ordering behaviour 
  Overall Conservation Openness Control 
Checking Mean (sd) 230.43 (58.26) 243.07 (49.92) 215.43 (66.14) 233.20 (55.84) 
Range (Min-Max) 232 (115-347) 195 (152-347) 232 (115-347) 202 (145-347) 
Ordering Mean (sd) 5.16 (2.10) 5.07 (2.17) 5.20 (2.11) 5.21 (2.08) 
Range (Min-Max) 7 (2-9) 7 (2-9) 6 (3-9) 7 (2-9) 
 
The conservation group showed the highest mean scores on the checking 
behaviour measure (as shown in Table 3.4) along with the smallest standard 
deviation and ranges.  The openness group by comparison had the lowest scores on 
the checking behaviour measure along with the highest standard deviation and 
range with the control group falling in between these two groups.  The ordering 
behaviour measure showed consistent means across the three groups with similar 
standard deviations and ranges.  The conservation group also showed the highest 
proportion of participants who performed cleaning behaviour (see Table 3.4) with 
the openness group showing the highest proportion of participants who did not 
perform the cleaning behaviour. 
 
Table 3.5 – Descriptive Statistics for Cleaning behaviour 
 Overall Conservation Openness Control 
Used wipe 39 (43%) 18 (62%) 9 (30%) 12 (40%) 
Did not use wipe 50 (56%) 11 (38%) 21 (70%) 18 (60%) 
 
 
3.4 MAIN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
All statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS 20 (IBM Corp., 2011).  The 
methods and findings are presented in the following section organised by the main 
hypotheses.   
 
3.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants primed for obsessionality (conservation 
priming group) would show more obsessionality related behaviours than controls 
while the participants primed for non-obsessionality (openness priming group) would 
show less obsessionality related behaviours than controls.  As such, this section of 
the analysis focused on investigating differences between the three groups of 
participants in terms of checking, ordering and cleaning behaviour.   As noted 
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above (see section 3.2.5) linearity could not be assumed and therefore non-
parametric methods of analysis were used.  The cleaning behaviour measure is 
categorical in nature and as such was not subjected to the assumption checks.  
 
Figure 3.1 below represents the mean scores of each group on the checking 
behaviour measure (see Table 3.4) and indicates that there are only small 
differences between the three groups.  A Kruskal-Wallis independent samples test 
confirmed this by showing that there was no significant difference between the 
distribution of the three groups, H(2) = 5.114, p = .078.  As no significant difference 
was found overall, multiple comparisons were not performed between the groups. 
 
It can be seen from Figure 3.2 that the mean scores across the groups on the 
ordering behaviour measure were practically identical (see also Table 3.4).  Indeed, 
a Kruskal-Wallis independent samples test showed that the null hypotheses should 
be retained meaning that there was no significant difference seen between the 
distribution of the three groups, H(2) = .191, p = .909.  As there was no overall 
significant difference found multiple comparisons were not performed between the 
groups. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Checking Behaviour by Group 
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Figure 3.2 – Ordering Behaviour by group 
 
Figure 3.3 below shows the percentages of participants who did or did not use a 
cleaning wipe in each group (see Table 3.5).  It can be seen that the conservation 
group showed a higher proportion of participants who used wipes compared to the 
other two groups while the openness group showed a higher proportion who did not 
use wipes.  A chi-square analysis was carried out to assess for association between 
the three groups and the cleaning behaviour.  All of the expected frequencies within 
the cross-tabs table were above 5 so no assumptions were violated with regards to 
participant numbers (Field, 2013).  The results indicated that there was a significant 
association between the groups and whether or not participants used a cleaning 
wipe x2 (2) = 6.428, p<.05.  The Cramer’s V value suggests that this effect size is 
small (.269) although this is a significant effect size (p<.05).  More specifically, it was 
shown that the proportion of participants who used a wipe after the conservation 
prime (46.2%) was significantly higher than the proportion who did not use a wipe 
after the conservation prime (22%).  There were no such differences found within the 
other two groups and none of the standardised residuals were significant so can 
offer no further interpretation of this result. 
 
124 
 
         
Figure 3.3 – Cleaning Behaviour by group 
 
Summary for Hypothesis 1 
 
The analyses above offer mixed results with regards to Hypothesis 1.  Specifically 
Hypothesis 1a, that following the obsessionality prime (conservation group) 
participants will spend more time checking than participants in the control group 
was not supported.  Likewise Hypothesis 1b, that following the non-obsessionality 
prime (openness group) participants would spend less time checking than 
participants in the control group was also not supported.  Therefore, regarding 
checking behaviour Hypotheses 1a and 1b were not supported. 
 
Hypothesis 1c, that those primed for obsessionality would show higher ordering 
scores than those in the control group was not supported and neither was 
Hypothesis 1d, that those primed for non-obsessionality would show lower scores of 
ordering than the control group.   Therefore, regarding ordering behaviour 
Hypotheses 1c and 1d were not supported. 
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Hypothesis 1e, that obsessionality priming would lead to more participants showing 
cleaning behaviour than those in the control group was supported.  Hypothesis 1f, 
that non-obsessionality priming would lead to less participants showing cleaning 
behaviour than those in the control group was not supported.  Therefore, regarding 
cleaning behaviour Hypotheses 1e was supported while 1f was not. 
 
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be significant correlations within the control 
group participants between the obsessionality and responsibility belief questionnaire 
measures (VOCI, SOAQ and RAS) and the obsessionality behaviour measures 
(checking, ordering and cleaning).  It was expected that those participants who 
scored highest on the obsessionality and responsibility measures would show higher 
scores on the checking and ordering behaviour as well as a higher chance of 
showing cleaning behaviour.  
 
Scores from the control group were correlated across the three questionnaire 
measures and the behaviour scores.  As the assumptions for parametric analysis 
were not met for all the measures intended for the correlations Kendall’s Tau was 
used.  Kendall’s Tau was chosen over Spearman’s Rho due to the number of tied 
ranks that are present in the SOAQ and ordering data (Field, 2013).  The cleaning 
behaviour was analysed using point-biserial correlations due to being categorical in 
nature (Field, 2013).  Table 3.6 shows the correlations between the questionnaire 
measures and the checking, ordering and cleaning behaviour.   
 
Table 3.6 – Correlations within Control group 
 VOCI SOAQ RAS Checking Ordering Cleaning 
VOCI  .586** -.560** -.052 .042 .093 
SOAQ .586**  -.496** -.026 .182 .153 
RAS -.560** -.496**  -.090 -.071 .180 
Checking -.052 -.026 -.090  -.026 .145 
Ordering .042 .182 -.071 -.026  .140 
Cleaning .093 .153 .180 .145 .140  
**indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The results indicate that there are significant positive correlations between the VOCI 
and the SOAQ as well as significant negative correlations between the RAS and 
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both the VOCI and SOAQ as would be expected from the reverse scoring of the 
RAS.  This suggests that the three questionnaires are measuring related constructs 
in that as participants rate themselves as having more obsessionality symptoms on 
the VOCI they also do the same on the SOAQ.  Likewise as obsessionality scores 
increase (on both the VOCI and the SOAQ) participants rate themselves as having 
more responsibility beliefs (as indicated by lower scores on the RAS). 
 
There were, however, no significant correlations seen between the obsessionality or 
responsibility questionnaire measures (VOCI, SOAQ and RAS) and the checking, 
ordering and cleaning behaviour.  That is, as obsessionality and responsibility 
scores increase we do not see more time spent checking or higher ordering scores 
or higher proportions of cleaning wipe use within the control participants.  This 
suggests that there is no relationship within the control group between the levels of 
obsessionality (as recorded by the VOCI and SOAQ) and the obsessionality 
behaviour measures of checking, ordering and cleaning or between the levels of 
responsibility beliefs (as measured by the RAS) and the obsessionality behaviour 
measures. 
 
It is also of interest to note that there were no significant correlations between the 
three behavioural measures within the control group.  That is, as scores on one of 
the obsessionality behaviour measures increase, scores on the other obsessionality 
behaviour measures do not necessarily also increase.  This suggests that there are 
no relationships within the control group between the levels of checking, ordering 
and cleaning behaviours shown. 
 
 
Summary for Hypothesis 2 
 
Contrary to Hypothesis 2 there were no significant correlations between the 
obsessionality questionnaire measures (VOCI and SOAQ) and the obsessionality 
behaviour measures within the control group.  There was also no significant 
correlation between the responsibility beliefs measure (RAS) and the obsessionality 
behavioural measures.  It should be held in mind that the number of participants 
included in these correlations is low (n=30) so they should be interpreted with some 
caution.   
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3.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 3 stated that participants who scored high on the obsessionality 
questionnaire measures (VOCI and SOAQ) would show higher scores on the 
behaviour measures of checking, ordering and cleaning compared to those who 
scored low on the obsessionality questionnaire measures. 
 
In order to test hypothesis 3 the scores from the VOCI and SOAQ were added 
together to give each participant an overall obsessionality score.  These two 
questionnaires were found to be strongly correlated both within the individual groups 
and across the three groups (Kendall’s Tau correlations of between .429 to .586, 
p<.001).  The original purpose of including the SOAQ in this study was due to the 
VOCI lacking items that sufficiently captured the ordering and arranging type 
symptoms related to obsessionality (e.g. Radomsky & Rachman, 2004; see method 
section 2.6.3.4).  As such, the SOAQ adds a further valuable dimension to those 
already measured by the VOCI and they are rated using a very similar 0-4 rating 
scale.  The rationale for adding the two scales together was that this would give an 
overall obsessionality score that best captured the breadth of symptoms related to 
obsessionality.  It also meant that the subsequent analysis outlined below was not 
carried out with two separate obsessionality measures which would have increased 
the chances of a Type 1 error occurring.   
 
This overall obsessionality measure (VOCI-SOAQ) was subjected to the same 
assumptions checks as those outlined in section 3.2.5.  There were no outliers 
identified over the measure as a whole (see appendix 28).  Table 3.7 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the VOCI-SOAQ measure from the complete participant 
sample.  There was highly significant positive skew in the scores (z = 4.357, p<.001) 
and Q-Q Plots indicated significant deviation from a normal distribution across all 
groups which was supported by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the overall measure 
(D(89)=.156, p<.001).  Generally a normal distribution within this measure cannot be 
assumed (as was the case with the original VOCI and SOAQ measures).  
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      Table 3.7 – descriptive statistics for the VOCI-SOAQ obsessionality measure 
 VOCI-SOAQ 
Mean  44.809 
Standard 
Deviation 
33.156 
Median 34 
Range 155 (4-159) 
 
In order to identify a high obsessionality group and a low obsessionality group a split 
at the median was carried out (a median split is less likely to be affected by skewed 
distribution than a split at the mean).  This split identified that overall there were 42 
participants who fell above the median (34) and 44 participants who fell below the 
median.  There were three participants whose scores fell on the median score and 
these participants were excluded from this analysis.   
 
The obsessionality scores were used to investigate whether high or low 
obsessionality (as measured by the VOCI-SOAQ) had an effect on the levels of 
obsessionality behaviour (checking, ordering and cleaning behaviours – see 
Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 respectively).   
    
Figure 3.4a - Mean Checking behaviour scores in high and low obsessionality groups 
overall   
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Figure 3.4b – Mean Checking behaviour scores in high and low obsessionality groups 
by experimental group 
 
As seen in Figure 3.4a there did not appear to be large differences in the mean 
scores of Checking behaviour between the high and low obsessionality groups and it 
can be seen in the Figure 3.4b that this was also true when mean scores were 
examined by experimental group.  A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that checking 
behaviour in the high obsessionality (mean rank = 45.68) participants did not differ 
significantly from the low obsessionality (mean rank = 41.42) participants, U = 832.5, 
z = -.791, p =.50, r = -0.09.   
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.5a there was again no differences observed between the 
high and low obsessionality groups overall although the high obsessionality 
participants did have a slightly higher mean score on the ordering behaviour than 
the low obsessionality participants.  Looking at the individual groups (Figure 3.5b) 
there did appear to be a pattern showing that high obsessionality participants 
performed higher levels of ordering behaviour than the low obsessionality group 
which was most marked for the control group.   However, a Mann-Whitney U test 
revealed that ordering behaviour in high obsessionality (mean rank = 47.23) 
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participants did not differ significantly from the low obsessionality (mean rank = 
39.94) participants, U = 767.5, z = -1.375, p = .20, r = -.15 meaning that this pattern 
of result did not reach significance. 
           
Figure 3.5a - Mean Ordering behaviour in high and low obsessionality groups overall 
                   
Figure 3.5b – Mean Ordering behaviour scores in high and low obsessionality groups 
by experimental group 
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With regards to the Cleaning behaviour, Figure 3.6a below shows that overall there 
was no difference between the percentage of participants who were in the high 
obsessionality group who used a cleaning wipe compared to those in the low 
obsessionality group who used a wipe (Figure 3.6a).  It can also be seen that there 
were differences in the percentages when broken down into the three groups of 
participants with those in the conservation group showing higher proportions of wipe 
use when compared to the openness group across both the high and low 
obsessionality groups (Figure 3.6b).  This suggests that the priming of obsessionality 
related values in the conservation group may have had more of an effect on 
subsequent cleaning behaviour than high or low levels of obsessionality as 
measured by the VOCI-SOAQ (see Hypothesis 1).  In line with this a Chi-Square 
analysis showed that there was no significant association between the high and low 
levels of obsessionality and whether or not participants demonstrated cleaning 
behaviour x2(1) =.001, p = .98. 
 
                
Figure 3.6a - Proportions of Cleaning behaviour scores in high and low obsessionality 
groups overall 
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Figure 3.6b – Proportions of Cleaning behaviour scores in high and low 
obsessionality groups arranged by experimental group 
 
 
Summary for Hypothesis 3 
 
These results indicated that there were no significant relationships between the 
levels of self-reported obsessionality, as measured by the VOCI-SOAQ and the 
obsessionality behavioural measures of checking, ordering and cleaning which is 
in contrast to what was predicted in hypothesis 3.  There were indications that the 
conservation group were most likely to show cleaning behaviour regardless of their 
levels of obsessionality (Figure 3.6b) suggesting that for this behaviour at least the 
priming task had more effect than the levels of obsessionality (as measured by the 
VOCI-SOAQ). 
 
3.4.4 Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 stated that those participants high in responsibility beliefs (as 
measured by the RAS) would show higher levels of obsessionality behaviours on the 
Checking, Ordering and Cleaning behaviours when compared to those who were 
low in responsibility beliefs.  In order to identify a high responsibility belief group and 
a low responsibility belief group a split at the median was carried out on the RAS 
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data.  A median split was chosen due to the overall RAS scores showing significant 
skew and a median split is less likely to be affected by skewed distributions than a 
split at the mean (Field, 2013).  This split identified that overall there were 44 
participants who fell below the median (102) and were therefore identified as having 
high responsibility beliefs, and 44 participants who fell above the median and were 
identified as having low responsibility beliefs.  One participant scored on the median 
and was excluded from the analysis.   
 
The responsibility scores from all participants were used to investigate whether high 
or low responsibility had an effect on the levels of obsessionality behaviour across all 
participants.  Figure 3.7 below shows that the mean scores for checking behaviour 
overall between the high and low responsibility groups was the same (Figure 3.7a).  
This was supported by the Mann-Whitney U test which revealed that checking 
behaviour in the high responsibility (mean rank = 45.16) participants did not differ 
significantly from the low responsibility (mean rank = 43.84) participants, U = 939.00 
z = -.242, p =.80, r = -0.02.  Figure 3.7b shows that breaking down the high and low 
responsibility participants into their original experimental groups did not appear to 
suggest any meaningful patterns. 
        
Figure 3.7a - Mean Checking behaviour scores in high and low responsibility groups 
overall 
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Figure 3.7b – Mean Checking behaviour scores in high and low responsibility groups 
by experimental group 
 
Figure 3.8a shows that there was a slight difference in the mean scores of ordering 
behaviour between the high and low responsibility participants although these 
differences were not large (Figure 3.8a,).  It can also be seen that there were no 
large differences in mean scores when high and low responsibility participants were 
split into their experimental groups (Figure 3.8b).  A Mann-Whitney U test showed 
that ordering behaviour in high responsibility (mean rank = 47.53) participants did 
not differ significantly from the low responsibility (mean rank = 40.38) participants, U 
= 790.50, z = -1.342, p = .20, r = 0.14.   
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Figure 3.8a - Mean Ordering behaviour scores in high and low responsibility groups 
overall 
 
 
                        
Figure 3.8b – Mean Ordering behaviour scores in high and low responsibility groups 
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With regards to cleaning behaviour it can be seen in Figure 3.9a that slightly higher 
proportion of participants in the high responsibility group used a cleaning wipe than 
those in the low responsibility group (Figure 3.9a).  When the proportions were 
broken down into the groups it can be seen that those in the conservation group had 
the highest proportions of cleaning behaviour compared to the other groups 
regardless of whether they had high or low responsibility scores, with those in the 
openness group showing the least cleaning behaviour (Figure 3.9b).  This suggests 
that the priming of obsessionality related values in the conservation group may have 
had more of an effect than participants’ levels of responsibility beliefs (see 
Hypothesis 1).  In line with this a Chi-Square analysis showed that statistically there 
was no significant association between high and low levels of responsibility and 
whether or not participants demonstrated cleaning behaviour x2(1) =.185, p = .70. 
 
                  
Figure 3.9a - Proportions of Cleaning behaviour in high and low responsibility groups 
overall 
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Figure 3.9b – Proportions of Cleaning behaviour in high and low responsibility groups 
by experimental group 
 
Summary for Hypothesis 4 
 
These results indicate that there were no significant relationships between the levels 
of self-reported responsibility (as measured by the RAS) and the obsessionality 
related behavioural measures meaning that hypothesis 4 is not supported.  There 
were indications that the conservation group were most likely to show cleaning 
behaviour regardless of levels of responsibility (see Figure 3.9b), once again 
suggesting that the priming task had more of an effect than the levels of 
responsibility beliefs on this behaviour. 
 
3.4.5 Hypothesis 5 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that those who have high conservation value priorities would 
score higher on obsessionality as measured by the VOCI and SOAQ measures than 
other participants, particularly those with high openness value priorities.  In relation 
to the responsibility measure it was predicted that those with high self-transcendence 
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value priorities would have higher responsibility beliefs as measured by the RAS 
than those with other value priorities, particularly self-enhancement.   
 
The PVQ data was analysed using the method outlined in the methods section (see 
section 2.6.3.2) which is briefly described here.  Each individual participant’s scores 
for each of the 21 individual PVQ items was first standardised across that participant 
in order to account for the different ways participants may respond to a Likert 
response scale.  This standardisation procedure simply involved each participant’s 
average response score from the scale as a whole being subtracted from their 
individual scores (procedure recommended by Schwartz, 2005).  Following this, the 
actual value scores were derived by adding together the individual standardised 
scores for each item belonging to a value (2 or 3 items for each value) and 
calculating an average score for each of the 10 values (i.e. the total scores of the 2/3 
items divided by the number of items).  The 10 value scores were then added 
together to form quadrant scores (Verkasalo et al, 2012) with these scores also 
averaged by the number of values within each quadrant (there were 2 or 3 values 
per quadrant – see introduction section 1.3.2).  These final four quadrant scores 
were then ranked within each individual participant with the lowest quadrant score 
ranked as 1 up to the highest quadrant score ranked as 4 (the lowest score indicates 
strongest importance and the highest score least importance).    
 
This resulted in each individual having the four value quadrants ranked in order of 
their value priorities (see Table 3.3 above) which shows the proportion of participants 
who rated each quadrant as their highest or lowest priority).  Four participants had 
tied ranks for their highest value priority and so were not included in this part of the 
analysis.  The descriptive statistics for the questionnaire data arranged using the 
value quadrant priorities are shown in Tables 3.8 to 3.10 below.  It is important to 
note that very few participants rated Conservation values as being of highest 
importance to them and therefore the analyses below should be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
It can be seen that participants who highly value Openness values show the lowest 
mean score on the VOCI whilst those who most highly value Conservation values 
show the highest mean score (see Table 3.8 below).  Both of these groups also 
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show lower ranges of scores and lower standard deviations than the Self-
enhancement and Self-transcendence groups.  A Kruskal-Wallis Test, however, 
found that those who rate conservation values as being higher in importance to them 
relative to other value quadrants are statistically no more likely to score high on the 
VOCI obsessionality questionnaire measure, H(3) = 4.020, p = .259.  It is of interest 
to note, however that the Conservation and Self-enhancement value priority groups 
had higher mean scores on the VOCI measure of obsessionality than the other two 
groups even though this result did not reach significance.   
 
Table 3.8 - Scores on VOCI arranged by value priority 
 Conservation Openness Self-Enhancement Self-Transcendence 
No. of p’s 3 13 13 56 
Mean 43.33 23.154 41.923 34.052 
StD 18.771 17.063 34.789 24.582 
Median 33 20 28 27.5 
Range  33 (32-65) 48 (4-52) 93 (7-100) 92 (3-95) 
 
The data in Table 3.9 shows that participants who rated Conservation values as of 
highest importance to them had the highest mean and median scores on the SOAQ 
measure of obsessionality with Openness values again showing the lowest scores 
as found with the VOCI scores above.  However, a Kruskal-Wallis Test found that 
those who rate conservation values as being higher in importance to them relative to 
other value quadrants are statistically no more likely to score high on the SOAQ 
obsessionality questionnaire measure, H(3) = .586, p = .90.   
 
Taken together, the information from Tables 3.8 and 3.9 indicate that there could be 
a link between the value priorities that people have and the levels of obsessionality 
that they report on the VOCI and SOAQ measures in the direction that we would 
predict i.e. that those who highly favour conservation values show more 
obsessionality than those who have Openness value priorities.  However, this data is 
based on small participant numbers, especially in the case of the Conservation value 
priorities group and is not supported statistically. 
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Table 3.9 - Scores on SOAQ arranged by value priority 
 Conservation Openness Self-Enhancement Self-Transcendence 
No. of p’s 3 13 13 56 
Mean 11 7.923 9.5 10.466 
StD 3.606 4.838 7.165 9.114 
Median 12 7 9 8.5 
Range 7 (7-14) 15 (2-17) 27 (1-28) 28 (0-28) 
 
The same patterns were again seen when investigating the responsibility belief 
measure and the value priorities (see Table 3.10).  Those participants who had 
conservation value priorities appeared to be more likely to show higher levels of 
responsibility beliefs (as indicated by lower scores on the RAS) whilst those who had 
Openness to Change value priorities were more likely to show lower responsibility 
beliefs.  Statistical analyses demonstrated that there was a statistically significant 
effect of value priority on responsibility belief scores, H(3) = 9.016, p = .029.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that there were no significant differences between 
responsibility belief scores when participants had conservation value priorities 
compared to self-transcendence values (p = 1.0, r = -.08), self-enhancement values 
(p = 1.0, r = -.10) or openness values (p = .237, r = .22).  There were also no 
significant differences in responsibility belief scores when participants had self-
transcendence value priorities compared to self-enhancement values (p = 1.0, r = 
.06) or when participants had self-enhancement value priorities compared to 
openness values (p = .439, r = .19).  However, there was a significant difference in 
responsibility scores when participants had self-transcendence value priorities 
compared to openness value priorities (p = .029, r = .30). 
 
Table 3.10 - Scores on RAS arranged by value priority 
 Conservation Openness Self-Enhancement Self-Transcendence 
No. of p’s 3 13 13 56 
Mean 92.67 119.23 105.46 101.55 
StD 8.622 16.027 21.881 20.928 
Median 91 118 97 99 
Range 17 (85-102) 59 (95-154) 61 (74-135) 91 (63-154) 
 
Summary for hypothesis 5 
 
The descriptive statistics shown in Tables 3.8 to 3.10 above suggested that there 
could be links between the value priorities that individuals have and their levels of 
obsessionality and responsibility (as measured by the VOCI, SOAQ and RAS).  
Specifically, that having Conservation value priorities might be linked to higher 
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obsessionality and responsibility whilst Openness value priorities might be linked to 
lower obsessionality and responsibility.  However, this was most likely a result of the 
small sample sizes included in the Conservation values priority group as statistical 
analyses shown above clearly did not support there being any relationships between 
value priorities and scores on the questionnaire measures.    
 
More specifically hypothesis 5a which stated that participants with Conservation 
value priorities would score higher on measures of obsessionality (VOCI and SOAQ) 
was not supported by the statistical analysis.  
 
Hypothesis 5b which stated that participants with Self-transcendence value priorities 
would score higher on measures of responsibility (RAS) is tentatively accepted 
although the exact direction of this relationship was not as predicted as the 
participants who had self-transcendence value priorities were found to show 
significantly different responsibility scores compared to the Openness value priorities 
group rather than the Self-enhancement group predicted. 
 
As noted above, the number of participants who had Conservation value priorities 
was very low compared to other groups and this could have had an effect on this 
analysis. 
 
3.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS  
 
Given the questionable reliability of the continuous measure used for the Ordering 
behaviour (see sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5), further analysis was carried out on the 
ordering data giving consideration to this variable as being categorical, similar to the 
Cleaning behaviour.  As such participants were categorised as either ordering the 
pens or not ordering the pens.  However, when identical analyses as those carried 
out above for the Cleaning behaviour were replicated with the Ordering behaviour 
as a categorical variable it was found that there were no significant results in relation 
to any of the hypotheses which was consistent with the results already reported 
above for the Ordering behaviour.  As such, this additional analysis is not reported 
further. 
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3.6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
Against expectations there was little difference observed between the three groups 
of participants in terms of the obsessionality related behaviours of Checking, 
Ordering and Cleaning.  It was found that there was no effect of the Conservation 
priming task or the Openness priming task on the levels of obsessionality seen in 
Checking and Ordering behaviours when these groups were compared with a 
control group (Hypothesis 1a-d).  The sole exception was that the Conservation 
prime group showing a higher proportion of Cleaning behaviour compared to the 
Openness prime and Control groups (Hypothesis 1e).  The opposite effect was, 
however, not seen in the Openness group with them using no less cleaning wipes 
than the Control group (Hypothesis 1f).  These results indicate that there was no 
effect of priming Openness values on behaviours of Checking, Ordering and 
Cleaning related to obsessionality.  They also indicate that there was no effect of 
priming Conservation values on behaviours of Checking and Ordering related to 
obsessionality but that there was a significant effect of priming Conservation values 
on Cleaning behaviour. 
 
In relation to general patterns of relationships that were expected to be seen in the 
data it was found that control group participants did not show a relationship between 
obsessionality as measured by the VOCI and the SOAQ and the obsessionality 
behaviours of Checking, Ordering and Cleaning as measured by the behavioural 
measures (Hypothesis 2).   
 
In line with this analyses indicated that against expectations participants from across 
all three groups who scored high on obsessionality (as measured by the VOCI-
SOAQ) did not show higher levels of obsessionality related behaviours of Checking, 
Ordering and Cleaning than those who scored low on obsessionality (Hypothesis 
3).  Likewise, analyses also indicated that participants who scored high on 
responsibility beliefs (as measured by the RAS) did not perform more obsessionality 
related behaviours of Checking, Ordering and Cleaning than those who scored low 
on responsibility beliefs (Hypothesis 4).  These results generally indicated that there 
was no significant relationship between obsessionality (as measured by the VOCI-
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SOAQ) and responsibility beliefs (as measured by the RAS) and the obsessionality 
behaviour measures of Checking, Ordering and Cleaning.  
 
Finally, it was found that although the descriptive statistics supported relationships 
between Conservation value priorities being linked to higher obsessionality and 
responsibility (as measured by the VOCI, SOAQ and RAS) and Openness value 
priorities being related to lower obsessionality and responsibility this was not 
supported by the statistical analysis carried out.  Statistically, the value priorities of 
participants in terms of their value quadrant priorities did not have any effects on 
obsessionality as measured by the VOCI and SOAQ (Hypothesis 5a).  The quadrant 
priorities did show an effect on responsibility beliefs (as measured by the RAS) such 
that those with high Self-transcendence value priorities were more likely to score 
high on responsibility measures as predicted compared to those with high Openness 
value priorities although all other comparisons between quadrants were not 
significant (Hypothesis 5b).  
 
All of the results above are discussed in further detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 - Discussion 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The following chapter gives a summary of the results before interpreting these 
findings in relation to obsessionality, values and the priming literature.  It moves on 
to consider the implications and clinical relevance of the results before detailing the 
strengths and limitations of the research.  The chapter then outlines further research 
directions and gives conclusions for the current study. 
 
4.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
1) Effects of priming obsessionality values on behaviours related to 
obsessionality 
 
It was found that the priming task only had an effect on the cleaning behaviour, that 
is, whether the participants used a wipe or not.  A higher proportion of those in the 
conservation priming group used a cleaning wipe compared to the other groups.  
There were no other effects of the conservation prime found on the obsessionality 
related behaviours.  Contrary to expectations the openness to change priming group 
had no effects on any of the behaviours at all.   
 
2) Relationships between questionnaire measures of obsessionality and 
behaviours related to obsessionality 
 
The results also showed that there were no significant relationships between the 
questionnaire measures and the behaviour measures within the control group. 
 
3) Effects of obsessionality and responsibility levels on behaviours related to 
obsessionality 
 
Levels of obsessionality and responsibility were found to generally not be related to 
the behaviour measures.  Those who scored higher on the obsessionality measures 
did not score higher on the behaviour measures just as those who scored lower on 
the obsessionality measure did not score lower on the behaviour measures.  
Similarly with the responsibility measure, which was expected to have a mediating 
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relationship there was no effect of high or low responsibility on the behaviour 
measure scores.  
 
4) Relationship between value orientation and obsessionality 
 
The value orientation of participants was also found to not have any significant effect 
on the questionnaire measures generally or on the behaviour measures.  There was 
a small exception to this in that those with self-transcendence value priorities scored 
significantly higher on the measure of responsibility than those with openness to 
change value priorities. 
 
4.3 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
4.3.1 Effects of priming obsessionality values on behaviours related to 
obsessionality 
 
Statistical analysis indicated no effects of the obsessionality value primes on 
behaviours of checking and ordering.  However, there were effects of the 
obsessionality value primes on cleaning behaviours.  There were also no effects 
found of priming openness values on the measures of checking, ordering and 
cleaning behaviours.  These results are interpreted below in relation to differences 
between how the three behaviours relate to the priming task, to values and to 
obsessionality.  Consideration is also given to how the openness prime relates to 
motivations underlying obsessionality as an explanation for the lack of effects seen 
in this area of the study. 
 
4.3.1.1 Links between the priming task and behaviours 
The obsessionality (conservation values) priming task asked participants to give 
reasons why being ‘clean, healthy and self-disciplined’ were important in order to see 
the effects on obsessionality value congruent behaviours.  As only the cleaning 
behaviour measure showed any effects of the prime it is possible that the ‘clean’ 
instantiation used in the priming task may have led to more use of wipes due to the 
more concrete link between giving reasons for the importance of being clean and 
being provided with cleaning wipes.  However, the fact that only one participant 
raised any suspicions of the conservation values priming task being related to the 
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subsequent tasks in this way suggests that the vast majority of participants were not 
explicitly aware of this link.  Instead this would suggest that being primed with the 
‘clean’ value instantiation may have subconsciously activated this and other linked 
concepts in line with the theory of spreading activation (e.g. Shroder & Thagard, 
2012; Bargh, 1996).   
 
The links to the checking and ordering behaviours in contrast were more abstract 
from the value instantiations being used in the obsessionality related priming task.  
This would suggest that the priming manipulation only works under certain conditions 
and could be linked to the research carried out by Maio et al (2009b) which 
demonstrated that priming typical instantiations of values is more likely to lead to 
value congruent behaviour than priming atypical instantiations.  This means that the 
more recognisable the value instantiation is as an example of a concept related to 
the value the more likely it is to have effects in line with the value.  In the case of the 
current research it is possible that ‘clean’ and ‘healthy’ are more recognisable as 
concepts related to obsessionality than ‘self-discipline’ especially considering the 
contamination aspects of obsessionality beliefs (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999).  As such 
this may have led to obsessionality related behaviour in line with these particular 
instantiations rather than other obsessionality related behaviours of checking and 
ordering.  Obsessionality research indicates that a cleanliness/contamination factor 
is commonly identified as a subtype of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (e.g. 
Calamari et al, 1999; Lechman et al, 1997). 
 
4.3.1.2 Priming motivations of obsessionality 
The other aspect to consider is whether the motivation to perform the obsessionality 
behaviours was primed by the priming task.  The Schwartz model (Schwartz 1992; 
Schwartz et al, 2012) suggests motivational underpinnings for the values within the 
conservations quadrant that have been linked to obsessionality such as the anxiety 
motivational dimension (Schwartz et al, 2012).  In previous experimental research it 
has been found that priming security values (part of the conservation quadrant) 
successfully led to the use of more cleaning wipes which was interpreted as being 
related to the motivations of avoiding the threat of uncertainty and conserving the 
existing order (Maio et al, 2009a, experiment 3).  This is consistent with 
understandings of obsessionality particularly with regards to clinical obsessionality 
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where there is an element of distress or anxiety about avoiding harm which 
motivates behaviours (e.g. Salkovskis et al 2001).  In the case of the current study, 
the priming of obsessionality related (conservation) values may have had an effect 
on the motivations underlying the cleaning behaviour (as previously demonstrated by 
Maio et al, 2009a) but may not have primed motivations underlying the checking and 
ordering behaviours.   
 
It is also possible that priming conservation values did lead to the obsessionality 
motivations being primed (as supported by the fact that the cleaning behaviour 
showed an effect) but that participants did not perceive the other behaviours as 
fulfilling these motivations suggesting that the checking and ordering behaviours 
were less salient behaviours for fulfilling the conservation/obsessionality motivations 
than the cleaning behaviour.  This is an important point as it could be the case that 
the checking and ordering behaviours are related to other values within the Schwartz 
(1992) values model (see Figures 1.1 & 1.2) whereas the cleaning behaviour may 
have been primarily related to the primed values.  For example, in the case of the 
checking behaviour, the primary motivation might be a motivation to achieve which 
could be linked to getting the answers right or might be related to getting the task 
finished as soon as possible.  With no way on knowing which of these two 
motivations the participant was experiencing it is possible that both were at play 
within participants and between different participants.  As such, the obsessionality 
related priming task may have had an effect on cleaning behaviour because of there 
being a much clearer single motivation to perform this behaviour compared to the 
other two behaviours.   
 
Checking and ordering behaviours may be less linked to the conservation values 
quadrant than cleaning behaviour suggesting that there are other links between 
obsessionality and values within the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et 
al, 2012).  For example, it is possible that achievement based motivations exist with 
regards to checking and ordering behaviour, specifically in relation to perfectionism 
and the need to ensure that something is done right.  This is related to obsessionality 
with regards to the common ‘not quite right’ feelings that individuals can experience 
(e.g. Coles et al, 2003) which can motivate behavioural responses.  Indeed 
perfectionism has been shown to be a common variable in several mental health 
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difficulties (e.g. eating disorders, see Shafran et al, 2006) and was indicated to be a 
factor in the relationship between priming high social standards and eating 
behaviours (Shafran et al, 2006).  As such, it is possible that similar motivations may 
underlie the checking and ordering motivations of obsessionality behaviour meaning 
that priming the conservation quadrant values may have only primed certain aspects 
of obsessionality.  This would fit with the general obsessionality literature which 
suggests that there are different subtypes of obsessionality symptoms that are 
commonly seen (Calamari et al, 1999). 
 
4.3.1.3 Underlying motivations of obsessionality behaviours 
Leading on from the motivation argument above, the three behaviours were chosen 
to consider different aspects of the concept of obsessionality (e.g. Thordarson et al, 
2004).  Considering that there are studies which indicate that there are sub-types of 
symptoms within the presentation of obsessionality (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999; 
Lachman et al, 1997; Van Oppen et al, 1995) and that measures of obsessionality 
tend to be constructed of several subscales (e.g. the VOCI; Thordarson et al, 2004; 
OCI; Foa et al, 1998) it is clear that there is a multi-factorial presentation to 
obsessionality.  The results of the current study indicated that within the control 
group there were no significant correlations between the three behavioural measures 
(see results section 3.4.2).  This could suggest that the behavioural measures may 
have been tapping into different factors of obsessionality in line with the argument 
above.  Although these factors may differ slightly between measures and participant 
samples it is apparent that a wide range of symptoms can occur related to 
obsessionality and that different individuals may experience very different symptoms.  
For example, one individual may focus their obsessionality on avoiding 
contamination and performing cleaning behaviours while another may focus on 
preventing harm to others by repeatedly checking that the oven and plugs are 
switched off.  It is also possible that another individual will perform checking 
behaviour because they have obsessional doubts about whether they have done 
something right.  As such, there is no clear understanding within the obsessionality 
literature as to what drives one individual to experience one type of symptoms over 
another.  It is therefore possible that it is the fact that there are different underlying 
motivations for these different obsessionality behaviours that affects which 
symptoms an individual is likely to suffer from.  In this way the different 
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obsessionality related behaviours used in the current research may be related to 
conservation values generally but may also be related to other values within the 
Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz et al, 2012) depending upon the 
behaviour and its motivation.    
 
It is therefore possible that the proposed links between the values within the 
conservation quadrant of the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) 
and obsessionality are not robust enough for priming conservation values to lead to 
obsessionality related behaviours generally.  Rather, the priming of conservation 
values activated certain aspects of obsessionality such as contamination/cleanliness 
(e.g. Maio et al, 2009a) which led to cleaning behaviour but did not activate wider 
related concepts of checking and ordering due to confounding links with other values 
outside of the conservation quadrant. 
 
4.3.1.4 Non-obsessionality (openness) related values 
The openness to change (non-obsessionality) priming task had no effect at all on the 
obsessionality behaviour measures in the current study.  Considering the Schwartz 
model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) we would have expected these values 
to be related to the opposing motivational goals of the conservation values and as 
such to have seen different effects on behaviour as seen in previous studies of 
opposing values (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a; Smeesters et al, 2009).  As such we would 
have expected to have seen a relationship between priming these values and seeing 
less obsessionality related behaviours as the underlying motivations of seeking 
independence and new experiences would be in opposition to behaviours of 
checking, ordering and cleaning (e.g. Maio et al, 2009).  However, as noted above, 
the checking and ordering behaviour may have had underlying motivations that are 
consistent with values outside of the conservation quadrant meaning that the 
openness values would not necessarily have been priming the opposing motivations 
for these behaviours.  With regards to the cleaning behaviour, which did show an 
increase following the conservation primes, the current results would suggest that 
the opposing openness to change values may not hold enough motivational pull for 
participants with regards to performing less of the obsessionality related behaviours.   
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However a study by Karremans (2007) indicated that priming opposing values (in 
this case benevolence and achievement values) does not necessarily lead to 
opposite effects with regards to the same behaviour.  They found that priming 
benevolence values increased helpfulness behaviour but priming achievement 
values did not decrease helpfulness behaviour to lower levels than controls.  This 
demonstrates that being primed for achievement does not mean that participants are 
primed to not be helpful.  However, it is possible that if there had been an alternative 
behaviour available to the participants that would have fulfilled the achievement 
motivation then they may have engaged in that behaviour rather than the helping 
behaviour.  This was demonstrated to some extent in the Maio et al (2009) 
experiment which primed opposing conservation and openness values to investigate 
the effects on cleaning behaviour.  In this study the participants had opposing value 
motivations competing for their attention with regards to the task they were asked to 
complete being a creative task (an openness to change value instantiation) that also 
made their hands dirty (a conservation value instantiation).  This gave participants 
two competing motivations at the same time in terms of wanting to fulfil a creativity 
motivation and a being clean motivation (Maio et al, 2009).  In this competing 
motivations paradigm the effects of the opposing primes were in the directions 
expected with those primed for conservation values engaging in cleaning behaviour 
at an earlier stage of the task compared to controls and those who were primed for 
openness values engaging in the cleaning behaviour at a later stage than controls 
(Maio et al, 2009). 
 
In the current study it could be argued that the clean behaviour had a being clean 
motivation but no clear opposing motivation.  Although participants were asked to 
complete a messy sticking task in order to provide the motivation for participants to 
be clean, the sticking task was not necessarily as creative as that used in the Maio et 
al (2009) study meaning that in the current research participants in the openness 
prime may not have recognised the sticking task as fulfilling these creativity 
motivations.  There are also other reasons why the behaviour measures may not 
have shown relationships to the openness primes which are discussed further in the 
limitations section.    
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4.3.1.5 Summary for section 1 
 
There were differences between the effects of the obsessionality related priming task 
on behaviours related to obsessionality.  Specifically cleaning behaviour was found 
to occur more often following the prime while the other behaviours of checking and 
ordering did not.  An interpretation of these findings is that the clean and healthy 
primes used in the conservation priming task have stronger links conceptually with 
the contamination aspects of obsessionality in particular rather than obsessionality 
as a whole (e.g. Calamari et al, 1999; Lechman et al, 1997; Thordarson et al, 2004).  
This means that the ‘clean’ and ‘healthy’ instantiations may have activated concepts 
related to this aspect of obsessionality but activation may not have spread to other 
aspects of obsessionality.  As well as this, there is the likelihood that the cleaning 
behaviour is based upon a single motivation (wanting to be clean) whereas checking 
and ordering behaviour could be related to multiple motivations and therefore 
multiple values from the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).  
This could also have led to the cleaning behaviour being seen more often while there 
was no effect of the conservation values primes on checking and cleaning.  The non-
obsessionality openness primes are unlikely to have had an effect on behaviour due 
to the experimental tasks not providing participants with a channel for their primed 
openness motivations (e.g. Karremans, 2007). 
  
4.3.2 Relationships between questionnaire measures of obsessionality and 
behaviours related to obsessionality 
 
Statistical analyses showed that there were no links between control participants’ 
levels of obsessionality as measured by the obsessionality questionnaires (VOCI & 
SOAQ) and the three obsessionality related behaviours.  There were also no links 
between the measure of responsibility and the behaviour measures.  These results 
are interpreted below with regards to the priming literature as well as in relation to 
obsessionality in non-clinical populations. 
 
4.3.2.1 Obsessionality in non-clinical samples 
The control group, who did not receive a priming task, showed no relationship 
between obsessionality (as measured by the VOCI and SOAQ) and the 
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obsessionality related behaviours (Checking, Ordering and Cleaning).  This suggests 
that there were no links between the questionnaire measures and the behavioural 
measures which indicates that the two could be measuring very different concepts.  
However, there is already strong evidence that congruent behaviours do not 
necessarily follow on from intentions or values (e.g. Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996) and 
there is an evidence base for the fact that obsessionality can occur in the non-clinical 
population to varying degrees both with regards to purely obsessional symptoms 
(e.g. Rachman & DeSilver, 1978; Belloch et al, 2004) as well as related to behaviour 
(e.g. Thordarson et al, 2004; Mathews et al, 2004).  
 
As stated above, there is evidence that obsessionality exists along a continuum 
meaning that obsessionality related symptoms (as related to OCD) can be seen in 
non-clinical as well as clinical populations (e.g. Coles et al, 2003; Mathews et al, 
2004; Rassin & Muris, 2006).  As non-clinical populations can often report 
obsessionality related symptoms without fitting the criteria of OCD (as outlined in 
DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) there is theorised to be another 
factor that links the actual experience of obsessionality symptoms and clinical levels 
of OCD which could be related to underlying motivations such as appraisals of 
obsessional thoughts and desire to reduce anxiety (e.g. Salkovski et al, 1995; Berry 
& Laskey, 2012).  In the case of the current study it has already been highlighted 
above that it is the motivations underlying the primed values of conservation which 
are proposed to be linked to whether obsessionality congruent behaviours will follow.   
 
As highlighted by Verplanken & Holland (2002) it is also the case that values only 
lead to behaviour when they are primed.  This is relevant when considering the 
control group as this could also be related to participant’s overt displays of 
obsessionality.  For example, although we might expect individuals with higher levels 
of obsessionality to perform more obsessionality related behaviours they would still 
need to identify the behaviours in question as being capable of fulfilling this 
motivational goal.  It has been highlighted above that the checking and ordering 
behaviours may have had ambiguous motivations meaning that these behaviours 
may not have been seen as obsessionality relevant.  It is also true that 
obsessionality within non-clinical populations has been shown to have similar factor 
structures to those in clinical populations (e.g. Mathews et al, 2004; Thordarson et al, 
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2004).  As such, it is reasonable to expect that even those control participants high in 
obsessionality would show tendencies towards certain symptoms and the behaviours 
in the current study may not have been consistent with their usual obsessional 
symptoms.  However, as the obsessionality subscales of the VOCI were not 
investigated in the current study it is unknown what symptom structures were 
reported by participants to be able to verify this. 
 
Levels of self-reported responsibility beliefs also did not show relationships to scores 
on the obsessionality related behaviours within the control participants although 
there were significant positive correlations between the obsessionality scores and 
the responsibility measures which supports the findings from previous research (e.g. 
Salkovskis et al, 1999, 2000; Arntz et al, 2007).  It is thought that obsessionality is 
related to responsibility beliefs in such a way that those who experience increased 
responsibility beliefs are more likely to become distressed by their obsessionality 
symptoms especially in regards to whether they attribute the symptoms to a need to 
prevent harm to the self or others (Salkovskis et al, 2000).  Although a range of 
obsessionality and responsibility scores were apparent within the control group it 
appears that the occurrence of high levels of these two factors together is not 
enough to motivate obsessionality related behaviours.  This is discussed further in 
the section that follows.   
 
4.3.2.2 Summary for section 2 
 
There were no effects found between control group scores on questionnaire 
measures and obsessionality related behaviours.  This could be due to behaviours 
generally only occurring when they have a motivation to be performed (e.g. 
Verplanken & Holland, 2002).  As such, it is possible that the control participants did 
not have a motivation to engage in the obsessional behaviours in relation to their 
pre-dispositional obsessionality and responsibility.  This is in line with the hypothesis 
that obsessionality is a continuum and that the presence of obsessionality symptoms  
is not necessarily related to obsessionality behaviours (e.g. Rachman & DeSilver, 
1978; Belloch et al, 2004). 
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4.3.3 Effects of obsessionality and responsibility levels on behaviours related 
to obsessionality 
 
Levels of obsessionality and responsibility as measured by the VOCI, SOAQ and 
RAS did not appear to have an effect on behaviours related to obsessionality across 
the three groups or within the individual experimental groups.  It had been predicted 
that overall the high obsessionality group would show more obsessionality behaviour 
than the low obsessionality group.  However, it was also predicted that priming 
obsessionality related values would over-ride the level of obsessionality such that 
those in the conservation priming condition would show more of the behaviours in 
both the high and low obsessionality groups whilst the openness priming condition 
would show the least behaviours across the high and low obsessionality groups.   
These results are interpreted below in relation to the priming and obsessionality 
literature. 
 
4.3.3.1 Relationships between primes and obsessionality 
Although the statistical analysis did not show any meaningful relationships between 
the high and low obsessionality/responsibility groups and the behaviours, there were 
some interesting patterns within the descriptive data (see results sections 3.4.3 & 
3.4.4) which supported the fact that the prime over-rode the levels of pre-existing 
obsessionality and responsibility as predicted.  Specifically it was noted that for the 
cleaning behaviour those within the conservation group had the highest proportion of 
wipe use across the high and low obsessionality groups whilst the openness to 
change group had the lowest proportion of wipe use as had been predicted.  
However, the openness to change group showed this pattern in the opposite 
direction to what was expected (i.e. they showed more use of wipes in the low 
obsessionality group and less use of wipes in the high obsessionality group) which 
may have led to no differences being found in the statistical analysis overall.   
 
The cleaning behaviour in relation to the high and low responsibility beliefs groups 
showed a similar pattern of results to those above when looking at the descriptive 
data, but again the statistical analysis found no significant effects.  In this case the 
conservation group again had a higher proportion of cleaning wipe use in both the 
high and low responsibility groups but with more seen in the low responsibility group 
155 
 
than the high which was not as expected.  The openness to change group had the 
least wipe use overall with less use in the low responsibility group and more use in 
the high responsibility group as would be expected.   
 
As noted these patterns of results were not supported statistically but are 
commented upon here in relation to the strength of the priming paradigm used.  With 
regards to the cleaning behaviour it is of interest that the prime had stronger effects 
on the proportion of wipe use than the levels of obsessionality or responsibility as 
measured by the questionnaires (and as also supported by Hypothesis 1).  The 
proposed mechanisms for why the cleaning behaviour may have shown this effect 
while the other behaviours did not have been discussed elsewhere.  Briefly, it is 
proposed that the conservation priming task may have been successful at activating 
certain concepts related to obsessionality (i.e. contamination and cleanliness; e.g. 
Calamari et al, 1999; Lechman et al, 1997) but not others, which may have led to 
participants engaging in the cleaning behaviour to fulfil the primed motivation 
underlying this behaviour (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).   
 
4.3.3.2 Obsessionality and responsibility as dispositional tendencies  
In relation to the fact that no statistically significant differences were found between 
the high and low obsessionality or responsibility groups and the behavioural 
measures there are two points of consideration.  The first is that these results are in 
contrast to some aspects of the values priming literature in that there are often 
interactions seen between priming values and related pre-dispositional tendencies 
as we expected to see here.  For example, Hart & Albarracin (2009) found that 
priming achievement only led to achievement based perseverance behaviour in 
those with a pre-dispositional achievement focused personality trait.  Similarly 
Smeesters et al (2003) found that pro-social primes had effects on cooperative 
behaviour when individuals had a pre-existing (i.e. prior to the prime) dispositional 
tendency towards being pro-social.  This is similar to what we expected within the 
current study, in that those with higher dispositional tendencies towards 
obsessionality would be more likely to perform the obsessionality related behaviours. 
 
However, the second point is that in relation to the obsessionality literature these 
results may not seem as surprising.  When we consider that obsessionality appears 
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to exist as a continuum in the general population (e.g. Clark & Rhyno, 2005; Belloch 
et al, 2004; Mathews et al, 2004) it has been indicated that it is not the presence of 
symptoms alone that accounts for clinical levels of obsessionality (e.g. Salkovskis et 
al, 2005; Berry & Lasky, 2012).  Indeed in order for obsessionality to lead to 
behaviours related to obsessionality there needs to be a motivated direction for the 
behaviour and the motivations proposed by current theories are around significant 
anxiety and misinterpretations of obsessions as well as responsibility beliefs (e.g. 
Salkovskis et al, 2000). Whether the current study was successful at motivating the 
obsessionality behaviours has been mentioned elsewhere.  Although responsibility 
has been proposed as a significant mediating factor between obsessionality and 
anxiety (e.g. Rheaume et al, 1995) it is apparent from the current study that the 
presence of both obsessionality and responsibility is not enough to motivate 
obsessionality related behaviours but that these concepts need to be activated (e.g. 
Verplanken & Holland, 2002) in order to lead to directed behaviour.  Indeed it has 
been demonstrated by Arntz et al (2007) that manipulating perceived responsibility in 
an experimental study can lead to higher obsessionality symptoms being reported 
and higher levels of checking behaviour.  This suggests that responsibility does have 
a role to play in mediating the effects of obsessionality when responsibility is 
activated to be salient to the individual rather than just as a dispositional tendency.  
 
4.3.3.3 Summary for section 3 
 
As previously the presence of higher obsessionality alone was not enough to lead to 
obsessionality related behaviours and this was also the case for the responsibility 
behaviours.  This can be interpreted in line with obsessionality being a continuum in 
the general population (e.g. Clark & Rhyno, 1995) and is consistent with priming 
research which indicates that pre-dispositional tendencies often interact with a prime 
to lead to behaviour (e.g. Hart & Albarracin, 2009; Smeesters et al, 2003).  The 
effect of the priming task for the cleaning behaviour appeared to override the 
obsessionality and responsibility pre-dispositions although for other behaviours 
stronger motivations to perform the behaviour may need to be primed. 
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4.3.4 Relationship between value orientation and obsessionality/responsibility 
 
As highlighted in the systematic review there is a great deal of evidence for value 
priorities having an effect on the prime to behaviour pathway (e.g. Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002; Utz et al, 2004; Smeesters et al, 2003; Bechtoldt et al, 2012).  In 
particular these studies indicate that the extent to which participants endorse the 
values focused on in the studies as being important to them (i.e. the more central the 
values are to the persons sense of identity), the stronger the effects of priming these 
values is in relation to leading to value congruent behaviours.  The current study did 
not find the expected relationships between value centrality and obsessionality.  In 
particular, conservation value priorities were not significantly related to higher 
obsessionality scores on questionnaire measures.  It was found however, that 
responsibility questionnaire measures were related to self-transcendence value 
priorities as predicted.  These results are interpreted below in relation to the 
literature. 
 
4.3.4.1 Value centrality 
The main point in relation to these results is that there were very few participants 
identified as having conservation value priorities (see results section 3.4.5).  In fact 
only three participants out of the 89 participants overall were found to have this value 
priority orientation.  This makes it extremely difficult to interpret these results.  With 
regards to the descriptive data (see Table 3.3 section 3.3.2.2) it appears that there is 
potential for further research in this area as mean scores on the obsessionality and 
responsibility measures appeared to be in the predicted directions.  However, as 
these scores are based on very few participants and the statistical results do not 
support these patterns in the data these conclusions cannot be drawn at the current 
time.   
 
The fact that the majority of participants were found to have self-transcendence 
values as their highest priority values is an important point as Verplanken & Holland 
(2002) state that centrality of values is essential for being able to see value 
congruent behaviours following priming.  This could also be a contributing factor in 
the relative lack of significant results for the current study.  It is argued that priming 
values that are central to the individual has more of an effect on value congruent 
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behaviours through the mechanisms of these values being more easily accessible to 
the individual cognitively (e.g. Bardi, 2000).  If participants in the current study had 
conservation value priorities it is possible that this would have led to these values 
being more easily activated by the conservation primes which may have led to 
stronger motivations for behaviour congruent with obsessionality. 
 
The high levels of participants rating self-transcendence values as their value 
priorities could also have affected the results of the current study as responsibility is 
a value that is present within the basic value of benevolence which is located within 
the self-transcendence quadrant (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).  The fact 
that the self-transcendence value priority group showed significantly lower scores on 
the RAS (indicating higher responsibility beliefs) than the openness value priority 
group supports the location of responsibility as a self-transcendence value 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).  Self-transcendence values are most 
associated with underlying motivations in line with pro-social tendencies such as 
supporting others within our community and to looking after the planet more 
generally (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).  These values could be argued to 
represent the most socially desirable values in the Schwartz model and appear to 
have been the subject of the most research within the social values psychology 
arena (e.g. Arieli et al, 2013; Maio et al, 2001; Maio et al, 2009b; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002; Karremans, 2007).  The self-transcendence quadrant also shares the 
anxiety motivation dimension of the Schwartz model (Schwartz et al, 2012) and the 
fact that responsibility is located here in the model is also in line with 
conceptualisations of responsibility within the obsessionality literature as 
responsibility is often related to feeling accountable for the safety and well-being of 
other people as well as the self (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 1999, 2000). 
 
4.3.4.2 Summary for section 4 
 
The majority of participants were identified as having self-transcendence value 
priorities which were also related to scores on the responsibility belief measure as 
predicted in line with the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012).  
Generally, the lack of participants who were identified as having conservation value 
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priorities meant that further relationships with regards to value centrality and 
obsessionality could not be explored. 
 
4.4 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
There are important implications that can be drawn from the current study in relation 
to clinical practice, specifically with regards to values underlying obsessionality and 
the use of values within therapies more generally.  There are also important 
implications with regards to the values priming literature in general and how it relates 
to therapies which should be considered.  These implications are presented in detail 
in the following sections. 
 
4.4.1 Values and obsessionality 
The current study indicates that there are some links between values as 
conceptualised by the Schwartz model of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992; 
Schwartz et al 2012) and obsessionality.  In particular, priming conservation values 
had an effect on cleaning behaviour which has been linked to obsessionality (e.g. 
Calamari et al, 1999; Thordarson et al, 2004) while levels of obsessionality as 
measured by the VOCI and SOAQ did not appear to have an effect on the levels of 
this same behaviour.  As such considering reasons for the obsessionality related 
values provided a motivational direction for subsequent behaviour leading to more 
obsessionality related behaviour.  In contrast, high self-reported levels of 
obsessionality did not necessarily lead to obsessionality related behaviour.  This 
finding supports current conceptualisations of obsessionality within a mental health 
context (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 1999, 2000; Rassin & Muris, 2006).  Within mental 
health conditions, such as OCD, obsessionality is thought to only lead to related 
behaviours when the obsessionality has caused significant anxiety and the individual 
is seeking to reduce this anxiety (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 2000).  As such, the levels of 
obsessionality themselves are not indicators of risk for obsessionality related 
behaviours but the levels of anxiety and distress caused by the obsessionality is the 
important factor.  In terms of the obsessionality values primed in the current study, 
these values have an anxiety based motivation underlying them (Schwartz et al, 
2012) meaning that when these values are activated they promote motivations to 
maintain the status quo and protect the self and society.  If behavioural options are 
available to the individual that they recognise as being able to fulfil these motivations 
160 
 
then this will lead to behaviours (Schwartz et al, 2012) as seen in the current study 
with regards to the cleaning behaviour.   
 
However, despite the above there are also important implications to draw from the 
fact that other behaviours of checking and ordering did not show relationships to the 
obsessionality primes.  As previously highlighted, obsessionality is understood to be 
a wide concept that incorporates a multitude of symptoms and behaviours (e.g. 
Calamari et al, 1999).  It is therefore possible that different aspects of obsessionality 
are related to different values within the Schwartz model.  For example, the 
contamination and cleaning aspect of obsessionality appears to be most closely 
related to security values which has been demonstrated in the current study.  This 
may be due to the fact that considering security values such as ‘clean’ and ‘healthy’ 
primes concerns about maintaining well-being and avoiding illness (Schwartz et al, 
2012) which instils a motivation to behave in accordance with this i.e. keeping clean.  
In contrast, the checking aspect of obsessionality may be more closely related to 
achievement values such as ‘successful’ and ‘capable’ which might prime concerns 
about proving yourself and getting things right which could instil a motivation to 
behave in such a way as to ensure that things are done properly i.e. checking 
behaviour.  This latter could also be related to perfectionism which is often seen in 
high achievers and is often related to mental health difficulties (e.g. Shafran et al, 
2006).   
 
It is important that these relationships between the Schwartz model values 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) and obsessionality are considered as there is 
currently no clear systematic conceptualisation of why one person develops 
particular symptoms related to obsessionality over other symptoms.  It has been 
proposed that individuals become more distressed about obsessionality symptoms 
when those symptoms are in relation to topics that they consider as being of high 
importance to them (e.g. Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1999).  For example if a 
mother experiences an intrusive thought about harming her children and believes 
that this thought is significant then it is likely that she will become distressed by this 
thought which in turn leads to further similar thoughts (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 1999, 
2000).  As such, obsessionality is sometimes understood to focus on the areas of life 
that individuals are most concerned about or feel the most responsible for and as 
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such investigating value priorities within obsessionality may be an important future 
direction for systematically understanding why certain individuals develop certain 
symptoms compared to others.  More importantly understanding these relationships 
could also allow directions for future interventions for obsessionality related mental 
health difficulties.   
 
4.4.2 Values in therapies 
As noted in the introduction there is widespread interest in using values in therapies 
such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al, 
1999), Positive Psychology (Seligman & Czikszentmihalyi, 2000) and Narrative 
Therapy (White & Epston, 1990).  However, the way that values are conceptualised 
differs between the different therapies and there is no clear evidence base for these 
conceptualisations (e.g. Wilson & Murrell, 2004).  As noted above, there is some 
evidence that the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) could offer 
a more comprehensive and systematic way of understanding values within 
obsessionality. 
 
For example, when therapies are encouraging clients to engage with their values 
there is a general lack of evidence as to how engaging with different values might 
actually affect the individual.  Considering the evidence from the priming values 
literature there is considerable reason to believe that priming values can lead to 
value congruent behaviours (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a; Maio et al, 2009b; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002; Karremans, 2007; Arieli et al, 2012).  Considering the current study, it 
may be the case that understanding how values are related to obsessionality is more 
complicated than a simple prime to behaviour pathway.  However, as also indicated 
in the systematic review, there are commonly mediating factors within the prime to 
behaviour pathway in the priming values literature as well (e.g. Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002; Maio et al, 2001; Utz et al, 2004; Karremans, 2007).  The current 
study also indicates useful directions in which these mediating factors might be 
found.  For example, it has been indicated that responsibility and obsessionality as 
measured by questionnaires varies to a large extent within the general population in 
line with understandings of obsessionality as a continuum (e.g. Clark & Rhyno, 
1995).  It has also been indicated that high obsessionality or responsibility within 
itself is not a factor in observing subsequent behaviour related to obsessionality.  
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However, responsibility was not a primed variable within the current study and there 
is reason to believe that had responsibility been manipulated so that participants 
were induced to experience high responsibility or low responsibility prior to priming 
the conditions of having motivation to perform the obsessionality behaviours may 
have been met (e.g. Arntz et al, 2007).  
 
The current study also indicates that with regards to contamination and cleaning 
aspects of obsessionality, values work in therapy that focuses on conservation 
values, as understood by the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 
2012), that have a potential anxiety motivation may not be useful as this anxiety 
based motivation might lead to further obsessionality related behaviours and thereby 
exacerbate their current difficulties.  Focusing on values placed elsewhere in the 
Schwartz model may be more useful for the client instead to counteract the anxiety 
based motivations (Schwartz et al, 2012; Maio et al, 2009a).  As such, the Schwartz 
model may provide a useful framework for values work in a therapeutic setting 
although further research needs to be carried out with regards to this. 
 
4.4.3 Priming mechanisms and mental health 
Considering the methods by which values are generally utilised in therapeutic 
settings it can be argued that a priming paradigm is the basis of this work.  Generally 
clients are asked to think about their values and in some cases devise goals in line 
with those values.  In the priming literature these methods have been shown to be 
very successful at priming value congruent behaviours (e.g. Maio et al, 2001; Maio et 
al, 2009b; Karremans, 2007) and have been indicated to show priming effects that 
are stronger than more implicit methods of priming (e.g. Maio et al, 2001).  It has 
also been shown by Arieli et al (2013) that utilising a battery of priming techniques 
can lead to changes in values priorities and increased value congruent behaviour.  It 
is also important to consider the values as truisms hypothesis (e.g. Bernard et al, 
2003; Karremans, 2007) which suggests that we do not have clear reasons in 
support of our values.  If therapies such as ACT (Hayes, 2004) and positive 
psychology (e.g. Seligman & Czikszentmihalyi, 2000) are aiming to promote living in 
valued directions, an essential part of the therapeutic interaction is a focus on the 
reasons why those values are important for the individual. 
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4.5 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
There were several strengths and limitations identified with regards to the current 
research.  These were generally in relation to the methods used in the study and are 
outlined below. 
 
4.5.1 Participant Sample 
The sample used in the current study included mainly university undergraduate 
students who were predominantly white British and female.  This is in line with the 
majority of previous research on the effects of priming values on value congruent 
behaviour (e.g. Maio et al, 2001; Arieli et al, 2013; Parzuchowski & Wojciszke, 2014 
etc.), however it does have limitations with regards to the generalisability of the 
results to a wider population.  It is also important to consider what effects this sample 
might have had on the result of the study.  For example, the majority of participants 
in the current study had self-transcendent value priorities which could be a feature of 
this particular sample of participants rather than being representative of the general 
population.   
 
4.5.2 Priming methods 
The priming method used in the current study has been shown to be valid in other 
studies (i.e. Maio et al, 2001; Karremans, 2007; Maio et al, 2009b).  However, the 
values chosen for the current study could have had a large impact on the research 
findings.  In particular, the use of the value ‘clean’ within the obsessionality priming 
task may have been a direct cause of the increase in participants performing 
cleaning behaviour.   This is unlikely to have been the case due to the thorough 
debriefing procedure during which the participants were probed for suspicion 
particularly in relation to whether they linked the priming task with the rest of the 
study.  It was found that one participant demonstrated awareness of the prime in 
direct relation to the ‘clean’ prime being related to the cleaning wipes but no other 
participants in the obsessionality prime condition made these links.  However, it 
would be useful in future research to avoid potential confounding factors such as 
this.   
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4.5.3 Debriefing procedure and the choice of tasks 
One participant demonstrated that they were explicitly aware of links between the 
priming task and the behaviour measures.  The fact that no other participants 
demonstrated any awareness of this link in the debrief procedure suggests that the 
set-up of the study was robust in terms of preventing suspicion of these links.  
However, most priming studies utilise an unrelated studies methodology in which 
participants are led to believe that the studies they are completing are not related at 
all (e.g. Maio et al, 2001; Rasinski et al, 2005; Verplanken & Holland, 2002).  In the 
current research participants were aware that the tasks were related in some way 
but were misdirected in terms of what exactly was being measured.  The most 
common link that participants made was between the study being related to OCD 
and how they stuck the stars in the sticking task or how many letters they found in 
the letter checking task.  The sticking and letter checking tasks were deliberately 
chosen in order to misdirect participants in this way and they appeared to be 
successful in this respect.  It is possible, however, that these tasks gave the 
participants a motivationally different goal to achieve which in some way could have 
distracted from the target behaviour goals of interest. 
 
4.5.4 Choice of behavioural measures 
The behavioural measures utilised in this study were experimental in many respects 
and although they have already been discussed above there are a few more 
important points that can be made about the cleaning behaviour measure in 
particular.   
 
The cleaning behaviour had been previously used in a study by Maio et al (2009a) 
and had shown effects within this study.  They scored this behaviour on a scale of 0-
3 depending upon at what point during two tasks the participants showed cleaning 
related behaviour (Maio et al, 2009a).  In the current study adaptations were made to 
the way the cleaning behaviour measure was scored as the sticking task had a time 
limit of five minutes due to time constraints which was deemed to not be long enough 
for the participants to be motivated to use a wipe during completion of the task in the 
majority of cases.  Instead it was generally recorded that if participants used a wipe it 
was at the end of the five minutes which could have been due to the fact that they 
were aware of how long they would have to tolerate being unclean and were 
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potentially more motivated to complete the sticking task in the time allotted rather 
than waste time using a wipe during the task although the task instructions 
attempted to avoid this being the case.  The fact that this behaviour had been 
successfully measured in a previous study (Maio et al, 2009a) and the fact that there 
was a difference between the groups in the current study could suggest that the 
measure is valid which in turn could offer an explanation as to why this behaviour 
showed effects whereas the other behavioural measures did not. 
 
The ordering and checking behaviour measures had not been utilised in the current 
context before and as such were experimental in nature.  In terms of the ordering 
behaviour measure it was apparent that the checking and cleaning behaviours may 
not pick up on the ordering aspects of the obsessionality conceptualisation (e.g. 
Overduin & Furnham, 2012; Calamari et al, 1999).  In terms of fitting an unobtrusive 
task into the experimental schedule it was decided that asking the participants to put 
something away would be the easiest way of measuring ordering to see whether 
they would put the objects away in a prescribed fashion when this information was 
available to them.  Hence the putting away of the colouring pens was devised as a 
task to measure ordering behaviour.  As this behaviour measure did not show any 
effects it could be argued that the measure is invalid.  However, there are other 
perspectives to offer, such as the fact that the checking, ordering and cleaning 
behaviours were devised in order to measure different aspects of the obsessionality 
concept (e.g. Overduin & Furnham, 2012; Calamari et al, 1999).  As such it is 
possible that the priming task did not activate the whole conceptual breadth of 
obsessionality within participants and as such they may not have been motivated to 
order the pens any differently compared to other participants. 
 
With regards to the checking behaviour it was decided that the overall timing from 
when participants started the task to indicating that they were finished would be used 
for this measure as attempting to time actual time spent checking would have been 
difficult to implement using a paper and pencil test and a manual stop-watch.  
However, total time spent checking was decided to offer a valid alternative as longer 
times spent on the measure should generally indicate more care and attention taken 
on the task.  However, it is acknowledged that a computer based task which would 
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have been able to automatically and unobtrusively time the participants would have 
provided a potentially more valid measure for this behaviour. 
 
4.5.5 Questionnaire measures 
The PVQ-21 has some limitations over the PVQ-40 in terms of how well it captures 
the individual values (e.g. Hinz et al, 2005; Verkasalo et al, 2009).  However, the 
current study was interested in the quadrants of the Schwartz model (Schwartz 
1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) rather than the individual values and as such the PVQ-
21 has been shown to provide a very stable and valid quadrant structure (Verkasalo 
et al, 2009).  In the case of the current study the PVQ-21 therefore gave a suitable 
measure of the quadrants and the difficulty with using these quadrant priorities in 
analyses came from the limited number of participants who rated conservation 
quadrant values as their value priorities rather than from the way that the quadrants 
were measured. 
 
The factor structure of the VOCI within a non-clinical sample is unclear (Thordarson 
et al, 2004).  This is the main reason why the VOCI subscales were not used within 
the current study to investigate the relationships between subscales of 
obsessionality and the different obsessionality behaviours.  It was decided that 
utilising the overall scores on the VOCI would be a more valid method of analysis.  
Although this may have limited the analyses and potential relationships that were 
investigated in the current study it provided a more valid measure considering the 
non-clinical population being investigated.  However, it was shown that there were 
difficulties with a normal distribution within the VOCI with issues of significant 
positive skew generally present.  As such it could be questioned whether the VOCI is 
a suitable measure for use with non-clinical populations and whether an alternative 
measure may have been more useful and valid. 
 
The SOAQ was a potentially useful addition to the current study as it was 
recommended that this measure be used alongside the VOCI (e.g. Overduin & 
Furnham, 2012l Gonner et al, 2010) in order to better capture the ordering and 
arranging type of symptoms that were not covered by the VOCI.  As mentioned 
above the aims of the current study were not to investigate the sub-types of 
obsessionality assessed by instruments such as the VOCI but it was still important to 
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ensure that a comprehensive measure that incorporated the entire conceptual 
breadth of obsessionality was included in the study (e.g. Overduin & Furnham, 
2012).  Again there was considerable difficulty with this measure in terms of a lack of 
a normal distribution with several outliers having to be changed and significant 
positive skew apparent across the measure as with the VOCI.  As both of these 
measures showed difficulties with regards to the distribution of scores within a 
normal population this could indicate that these measures are generally not as valid 
within a non-clinical population and another method of measuring obsessionality may 
have been better for the current study. 
 
The RAS (Salkovskis et al, 1999) was included as a measure of responsibility beliefs 
as responsibility has been investigated as one of the main additional factors that 
impacts on obsessionality in clinical samples i.e. within OCD (e.g. Rachman, 1998, 
2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1993; Salkovskis, Wroe, Gledhill, Morrison & 
Forrester et al, 2000; Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon & Thibodeau, 1993) and 
because responsibility is also a value instantiation (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 
2012) and as such could be a mediating factor between obsessionality related 
values and behaviours.  As the current study showed, levels of responsibility beliefs 
(as measured by the RAS) did not appear to be related to the levels of obsessionality 
related behaviours that were seen.  However, it was found that the levels of 
responsibility were related to whether an individual showed self-transcendence value 
priorities as opposed to openness to change values and potentially the other values 
quadrants as well.  In contrast to the obsessionality measures, the RAS did not show 
any difficulties with relation to a normal distribution which suggests that this measure 
was more valid within the non-clinical population.  
 
4.5.6 Analysis 
There were issues with all of the questionnaire and behaviour measures used in the 
study with regards to meeting the assumptions for parametric analysis (Field, 2013), 
in particular with regards to linearity and normal distributions.  It was decided for 
several reasons in the current study to use non-parametric methods of analysis 
rather than transforming the data for all of the measures (see results section 3.2.6).  
However, non-parametric tests can be argued to be less likely to show an effect 
when there is in fact an effect present, although there is a counter-argument that this 
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only occurs when comparing parametric and non-parametric methods on data with 
normal distributions (Field, 2013).  Generally, there are many reasons outlined 
throughout this chapter which indicate why effects may not have been found 
between the different priming groups and the obsessionality behaviour measures 
which go beyond the methods of analysis used. 
 
4.5.7 Number of participants 
It is also important to note that the initial power analysis that was carried out before 
undertaking the study was focused on the number of participants needed to ensure 
adequate power when using three groups of participants.  However, for the quadrant 
priorities analyses there were four groups of participants being analysed rather than 
the original three which could have affected the power of the analyses.  
 
 
4.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
It is important that potential relationships between the Schwartz model values 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) and obsessionality are considered as there is 
currently no clear systematic conceptualisation of why one person develops 
particular symptoms related to obsessionality over other symptoms.  Utilising 
measures such as the PVQ (Schwartz, 1994), and SVS (Schwartz, 1992) within 
therapeutic contexts would be helpful to begin to understand how the comprehensive 
Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) may be related to a wide 
range of mental health conditions including obsessionality.  This would enable 
interventions based upon values to be focused, not just in directions identified as 
important by the individual, but also in directions identified as important for individual 
mental health conditions based upon a wide understanding of social values and their 
underlying motivation (e.g. Schwartz et al, 2012). 
 
Further research related to understanding the motivating factor of responsibility 
would be a useful direction for research as well.  In particular, based upon the study 
by Arntz et al (2007) is would be important to know whether manipulating perceived 
responsibility as well as priming obsessionality related values would predict more 
expression of obsessionality related behaviour.  This would not only highlight 
important underlying motivations of responsibility in obsessionality related 
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experiences but would also provide further examination of values in relation to 
obsessionality.  As such it would be important for research to attempt to distinguish 
whether different values are related to different aspects of obsessionality i.e. security 
values related to contamination, achievement values related to checking and so on.  
However, it would be important for future research to ensure that the motivations for 
the participant to perform the behaviour is highly significantly present, hence the 
manipulation of responsibility suggested above. 
   
It would also be helpful for further research to use more participants to measure 
some of the potentially useful directions of the results seen in the current research.  
For example, more participants in the values priorities analysis would lead to more 
participants falling within each of the value quadrants and allow for a more thorough 
examination of the relationships between value priorities, priming obsessionality 
values and obsessionality measures.    
 
4.7 SUMMARY 
 
The measure of cleaning behaviour may have been more likely to be effected by the 
obsessionality priming task for several reasons.  There were more concrete links 
between the obsessionality priming task and the cleaning behaviour which may have 
led to the obsessionality concept of contamination and cleanliness being activated 
leading to cleaning related behaviour.  There was also a clearer motivation to 
perform the cleaning behaviour than the other obsessionality related behaviours 
which may have had more ambiguous motivational drives.  As the three behaviours 
were measuring different aspects of obsessionality it is also possible that in line with 
the idea of spreading activation (e.g. Shroder & Thagard, 2012), only certain aspects 
of obsessionality were activated through the conservation value primes. 
 
The fact that there were links between the cleaning behaviour and the conservation 
value primes suggests that the conservation values are linked with some aspects of 
obsessionality as predicted.  It is possible that the conservation values are linked to 
obsessionality through the underlying anxiety motivation of maintaining the status 
quo and protecting the self and society which is consistent with current psychological 
understandings of obsessionality in clinical samples (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 1999, 
2000).  For example, in OCD it is the anxiety that is felt around needing to avoid 
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harmful consequences that drives the desire to behave in obsessional ways and 
reduce anxiety (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 2000). 
 
The current study indicated that high or low levels of obsessionality did not predict 
levels of obsessionality related behaviour which is in line with previous research 
which suggests that obsessionality symptoms are common in the general population 
and do not necessarily predict overt obsessionality behaviours (e.g. Rachman & 
DeSilver, 1978; Belloch et al, 2004).  This supports the idea of obsessionality as a 
continuum (e.g. Clark & Rhyno, 1995).  As there were no significant correlations 
between the self-reported levels of symptoms and the obsessionality related 
behaviours it appears that there has to be a motivation present in order to perform 
behaviours in line with obsessionality pre-dispositions.  This has been supported in 
the priming literature which consistently shows that motivated behaviour can follow 
value primes when there are motivationally consistent behaviours present (e.g. Maio 
et al, 2009a; Karremans, 2007; Arieli et al, 2013) and that there are often interactions 
between pre-dispositional tendencies and the value primes on the subsequent 
effects of behaviours (e.g. Smeesters et al, 2003).   
 
Another important aspect of the study was that responsibility beliefs were related to 
self-transcendence value priorities such that participants with these value priorities 
had higher levels of responsibility beliefs than those in the openness to change value 
priority group.  This suggests that responsibility beliefs are linked to the values that 
incorporate the responsibility value instantiation (self-transcendence quadrant 
values) and offers support for the Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 
2012) when considering responsibility beliefs.  As so few participants rated 
conservation values as their value priorities it is difficult to comment on how these 
value priorities may have been related to obsessionality measures.  The potential for 
value centrality having a role to play in obsessionality and responsibility experiences 
should not be overlooked as value centrality has been shown to be linked to 
behaviours in many studies related to social values (e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 
2002; Utz et al, 2004; Arieli et al, 2013) and the use of values in therapies tends to 
take the stance of considering those values that the individual rates as being most 
important to them (e.g. Hayes, 2004; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). 
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Generally the results of the current research are clinically relevant due to adding to 
our understanding of concepts that can be linked to obsessionality as a construct.  
Values are utilised a great deal in therapies with very little understanding empirically 
of the effects that this might have on clients with regards to their particular difficulties 
(e.g. Wilson & Murrell, 2004).  The current results suggest that when working with 
individuals with obsessionality difficulties it might be wise to carefully consider any 
values work that is carried out with relation to how exactly those values might relate 
to obsessionality in terms of their underlying motivations.  If the Schwartz model 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) is correct then any values worked on that 
have an underlying anxiety motivation may not be as helpful for these clients.  
Further understanding of how the Schwartz et al (2012) model may be linked to 
different obsessionality subtypes would add greatly to this area.   
 
It is also useful to consider how priming mechanisms themselves are utilised in 
therapy work in relation to values.  It can be argued that through asking clients to 
consider their values and goals in relation to these values, therapies are utilising a 
values priming paradigm with the aim of increasing the clients motivation to engage 
in value directed behaviours (e.g. Maio et al, 2009a; Karremans, 2007).  Generally 
there are important implications for understanding how values are linked to mental 
health construct in more robust ways in order to more effectively utilise values in a 
systematic way within a therapy context.   
 
There were several strengths and limitations of the current research.  Generally the 
procedures used to carry out the actual experimental sessions appeared to be robust 
as only one participant identified any links between the priming tasks and the 
measures.  There were however concerns with the obsessionality related 
questionnaires which did not show normal distributions within this non-clinical 
sample of participants.  In terms of the analysis, non-parametric methods were used 
due to the difficulties with distributions of scores on some of the measures and lack 
of linearity between variables.  It is also possible that there was a lack of power in 
one section of the analysis due to too few participants. 
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4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overall the current research indicated that there are links between the Schwartz 
(1992, Schwartz et al, 2012) values model and obsessionality.  In particular priming 
obsessionality related conservation quadrant values led to more obsessionality 
related cleaning behaviour although there were no statistically significant effects on 
other obsessionality related behaviours of checking and ordering.  This could have 
been related to the obsessionality priming task particularly priming the 
clean/contamination dimension of obsessionality rather than the obsessionality 
concept as a whole.  Priming the non-obsessionality openness to change quadrant 
values did not appear to reduce obsessionality related behaviours although this 
could have been due to there not being available an alternative behavioural 
response in line with the openness to change values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et 
al, 2012; Maio et al, 2009a).   
 
It appeared that obsessionality related primes only led to obsessionality related 
behaviours when there was a clear motivation to engage in the behaviour and a 
clear opportunity to do so.  This is in line with previous research that suggests that 
values only lead to value congruent behaviours when they are activated (Verplanken 
& Holland, 2002).  It is also in line with research on obsessionality related disorders 
such as OCD which state that obsessionality symptoms only lead to diagnosable 
levels when the obsessionality symptoms cause severe distress or anxiety which 
motivates the individual to engage in obsessionality related behaviours to reduce the 
anxiety (e.g. Salkovskis et al, 2000).  It was further found that responsibility beliefs 
were related to self-transcendence value priorities as predicted which supports the 
Schwartz model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al, 2012) as being a useful tool for 
exploring further relationships with obsessionality related concepts.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Flow chart of review process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Database search identified 
3498 potential articles 
Reviewing references of these 71 
identified a further 8 articles 
Reviewing abstracts identified 
71 potential articles 
Removing duplicates left 151 
articles 
Reviewing titles identified 293 
articles 
Reviewing abstracts identified 4 
potential articles 
All 79 full text articles reviewed, 54 rejected due to not 
meeting all inclusion criteria 
Remaining 25 articles included 
in systematic review 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
         
Reference 
(Authors, 
Date, 
Experiment 
No.) 
Participants 
(Total no., 
%Female, 
Age, 
Sample) 
Values focus Priming task Behavioural 
measure 
Main 
effects 
(yes/no) 
Main results 
(direct effects 
of priming on 
behaviour) 
Mediatin
g effects 
(yes/no) 
Additional 
analysis 
(mediating 
factors etc.) 
Limitations 
Maio, Olsen, 
Allen & 
Bernard 
(2001) Ex 1 
177 (97F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Equality 1 - Making 
reasons salient 
(listing reasons 
for and against 
equality) 
(conscious – 
explicit) 
2 - Anagrams 
(around the 
theme of 
equality)  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Minimal 
group 
paradigm 
(equality 
measure) 
Yes In-group 
favouritism 
lower for 
participants in 
the reasons 
salient 
condition than 
for participants 
in the values 
salient or 
control 
conditions 
Yes Participants 
who gave more 
clear reasons 
and concrete 
cognitions in 
the reasons 
salient 
condition 
exhibited less 
in-group 
favouritism 
Generalisability to 
general population 
 
Maio, Olsen, 
Allen & 
Bernard 
(2001) Ex 2 
58 (50F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Tradition 
Helpfulness 
 
1 – Making 
reasons salient 
(listing reasons 
for and against 
helpfulness) 
(conscious – 
explicit) 
2 – Indicating 
feelings about 
values in 
response to 10 
questions  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
 
Volunteering 
time to 
complete 
further 
research for 
no payment 
or course 
credit 
(helpfulness 
measure) 
Yes Participants in 
the reasons 
salient 
condition 
offered more 
time than those 
in the value 
salient 
condition 
Yes Participants 
who gave more 
clear reasons 
and concrete 
cognitions in 
the reasons 
salient 
condition 
volunteered 
more time 
No control group 
Feelings group spent less 
time on the task than 
reasons salient group 
Small number of 
participants 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Arieli, Grant 
& Savig 
(2013) Ex 2 
48 (17F, 
22.89 mean 
age) 
undergradua
te students 
Benevolence 1 – reading 
evidence for 
benevolence 
2 – tick list of 
benevolence 
behaviours 
3 – writing stories 
of own 
experiences 
related to 
benevolence 
4 – writing a 
persuasive essay 
on benevolence 
(conscious and 
unconscious) 
Volunteering 
intention 
(benevolenc
e measure) 
Yes more p’s in 
benevolence 
condition gave 
their details for 
volunteering 
than in the 
control 
condition 
Yes the 
benevolence 
values condition 
increased in 
benevolence 
values following 
the priming 
which mediated 
the effect of 
prime on 
behaviour  
All participants increased 
in benevolence values 
Small sample size 
University students 
Which priming exercise 
had an effect 
(participants in 
benevolence group did 
all four priming tasks) 
Not probed for suspicion 
Experimenters not blind 
to condition 
Maio, Hahn, 
Frost & 
Cheung 
(2009b) Ex1 
90 (76F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Equality Asked to list 
reasons why 
equality was 
important for 
typical and 
atypical 
instantiations (via 
two different 
stories) 
(conscious – 
explicit) 
Minimal 
Group 
Paradigm 
(allocating 
points) 
(measure of 
egalitarianis
m) 
Yes The typical 
equality prime 
condition 
exhibited less in 
group 
favouritism than 
both the control 
and atypical 
prime groups 
No There were no 
sig effects of 
priming on 
ratings of 
importance of 
equality or on 
the measure of 
equality value 
strength.   
Behaviour measure is 
loaded to substantially 
favour the in group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Maio, Hahn, 
Frost & 
Cheung 
(2009b) Ex3 
60 (47f, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Equality Reading a short 
story about 
typical/atypical 
instantiations 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Minimal 
group 
paradigm 
(measure of 
egalitarianis
m) 
Yes Typical equality 
prime group 
exhibited less in 
group 
favouritism than 
atypical equality 
prime  
No No significant  
effects of 
priming on 
importance of 
equality, or 
extent that 
participants feel 
they should use 
equality 
Small participant 
numbers  
Behaviour measure 
loaded to substantially 
favour the in group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Maio, Hahn, 
Frost & 
Cheung 
(2009b) Ex4 
77 (60f, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Equality Reading a short 
story about 
typical/atypical 
instantiations 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Minimal 
group 
paradigm 
(measure of 
egalitarianis
m) 
Yes Typical equality 
prime group 
exhibited less in 
group 
favouritism than 
atypical equality 
prime group 
No No significant 
effects of 
condition on 
ratings of 
importance of 
equality 
No control group 
Behaviour measure 
loaded to favour the 
ingroup 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Jonas, 
Sullivan & 
Greenberg 
(2013) Ex2 
68 (44f, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Generosity 
Kindness 
 
Reading 
biography of 
Florence 
Nightingale (or 
Marie Curie) and 
then answering 
questions 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Donating 
money to 
charity  
(measure of 
generosity) 
Yes Participants in 
the mortality 
salience 
condition made 
more donations 
following 
kindness prime, 
no effects of 
prime in dental 
pain condition 
as expected 
Yes Significant 
interaction 
between 
mortality 
salience and 
money 
importance 
Reliant on p’s having 
money to donate. 
Measure of attitudes to 
money needs 
investigating  
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Jonas, 
Sullivan & 
Greenberg 
(2013) Ex3 
76 (36f, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Fairness 
 
Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Dictator 
game 
(measure of 
fairness) 
Yes Significant 
effect of 
fairness prime 
leading to more 
fair behaviour 
Yes Marginal main 
effect for 
mortality 
salience as well 
as significant 
interaction 
between 
mortality 
salience and 
prime 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Parzuchows
ki & 
Wojciszke 
(2014) Ex3 
48 (40F, 
20.16 yrs 
mean age) 
undergradua
te students 
honesty Hand placement 
on heart or hip 
while looking at 
faces of women 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Rating the 
attractivene
ss of the 
women’s 
faces 
(measure of 
honesty) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime on ratings 
of unattractive 
faces – honesty 
primed gave 
lower ratings 
than neutral 
primed 
Yes Attractiveness – 
the effects were 
only seen for 
the unattractive 
faces with no 
difference in 
rating of 
attractive faces 
Placement of hand over 
body rather than over 
heart a factor 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Parzuchows
ki & 
Wojciszke 
(2014) Ex4 
52 (34F, no 
ages 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Honesty Hand on heart vs 
hand on shoulder 
and no gesture 
controls 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Self-
reported 
performance 
on a maths 
test 
(measure of 
honesty) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – Honesty 
primed 
reported less 
correct answers 
(in line with 
controls) than 
neutral primed 
No  No way of knowing how 
many questions 
participants actually 
solved in prime groups 
Small participants 
numbers 
No mediating factors 
examined (i.e. actual 
maths ability) 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, 
Chai, 
Barndollar 
& Trotschel 
(2001) Ex 2 
60 (0F, 24.1 
yrs mean 
age) 
undergradua
te students 
cooperation Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Fishing 
game 
(allocating 
resources) 
(measure of 
cooperation) 
Yes Main effect of 
priming – 
cooperation 
prime led to 
more 
cooperative 
behaviour  
Yes Main effect for 
conscious goal – 
led to more 
cooperation  
Experienced 
intentions to 
behave 
cooperatively 
showed no 
significant 
differences 
across groups 
Behaviour measure 
ambiguous as could 
include caring about the 
environment rather than 
cooperation with 
another person 
Small no of participants 
Possible intentions rated 
based on the behaviour 
just performed  - order 
effects 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Male only sample 
Rasinski, 
Visser, 
Zagatsky & 
Rickett 
(2005) 
66 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Honesty Word similarities 
task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Self-
reported 
measures of 
undesirable 
alcohol 
related 
behaviours  
Yes Main effect of 
prime – those 
exposed to 
honesty 
admitted more 
of the 
undesirable 
behaviours than 
the neutral 
words  
Yes Significant 
interaction 
between prime 
and order of 
questions - 
effect of prime 
significant when 
alcohol related 
questions came 
sooner after 
prime 
No debrief of 
participants 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Hertel & 
Kerr (2001) 
56 (40F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Loyalty 
Equality 
Memory task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Minimal 
group 
paradigm 
(measure of 
egalitarianis
m) 
No No significant 
main effect of 
primes 
Yes Significant 
interaction 
effect between 
prime and 
perceived group 
expectation of 
loyalty vs 
equality 
Significant 
interaction 
between prime 
and type of 
matrices 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Verplanken 
& Holland 
(2002) Ex1 
40 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Concern for 
the 
environment 
Impression 
formation task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Consumer 
choice task 
(environmen
tal measure) 
Yes Environmental 
status of the 
chosen 
alternative and 
acceptable 
alternatives was 
significantly 
higher in the 
priming 
condition than 
the control 
condition 
Yes Mediating 
effect of 
perceptions of 
attribute 
importance was 
statistically 
significant 
Small sample size 
Not blind to conditions 
Not clear how allocated 
participants to conditions 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Verplanken 
& Holland 
(2002) Ex2 
99 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Concern for 
the 
environment 
Scrambled 
sentences task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Consumer 
choice task 
(environmen
tal measure) 
Yes Environmental 
status of the 
chosen 
alternative  was 
significantly 
higher in the 
priming 
condition than 
the control 
condition 
 
Yes main effect of 
value centrality 
on 
environmental 
status of chosen 
alternative 
highly 
significant 
Not clear if 
experimenters blind to 
conditions 
Not clear how 
participants were 
allocated to conditions 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Verplanken 
& Holland 
(2002) Ex3 
105 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Concern for 
the 
environment 
Impression 
formation task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Consumer 
choice task 
(environmen
tal measure) 
No No significant 
main effects of 
primes on 
environmental 
status of chosen 
alternative or 
acquired 
number of 
pieces of 
environmental 
information 
Yes Main effect of 
value centrality 
for the 
environmental 
status of the 
chosen 
alternative and 
the proportion 
of 
environmental 
information 
acquired  
Significant 
interaction 
between value 
centrality and 
primes 
Not clear if 
experimenters were 
blind to conditions 
Not clear how 
participants were 
allocated to condition 
Do not state the effects 
of time spent on 
behaviour task on the 
choices made 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, 
Vohs & 
Baumeister 
(2013) Ex1 
16 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
market 
vendors 
Cleanliness 
(morality) 
Given clean or 
dirty money 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Weight of 
vegetables 
(measure of 
fairness) 
Yes Sales made by 
vendors 
following clean 
prime more fair 
than following 
dirty prime, 
clean money 
boosted 
fairness, dirty 
money caused 
decline in 
fairness 
No  Vendors not debriefed 
No suspicion probed 
Limitations of field 
research 
No manipulation checks 
No alternative 
explanations considered  
No information about 
other contextual factors 
Small participant 
numbers 
Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, 
Vohs & 
Baumeister 
(2013) Ex2 
68 (50f no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cleanliness 
(morality) 
Finger dexterity 
task (counting 
clean or dirty 
money of paper)  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Trust game 
(measure of 
sharing) 
Yes Clean money 
group returned 
more money 
than dirty do 
difference in 
clean and dirty 
money groups 
No  Small sample size  
Not probed for suspicion 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, 
Vohs & 
Baumeister 
(2013) Ex3 
60 (25f no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cleanliness 
(morality) 
Finger dexterity 
task (counting 
clean or dirty 
money of paper) 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Morality 
questionnair
e (indicating 
how much 
would need 
to be paid to 
perform 
immoral 
behaviours) 
Yes Clean money 
demanded 
more money to 
perform 
immoral acts 
than dirty 
money 
 
Yes Differences 
between money 
versus paper 
groups, i.e. 
clean money 
most moral, 
then dirty 
paper, then 
dirty money 
then clean 
paper 
Potential for multiple 
hypotheses/predictions 
Not clear which they are 
testing/expecting 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, 
Vohs & 
Baumeister 
(2013) Ex4 
156 (101f no 
age 
provided) 
sample 
unknown 
Cleanliness 
(morality) 
Finger dexterity 
task  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Prisoners 
dilemma 
game 
(measure of 
sharing) 
Yes Clean money 
shared more 
than dirty 
money prime 
Yes Differences 
between money 
versus paper 
groups, 
Clean money 
most sharing, 
then dirty 
paper, clean 
paper and 
dirty money 
Not probed for suspicion 
Unknown sample 
No control group 
 
Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, 
Vohs & 
Baumeister 
(2013) Ex5 
112 (52f no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cleanliness 
(morality) 
Finger dexterity 
task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Ultimatum 
game 
(measure of 
fairness) 
Yes Clean money 
rejected more 
unfair offers 
than dirty 
money 
 
Yes Accepting low 
or unfair offers 
shaped by 
interaction 
between dirt 
and money 
variables 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, 
Vohs & 
Baumeister 
(2013) Ex6 
127 (67F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cleanliness – 
morality 
Reading article 
about 
cleanliness/dirtin
ess of nations 
money 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Dictator 
game 
(measure of 
fairness) 
Yes Clean money 
significantly 
more generous 
and fairer than 
controls, dirty 
money less fair 
than controls 
Yes Evaluation of 
trade-related 
words mediated 
fairness in the 
dictator game 
Unclear whether words 
chosen indicate ‘fairness’ 
Ratings of the words 
more about how they 
valued trade – different 
construct to fairness 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, 
Vohs & 
Baumeister 
(2013) Ex7 
108(40f, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cleanliness – 
morality 
Reading article 
about 
cleanliness/dirtin
ess of nations 
money 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Dictator 
game 
(measure of 
fairness) 
Yes Clean money 
more generous 
and fair than 
controls, dirty 
money more 
selfish and less 
fair than 
controls  
Yes Favourable 
ratings of 
fairness or 
greed mediated 
money 
allocations,  
clean money 
endorsed 
fairness, dirty 
money 
endorsed more 
greed 
Not clear that handling 
money was necessary 
Generalisability to 
general population 
 
Shafran, 
Lee, Payne 
& Fairburn 
(2006) 
41 (41F, 22.6 
yrs mean 
age) 
university 
undergradua
te and 
community 
sample 
Personal 
Standards 
(an aspect of 
perfectionis
m) 
Contracts that 
highlight sticking 
to high or low 
personal 
standards in all 
aspects of life for 
next week 
(conscious – 
explicit) 
Food 
consumptio
n over 
course of a 
week 
(measure of 
perfectionis
m) 
Yes Attempted 
restraint 
different 
between high 
and low 
standards 
groups post 
prime - regret 
after eating and 
number of high 
calorie foods 
eaten different 
after primes 
Yes Post prime 
there were 
group 
differences for 
all aspects of 
clinical 
perfectionism 
between the 
high and low 
standards 
groups  
Participant awareness of 
nature of study  
Not probed for suspicion 
Cannot be generalised to 
eating disorders 
population 
Do not report whether 
any differences on 
questionnaire scales pre 
prime or pre and post 
prime 
No control group 
Female only participants 
Small participant 
numbers 
Wheeler, 
Morrison, 
DeMarree & 
Petty (2008) 
49 (31F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Politeness 
Rudeness 
 
Computer task 
(subliminal) 
Time taken 
to interrupt 
experimente
r (measure 
of rudeness) 
No  Yes Significant 
interactions 
between prime 
and levels of 
self-monitoring, 
internal state 
awareness and 
self-reflection  
 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Bargh, Chen 
& Burrows 
(1996) Ex1 
34 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Politeness  
Rudeness 
Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Time taken 
to interrupt 
experimente
r (measure 
of rudeness) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – those in 
rude prime 
interrupted 
significantly 
faster than 
those in neutral 
or polite prime 
No No reliable 
difference in 
ratings made of 
the 
experimenters 
politeness post 
experiment – 
suggests 
perceptions of 
experimenter 
not a factor 
Perceptions could be the 
same for other reasons 
and may not be accurate 
reflection of true feelings 
Large number of 
participants did not 
interrupt at all 
Small participant 
numbers 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Epley & 
Gilovich 
(1999) Ex1 
34 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Conformity Scrambled 
sentences  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Agreeing 
with 
confederate
s on 
interestingn
ess of a task 
(measure of 
conformity) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – 
conformity 
group rated task 
more 
favourably than 
those primed 
with non-
conformity 
No  Note that scores for non-
conformity group were 
still high Conformity and 
non-conformity could 
both prime conformity 
No control group 
Small no of participants 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Epley & 
Gilovich 
(1999) Ex2 
120 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Conformity Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Agreeing 
with 
confederate 
on 
interestingn
ess of a task 
(measure of 
conformity) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime on 
behaviour - 
conformity 
rated task more 
interesting than 
other two 
conditions  
Yes No priming 
effects seen 
when pressure 
to conform is 
absent (control 
groups) 
Suggest pattern of 
results supports idea that 
non-conformity can 
prime conformity but t-
test results do not 
confirm this 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Harris, 
Coburn, 
Rohrer & 
Pashler 
(2013) Ex 1 
106 (73F, no 
ages 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Word search 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Performance 
on three 
further word 
searches 
(measure of 
achievement
) 
No No effect of 
prime condition 
on behaviour in 
two different 
scoring analyses  
(stringent 
scoring and 
lenient scoring) 
No No main effect 
of gender, no 
significant 
interaction of 
gender and 
prime 
Participants aware the 
experimenter blind to 
conditions 
Not all original materials 
available to replicate 
Added measures to 
ensure experimenter bias 
was reduced  
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Harris, 
Coburn, 
Rohrer & 
Pashler 
(2013) Ex 2 
72 (49F, no 
ages 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Word search 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Five minute 
delay (with 
filler task) 
then 
performance 
on three 
further word 
searches 
tested 
(measure of 
achievement
) 
No No effect of 
primes on 
behaviour in 
two different 
scoring analyses 
(stringent 
scoring and 
lenient scoring) 
No Significant main 
effect of gender 
– females found 
more words, no 
interaction of 
gender with 
condition 
No other mediating 
factors considered i.e. 
differences between the 
students in terms of the 
university they are 
studying at, course they 
are studying, cultural 
differences compared to 
original study 
Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, 
Chai, 
Barndollar 
& Trotschel 
(2001) Ex 1 
78 (48F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Word search 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Word search 
performance 
(measure of 
achievement
) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – 
achievement 
primed found 
more words 
than neutral 
prime 
No  Instructed to find ‘as 
many words as possible’ - 
extra prime 
No mediating factors 
considered 
Generalisability to 
general population 
 
 
Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, 
Chai, 
Barndollar 
& Trotschel 
(2001) Ex 3 
288 (186F, 
no age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Word search 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
 
Word search 
performance 
after a delay 
(also 
impression 
formation 
task after a 
delay) 
(measure of 
achievement
) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – 
achievement 
primed found 
more words 
after a delay 
 
Yes Significant 
interaction 
between prime, 
delay and task 
Primed group 
achievement 
related 
impressions 
became less 
extreme over 
time and 
performance on 
word search 
increased over 
time 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
 
197 
 
Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, 
Chai, 
Barndollar 
& Trotschel 
(2001) Ex 4 
76 (50F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Word search  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Scrabble 
task 
(measure of 
achievement
) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – those 
primed with 
achievement 
were more 
likely to carry 
on searching 
after being told 
time was up 
No  No mediating factors 
investigated 
Generalisability to 
general population 
 
Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, 
Chai, 
Barndollar 
& Trotschel 
(2001) Ex 5 
65 (36F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Word search  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Choice of 
which task 
to complete 
after an 
interruption 
(measure of 
perseverenc
e) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – more of 
the 
achievement 
primed choose 
to continue with 
task than those 
not primed 
Yes Significant 
effect of gender 
– more women 
than men chose 
Scrabble task 
Call the gender effect a 
hypothesis irrelevant 
effect – but it is an effect 
so how could this be 
explained 
No other mediating 
effects investigated 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Hart & 
Albarracin 
(2009) Ex 3 
104 (43M, 
no age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Computer based 
lexical decision 
task (subliminal) 
Choice of 
resuming 
puzzles or 
doing fun 
task 
(measure of 
perseverenc
e) 
No No significant 
main effect of 
primes 
Yes Regression 
model 
1 - reliable 
effect of 
achievement 
motivation but 
no effect of 
prime 
2 - significant 
two way 
interaction 
between 
priming and 
chronic 
achievement 
motivation 
 
 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Hart & 
Albarracin 
(2009) Ex 4 
226 (72M, 
no ages 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
Word search task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Number of 
words found 
in word 
search tasks 
(measure of 
achievement
) 
No No significant 
main effect of 
prime 
Yes Regression 
model 
1 – reliable 
effects of 
achievement 
motivation but 
no effect of 
prime 
2 – significant 
interaction 
between prime 
and 
achievement 
motivation 
3 – nature of 
interaction 
between 
chronic 
achievement 
and prime 
dependent 
upon task frame 
 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Utz, 
Ouwerkerk 
& van Lange 
(2004) Ex 1 
93 (65F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Competence Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Dilemma 
task 
(measure of 
cooperation) 
No  Yes Significant 
interaction 
between prime 
and social value 
orientation – 
prime only 
affected 
competitive 
participants 
Main effect of 
social value 
orientation 
 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Utz, 
Ouwerkerk 
& van Lange 
(2004) Ex 2 
134 (103F, 
no age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Competence Scrambled 
sentences  
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Dilemma 
task 
(measure of 
cooperation) 
No  Yes Significant 
interaction 
between prime 
and social value 
orientation 
Main effect of 
social value 
orientation 
Main effect of 
strategy in task 
Interaction 
between 
strategy and 
social value 
orientation 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Smeesters, 
Wheeler & 
Kay (2009a - 
Ex3) 
106 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cooperation 
Competition 
 
Computer based 
lexical decision 
task (subliminal) 
 
Non-
reciprocal 
dictator 
game 
(cooperation 
behaviour) 
Yes Main effect of 
primes - 
competition 
prime shared 
less than those 
primed with 
cooperation 
Yes Effect of primes 
on perception 
of other 
moderated by 
communal 
orientation as is 
the effect of 
perceptions on 
behaviour 
Do not clearly 
conceptualise the values 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Maio, 
Pakizeh, 
Cheung & 
Rees (2009a 
– Ex5) 
112 (67F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Achievemen
t 
benevolence 
Sorting task 
(memory task) 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Word search 
(achievemen
t measure) 
and 
volunteering 
for future 
research 
(benevolenc
e measure) 
Yes Participants 
primed for 
achievement 
find more 
words than 
benevolence. 
Participants 
primed for 
benevolence 
volunteer more 
time than 
achievement 
No  No orthogonal primes 
Behaviours could be 
linked to other values 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Karremans 
(2007) Ex 1 
94 (59F, 
20.5yrs 
mean age) 
undergradua
te students 
Benevolence 
Achievemen
t 
 
Reasons for and 
against 
benevolence or 
achievement 
(conscious – 
explicit) 
Helping to 
pick up 
pencils 
(measure of 
helpfulness)  
Yes Participants 
more likely to 
help in the 
benevolence 
condition than 
in the 
achievement 
condition and 
control 
condition 
Yes Favourability of 
the 
benevolence 
reasons was 
positively 
correlated with 
helping 
behaviour 
Relatively small number 
of participants interpret 
correlations with care 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Hertel & 
Fiedler 
(1998) Ex1 
134 (97 
females, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cooperation 
Competition 
Memory task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Ring 
Measure of 
Social Values 
(measure of 
pro-social vs 
pro-self 
decisions) 
No  Yes The only strong 
predictor of 
cooperative  
behaviour was 
cooperative 
pre-disposition, 
also a 
consistency 
main effect, 
higher 
cooperation 
shown by 
people low in 
consistency 
Small sample size Cannot 
differentiate between 
semantic and evaluative 
priming effects 
Not clear how people 
being more inconsistent 
relates to cooperation 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Ring measure validity as 
a behavioural measure 
Hertel & 
Fiedler 
(1998) Ex2  
94 (69 
females no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Cooperation 
Competition 
Memory task 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Ring 
measure of 
social values 
(measure of 
pro-social vs 
pro-self 
decisions) 
No No significant 
effects of prime 
obtained when 
data pooled 
across all 
participants  
Yes Dispositional 
preference had 
an effect  
Significant 
effect of 
consistency of 
pre-dispositions 
on behaviour 
No new control group 
Primes not previously 
presented together 
Assumptions that coop +- 
and comp +- would lead 
to cooperation and 
competition respectively 
as social norms 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Ring measure validity as 
a behavioural measure 
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Smeesters, 
Warlop, Van 
Avermaet, 
Corneille & 
Yzerbyt 
(2003) Ex1 
203 ( no 
gender or 
age) 
undergradua
te students 
Morality  
Might 
Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Prisoners 
dilemma 
game 
(measure of 
cooperation) 
Yes Main effect of 
primes – 
Morality primed 
more 
cooperative 
than neutral 
primes and 
might primes 
Yes Significant two 
way interaction 
between social 
value 
orientation and 
primes Main 
effect of primes 
for low 
consistent 
participants  
High consistent 
pro-socials 
more 
cooperative 
than pro-
individuals 
Conception of morality 
and might unclear 
Morality prime words 
related to pro-social 
values, might words to 
pro-individual values 
Potential demand 
characteristics 
Hypothetical game 
lacking actual monetary 
payoffs 
Single trial interactions, 
responses to feedback 
would be useful 
Generalisability to 
general population 
 
 
Smeesters, 
Warlop, Van 
Avermaet, 
Corneille & 
Yzerbyt 
(2003) Ex2 
193(no age 
or gender) 
undergradua
te students 
Morality  
Might 
Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Prisoners 
dilemma 
game 
(measure of 
cooperation) 
Yes Main effect of 
primes – 
morality more 
coop than  
neutral, might 
less coop than 
neutral 
Yes Main effect of 
social value 
orientation 
Three way 
interaction 
between social 
value 
orientation, 
consistency and 
primes  
Morality elicited 
higher 
expectations of 
partners coop  
 
 
 
 
Conceptualisation of 
morality and might 
unclear – as above 
Potential demand 
characteristics 
Hypothetical game 
lacking actual monetary 
payoffs 
Single trial interactions, 
responses to feedback 
would be useful 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Smeesters, 
Warlop, Van 
Avermaet, 
Corneille & 
Yzerbyt 
(2003) Ex3 
140(no age 
or gender) 
undergradua
te students 
Morality  
Might 
Lexicle decision 
making task 
(subliminal) 
Prisoners 
dilemma 
game 
(measure of 
cooperation) 
Yes  Main effect of 
primes – 
morality primes 
more 
cooperative 
than might 
Yes Main effect of 
social value 
orientation 
Main effect of 
consistency 
Three way 
interaction 
between social 
value 
orientation 
consistency and 
primes  
Correlations 
between 
expectations of 
partners 
cooperation and 
cooperative 
behaviour 
Conceptualisation of 
morality and might 
unclear – as above 
Potential demand 
characteristics 
Hypothetical game 
lacking actual monetary 
payoffs 
Single trial interactions, 
responses to feedback 
would be useful 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Smeesters, 
Warlop, Van 
Avermaet, 
Corneille & 
Yzerbyt 
(2003) Ex4 
167 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Morality  
Might 
Scrambled 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Prisoners 
dilemma 
game 
Yes Main effect of 
primes - 
morality primes 
more coop than 
neutral and 
might less coop 
than neutral 
Yes Main effect of 
social value 
orientation 
Main effect of 
consistency 
Three way 
interaction 
between social 
value 
orientation 
consistency and 
primes 
Correlations 
between 
expectations of 
cooperation and 
behaviour  
Did not examine specific 
nature of mediating 
process (i.e. personality 
impression vs behaviour 
expectations) 
Potential demand 
characteristics 
Hypothetical game 
lacking actual monetary 
payoffs 
Single trial interactions, 
responses to feedback 
would be useful 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Neuberg 
(1988) 
94 (0F, no 
ages 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Competitive 
(achievemen
t) 
Cooperation 
Computer based 
decision task  
(subliminal) 
Prisoners 
dilemma 
game 
(Measure of 
cooperation) 
No No significant 
main effect of 
primes 
Yes Significant 
interaction 
between prime 
and behavioural 
predisposition  
Main effect of 
behavioural 
tendency on 
first move to 
subsequent 
behaviour 
Main effect of 
partners initial 
move on 
subsequent 
behaviour 
Male only participants 
Some awareness of 
prime evident 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Karremans 
(2007) Ex 2 
107 (81F, 
20.0yrs 
mean age) 
undergradua
te students 
Helpfulness 
Equality 
Success 
Varied life 
1 - Reasons for 
and against 
values 
(conscious – 
explicit) 
2 – anagrams 
themed around a 
value 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Minimal 
group 
paradigm 
(measure or 
egalitarian) 
Yes Helpfulness and 
equality 
reasoning 
conditions 
allocated points 
more equally 
and choose the 
equal option 
more often than 
all other 
conditions 
Yes Favourability of 
the reasons for 
helpfulness 
correlated 
positively with 
choosing the 
equal option, 
same for the 
reasons for 
equality group 
Did not probe for 
suspicion in participants 
Small number of 
participants 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Verplanken, 
Trafimow, 
Khusid, 
Holland & 
Steentjes 
(2009) Ex2 
68 (no 
gender or 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
tes 
Private self  
Collective 
self 
Writing what 
have in common 
with or how differ 
from people feel 
close to 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Choosing an 
apartment 
based on 
attributes 
(measure of 
loyalty) 
Yes Main effect of 
prime – 
collective self 
gave more 
weight to 
loyalty attribute 
in their decision 
making than 
private self 
No  No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
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Bechtoldt, 
Choi & 
Nijstad 
(2012) 
174 (82F, 
21.3 yrs 
mean age) 
undergradua
te students 
Individual 
values 
Collectivist 
values 
Via task 
instructions as 
either individual 
rewards or group 
rewards 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
 
Fluency and 
originality of 
ideas 
(measure of 
creativity) 
Yes Fluency – Main 
effect of values 
prime - more 
ideas in 
collectivist 
values group 
than 
individualist 
values group 
Originality – No 
main effect of 
values prime  
 
Yes Significant 
interaction 
between self-
construal’s and 
value 
orientation for 
originality 
No control group 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Maio, 
Pakizeh, 
Cheung & 
Rees (2009a 
– Ex2) 
116 (84F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Stimulation 
Tradition 
 
Unscrambling 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Better-than-
average 
effect 
(modesty 
behaviour) 
Yes Better-than-
average effect 
weaker after 
tradition values 
primed than 
controls, and 
stronger after 
stimulation 
values primed 
than controls 
 
No  Generalisability to 
general population 
No mediating factors 
considered in analysis 
Maio, 
Pakizeh, 
Cheung & 
Rees (2009a 
– Ex3) 
58 (52F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Self-
direction 
Security 
Unscrambling 
sentences 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Leaky pen 
and sticky 
crayons 
(cleanliness 
behaviour) 
Yes Participants in 
the security 
condition 
requested 
another pen or 
used cleaning 
wipes earlier 
than controls 
and the self-
direction 
condition  
 
No  Small sample size 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Validity of behavioural 
measure 
No consideration of 
mediating factors in 
analysis 
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Maio, 
Pakizeh, 
Cheung & 
Rees (2009a 
– Ex4) 
60 (49F, no 
age 
provided) 
undergradua
te students 
Self-
direction 
security 
Sorting task 
(memory task) 
(unconscious – 
implicit) 
Indicating 
which 
questions 
would like to 
know more 
about on a 
quiz 
(curiosity 
measure) 
Yes self-direction 
condition 
showed more 
curiosity than 
the security 
condition 
No  Small sample size 
Generalisability to 
general population 
Validity of behavioural 
measure 
No consideration of 
mediating factors in 
analysis 
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Appendix 3 
Obsessionality Priming Task 
Importance of values – Version A  Gender:  M / F      Age:          
 
List as many reasons as you can as to why: 
 
It is important to be clean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be healthy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be self-disciplined 
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Appendix 4 
Non-obsessionality priming task 
Importance of values – Version B  Gender:  M / F      Age:  
 
List as many reasons as you can as to why: 
 
It is important to have freedom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to have variation in life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be curious 
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Appendix 5 
Control group task 
Importance of different beverages     Gender:  M / F     Age:    
 
List as many reasons as you can as to why: 
 
You like or dislike tea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You like or dislike orange juice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You like or dislike fizzy drinks 
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Appendix 6 
Letter identification task 
Please work through the following passage of text putting a line through every 
letter ‘t’ ‘g’ and ‘h’.  Please use a different colour pen for each of the three 
letters and write at the bottom of the page how many of each letter there was in 
the passage of text.  Please work as quickly as you can but try to avoid making 
mistakes. 
 
 
 
When John and Cathy first saw their new home they had liked  
 
 
how big the garden was.  It was one of the things that they had  
 
 
both been looking for in a new house and they had dreamt of  
 
 
being able to grow their own vegetables, have space for a dog  
 
 
to run around and building a patio area to have parties in the  
 
 
summer with their friends.   
 
 
 
 
 
Totals   t  =    g  =    h  = 
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Appendix 7 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Please indicate your answer by ticking the appropriate box or writing in the space provided. 
 
1. Are you: 
      Male 
      Female 
 
2. What is your age in years? ………………. 
 
3. What is your ethnic group?  Choose ONE section A to E, and then tick the appropriate box to 
indicate your ethnic group. 
 
A: White 
      British 
      Irish 
      Any other White background, please state …………………………………………………………….. 
 
B: Mixed 
      White and Black Caribbean 
      White and Black African 
      White and Asian 
      Any other mixed background, please state ……………………………………………………………… 
 
C: Asian or Asian British 
      Indian 
      Pakistani 
      Bangladeshi 
      Any other Asian background, please state ………………………………………………………………. 
 
D: Black or Black British 
      Caribbean 
      African 
      Any other Black background, please state ……………………………………………………………….. 
 
E: Chinese or other ethnic group 
      Chinese 
      Any other, please state …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
      Not stated 
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Appendix 8 – Portrait Values Questionnaire 21 item version – PVQ-21 
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Appendix 9 – Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – VOCI 
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Appendix 10 – Symmetry Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire – SOAQ 
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Appendix 11 – Responsibility Attitudes Scales – RAS 
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Appendix 12 – Information Sheet 
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Appendix 13 – Consent Form 
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Appendix 14 
Photograph of ordering task 
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Appendix 15 – Sticking stars task.                                                                                           
You have five minutes to spend on this task.  You have been given some paper stars of 
different sizes.  Please use the glue provided to stick the stars onto this sheet.  Match the stars 
for size and try to be as precise as you can with how the stars are stuck to the page (i.e. make 
sure the points are stuck down as well as the middles of the stars).  Please complete each star 
in order (i.e. work along the rows one star at a time).  You are not expected to stick all of the 
stars in the time allowed and it is more important that you try to complete the task as neatly 
and carefully as possible than that you try to complete them all. 
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Appendix 16 
Funnel de-briefing script 
That was the last part of the study.  Before you go I should give you some more detailed 
information about the study. 
First, do you have any questions? 
All research studies are guided by hypotheses, which are ideas that we want to test.  We 
previously told you that we were interested in looking at the motivational structure of 
human values.  Now I’d like to give you more details about the hypotheses that we are 
testing.  We wait until the end of the session to explain the hypotheses because this makes 
it easier for you as a participant.  Psychologists have previously noted that people have 
difficulty doing tasks naturally when they are aware of the hypotheses being tested.  In fact, 
people tend to unconsciously alter their behaviour when they learn a particular hypothesis.  
So, in psychological research of this kind we often give people details about hypotheses 
after the studies are over.  This way, we don’t interfere with people’s natural responses. 
Before I describe our hypotheses, I am curious whether you had any ideas about hypotheses 
that we could, should or would test in this study?  Did any ideas pop into your mind as you 
went through the tasks? 
That’s fine, I only ask because we are curious about anything that comes up spontaneously.  
It’s ok not to have been distracted by any relevant ideas.  We simply want people to 
respond naturally and not try to guess the nature of our studies. 
OR 
That’s interesting and quite relevant to what we are examining. 
In the questionnaires that you were asked to compete we were looking at variables related 
to obsessionality and responsibility which are clinically relevant for certain mental health 
conditions.  These questionnaires have been used with students and general community 
samples before and show that there can be a wide variation in responses within the general 
population.  We wanted to measure these variables so that we could investigate whether 
being primed for values related to obsessionality would lead to more behaviours related to 
obsessionality or a difference in the way participants answered the questionnaires. 
We prime certain values by asking participants to give reasons why certain values are 
important.  Some participants are primed to values that are related to obsessionality (clean, 
healthy and self-discipline), some are primed to values that are opposed to obsessionality 
(curious, freedom and variation in life) and others are not primed to any values at all so we 
have a control group, a group that just respond naturally with no influence from us. 
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During the other tasks we were actually trying to look at the effects of priming different 
values on behaviours related to obsessionality.  We were interested in measuring how much 
time you spent checking through your work on the text crossing out task and how orderly 
you were when you put away the colouring pens at the end, for example did you put them 
away according to the colours on the pack or in some other arrangement.  In the gluing task 
we were interested in how long you were doing the task before you used a wipe to clean 
your hands.  We hope to see that priming the obsessionality values leads to more of these 
behaviours compared to the control group and that priming the opposing values leads to 
less of these behaviours compared to the control group.  We also hope to show that being 
primed for different values doesn’t affect the way people answer the questionnaires 
because then we can show that it doesn’t matter how people answered the questionnaires 
as it is the priming task that affects behaviour and not pre-existing obsessionality related 
traits. 
Hopefully, you understand the reasons why we designed the study in this way.  As 
mentioned before if you had been aware of exactly what we were studying and that we 
were measuring certain aspects of your behaviour then you may have unconsciously 
changed the way that you responded to questions and tasks and may have changed your 
behaviour.  We believe that this study could have important implications for helping us to 
understand how values can be better incorporated into therapies for people with mental 
health conditions related to obsessionality. 
Did you think about these issues at all while you were completing the questionnaires and 
tasks? (If so, ask when and code for suspicion in notes, 0=not at all, 1=possibly, 2=definitely).  
Thank you very much for participating.  This feedback sheet (give copy of debriefing sheet) 
explains more about the study and indicates where you can reach me or Dr Andrew Vidgen 
or Prof Maio if you have any questions.  You may also be interested in the readings at the 
bottom.  Thanks again for taking part.  
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Appendix 17 – Debriefing Sheet 
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Appendix 18 
Ethical approval 
 
Ethics Feedback - EC.13.10.08.3531 
 
psychethics 
Fri 18/10/2013 13:46 
To: 
Rebecca Woodfield; 
Cc: 
Gregory Maio; 
Andrew Vidgen;  
Dear Rebecca, 
 
The Ethics Committee has considered your postgraduate project proposal: The influence of priming 
social values on behaviours related to obsessionality (EC.13.10.08.3531). 
 
The project has been approved. 
 
Please note that if any changes are made to the above project then you must notify the Ethics 
Committee. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Natalie Moran 
 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
Tower Building 
Park Place 
CARDIFF 
CF10 3AT 
 
Ffôn /Telephone: +44 (0) 29 2087 0360                            
Ffacs/Fax: +44 (0) 29 2087 4858   
 
http://psych.cf.ac.uk/aboutus/ethics.html 
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Appendix 19 
Box-plots checking for extreme scores 
VOCI            SOAQ 
 
RAS            Checking Behaviour 
 
Ordering Behaviour 
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Appendix 20 
 
Boxplots for outliers 
 
VOCI         SOAQ 
 
RAS         Checking Behaviour 
 
Ordering Behaviour 
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Appendix 20 
 
Boxplots of outliers by group 
 
VOCI       SOAQ 
 
 
RAS       Checking Behaviour 
 
Ordering Behaviour 
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Appendix 21 
 
VOCI – normal distribution measures 
 
Overall  
 
 
By Group 
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Appendix 22 
 
SOAQ – normal distribution measures 
 
Overall 
 
By Group 
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Appendix 23 
 
RAS – normal distribution  
 
Overall 
 
 
By Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
Appendix 24 
 
Checking behaviour – normal distribution 
 
Overall 
 
 
By Group 
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Appendix 25 
 
Ordering behaviour – normal distribution  
 
Overall 
 
 
By Group 
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Appendix 26 
 
Skew and Kurtosis Scores 
 
Skew and kurtosis z-scores for all measures 
 Group Skew 
Statistic 
Std Error Skew z 
scores 
Kurtosis 
Statistic 
Std Error Kurtosis 
z scores 
VOCI Overall .907 .255 3.557*** -.150 .506 -0.296 
Conservation .682 .434 1.571 -.756 .845 -0.895 
Openness .907 .427 2.124* -.074 .833 -0.089 
Control 1.205 .427 2.822** .579 .833 0.695 
SOAQ Overall .738 .255 2.894** -.359 .506 -0.709 
Conservation .869 .434 2.002* -.340 .845 -0.402 
Openness .850 .427 1.991* -.149 .833 -0.179 
Control .531 .427 1.244 -.448 .833 -0.538 
RAS Overall .262 .255 1.027 -.603 .506 -1.192 
Conservation .000 .434 0.000 -1.062 .845 -1.257 
Openness .265 .427 0.621 -.227 .833 -0.273 
Control .172 .427 0.403 -1.217 .833 -1.461 
Checking 
behaviour 
Overall .437 .255 1.714 -.393 .506 -0.777 
Conservation .313 .434 0.721 -.133 .845 -0.157 
Openness .664 .427 1.555 -.292 .833 -0.350 
Control .757 .427 1.773 -203 .833 -0.244 
Ordering 
behaviour 
Overall .629 .257 2.447* -.657 .508 -1.293 
Conservation .513 .434 1.182 -.751 .845 -0.889 
Openness .973 .427 2.279* -.529 .833 -0.635 
Control .474 .434 1.092 -.497 .845 -0.588 
VOCI-SOAQ Overall 1.111 .255 4.357*** .742 .506 1.466 
Conservation .667 .434 1.537 -.964 .845 -1.141 
Openness 1.250 .427 2.927** 1.290 .833 1.549 
Control 1.339 .427 3.136** 1.439 .833 1.727 
*significant at p<.05 level 
** significant at p<.01 level 
*** significant at p<.001 level 
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Appendix 27 
 
Scatterplots  
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Appendix 28 
 
VOCI-SOAQ Box-plot for outliers and normal distribution checks 
 
 
 
 
